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United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

Report to Congressional Committees: 

February 2012: 

Humanitarian and Development Assistance: 

Project Evaluations and Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage 
the Military's Efforts: 

GAO-12-359: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-12-359 a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In recent years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has increased its 
emphasis and spending on humanitarian assistance efforts outside of 
war and disaster environments. From fiscal years 2005 through 2010, 
DOD obligated about $383 million on its key humanitarian assistance 
programs. Because civilian agencies, such as the Department of State 
and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) also 
carry out many assistance efforts, DOD’s efforts require close 
collaboration with these agencies. This report was conducted as part 
of GAO’s response to a statutory mandate and reviewed (1) DOD’s 
management of two key humanitarian assistance programs-—the 
humanitarian assistance program funded through its Overseas 
Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation and its 
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance program—-and (2) the extent to which 
DOD, State, and USAID have visibility over each others’ efforts. To 
conduct this review, GAO analyzed funding and program information, and 
interviewed officials at DOD, State, USAID, nongovernment 
organizations, and 12 U.S. embassies. 

What GAO Found: 

The Department of Defense’s (DOD) management of its key humanitarian 
assistance programs reflects both positive practices and weaknesses: 

* Alignment with strategic goals. DOD aligns its humanitarian 
assistance project planning with the goals outlined in U.S. and 
departmental strategies, and has clearly established processes for 
implementing its projects. 

* Interagency project coordination. DOD has taken steps to coordinate 
with the Department of State (State) and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) on projects, such as seeking 
concurrence on project proposals and embedding representatives from 
their agencies at its combatant commands, but coordination challenges 
remain. 

* Poor data management. DOD does not have complete information on the 
status or actual costs of the full range of its Overseas Humanitarian, 
Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) projects. In addition, Humanitarian 
and Civic Assistance project data in DOD’s database differ from what 
DOD reports to Congress. 

* Limited program evaluations. From fiscal years 2005 through 2009, 
DOD had not completed 90 percent of the required 1-year post-project 
evaluations for its OHDACA projects, and about half of the required 30-
day evaluations for those projects, and thus lacks information to 
determine projects’ effects. 

* Limited program guidance. DOD’s primary guidance for the OHDACA 
humanitarian assistance program is limited, is not readily accessible 
to all DOD personnel, and has not been updated for several years. 

Furthermore, DOD, State, and USAID do not have full visibility over 
each others’ assistance efforts, which could result in a fragmented 
approach to U.S. assistance. There are several initiatives under way 
to improve information sharing, including one directed by the National 
Security Council. However, no framework, such as a common database, 
currently exists for the agencies to readily access information on 
each others’ efforts. Moreover, the potential for overlap exists among 
agencies’ efforts in four areas: (1) health, (2) education, (3) 
infrastructure, and (4) disaster preparation. For example, both USAID 
and DOD are conducting health care projects in Yemen and building 
schools in Azerbaijan. Overlap may be appropriate in some instances, 
especially if agencies can leverage each others’ efforts. However, 
given the agencies’ information-sharing challenges, there are 
questions as to whether DOD’s efforts are an efficient use of 
resources since USAID serves as the lead U.S. development agency. 
State and USAID officials said that DOD’s humanitarian assistance 
efforts can be beneficial, especially when responding to disasters or 
supporting foreign militaries. However, officials said DOD’s efforts 
can have negative political effects, particularly in fragile 
communities where even small gestures, such as distributing soccer 
balls to a particular population, can be interpreted as exhibiting 
favoritism. While DOD’s funding for humanitarian assistance is small 
relative to the billions spent by State and USAID, its programs are 
expanding. Given interagency information challenges, the fiscally-
constrained environment, and the similarity of agencies’ assistance 
efforts, DOD and the other agencies involved in foreign assistance 
could benefit from additional direction from Congress on DOD’s role in 
performing humanitarian assistance in peacetime environments. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD update its humanitarian assistance program 
guidance, improve data management, and conduct project evaluations, 
and that DOD, State, and USAID improve information sharing. GAO also 
suggests that Congress consider clarifying DOD’s role in humanitarian 
assistance efforts. DOD partially agreed with the recommendations, and 
State and USAID agreed with the recommendations addressed to them. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-359]. For more 
information, contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or 
pendletonj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Background: 

DOD's Humanitarian Assistance Program Management Incorporates Positive 
Practices, but Several Weaknesses Hinder the Effective Use of 
Resources: 

Information-Sharing Challenges and Potential for Overlap among the 
Agencies' Efforts Could Result in a Fragmented Approach to U.S. 
Assistance Efforts: 

Conclusions: 

Matter for Congressional Consideration: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope And Methodology: 

Appendix II: DOD'S Obligations For Humanitarian Assistance Efforts By 
Combatant Command: 

Appendix III: Humanitarian Assistance Efforts In U.S. Africa Command's 
Area Of Responsibility: 

Appendix IV: Humanitarian Assistance Efforts In U.S. Central Command's 
Area Of Responsibility: 

Appendix V: Humanitarian Assistance Efforts In U.S. European Command's 
Area Of Responsibility: 

Appendix VI: Humanitarian Assistance Efforts In U.S. Northern 
Command's Area Of Responsibility: 

Appendix VII: Humanitarian Assistance Efforts In U.S. Pacific 
Command's Area Of Responsibility: 

Appendix VIII: Humanitarian Assistance Efforts In U.S. Southern 
Command's Area Of Responsibility: 

Appendix IX: Noninteractive Graphics And Text For Appendixes III-VIII: 

Appendix X: Comments From The Department Of Defense: 

Appendix XI: Comments From The Department Of State: 

Appendix XII: Comments From The U.S. Agency For International 
Development: 

APPENDIX XIII: GAO Contact And Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: State and USAID Representatives within DOD's Combatant 
Commands: 

Table 2: Key DOD, State, and USAID Information-Sharing Initiatives: 

Table 3: List of Organizations Contacted: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Completed Construction of a Primary School in Vietnam: 

Figure 2: DOD's OHDACA-Funded Humanitarian Assistance Program 
Obligations: 

Figure 3: DOD Soldier Provides Medical Treatment to a Woman in Latin 
America While Engaging in an HCA Medical Readiness Activity: 

Figure 4: DOD's Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Obligations: 

Figure 5: Completed HCA Projects Reported to Congress as Compared with 
HCA Projects Marked "Completed" in DOD's Database, Fiscal Years 2007 
through 2009: 

Figure 6: Estimates of Post-Project Evaluations for OHDACA Projects 
Costing over $10,000 for Fiscal Years 2005 through 2009: 

Figure 7: Potential for Agency Overlap in Some Peacetime Humanitarian 
and Development Assistance Efforts: 

Figure 8: Similar USAID and DOD Health Efforts in Yemen: 

Figure 9: DOD's OHDACA-Funded Humanitarian Assistance Obligations by 
Combatant Command for Fiscal Years 2005 through 2010: 

Figure 10: DOD's Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Obligations for 
Projects Conducted within the Combatant Commands' Geographic Areas for 
Fiscal Years 2005 through 2010: 

Abbreviations: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

HCA: Humanitarian and Civic Assistance: 

OHDACA: Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid: 

USAID: United States Agency for International Development: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

February 8, 2012: 

Congressional Committees: 

While much attention has been paid to U.S. military efforts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense (DOD) has also increased 
its emphasis and spending on humanitarian assistance efforts outside 
of war and disaster environments in recent years. DOD's humanitarian 
assistance efforts include constructing schools, digging water wells, 
preparing communities for natural disasters, and helping local 
populations obtain medical care. DOD policy states that stability 
operations--which include providing humanitarian assistance--are a 
core U.S. military mission that the department shall be prepared to 
conduct with proficiency equivalent to that of its combat operations. 
[Footnote 1] From fiscal years 2005 through 2010, DOD obligated about 
$383 million for its two key humanitarian assistance programs[Footnote 
2] outside of Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 3] Civilian agencies, 
such as the Department of State (State) and the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) carry out assistance efforts on 
a larger scale than DOD to build and sustain more secure and 
prosperous nations or provide economic or development support. Thus, 
DOD's humanitarian assistance efforts require close collaboration with 
these federal agencies to avoid potential duplication, unnecessary 
overlap, or fragmentation, and to maximize the return on the U.S. 
government's investment in foreign assistance. 

This report was conducted as part of GAO's annual response to the 
mandate found in Public Law 111-139, Title II, section 21 (2010), 
which requires us to report on duplication, overlap, and fragmentation 
in federal government programs. We examined the U.S. military's role 
in conducting humanitarian assistance outside of war or disaster 
environments, including its management of humanitarian assistance 
efforts and its collaboration with State and USAID.[Footnote 4] 
Specifically, we reviewed (1) DOD's management of two key humanitarian 
assistance programs--the humanitarian assistance program funded 
through its Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) 
appropriation[Footnote 5] and its Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 
(HCA) program--and (2) the extent to which DOD, State, and USAID have 
visibility over each others' assistance efforts to avoid duplication, 
unnecessary overlap, or fragmentation. 

To conduct our work, we reviewed relevant documents, including 
guidance, legislation, and data related to DOD's OHDACA and HCA 
programs. We chose to focus on these two key humanitarian assistance 
programs based on interviews with officials from the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency; the Joint Staff; and the Office of the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability 
Operations. We conducted interviews with officials from various DOD 
offices involved in planning and implementing DOD's humanitarian 
assistance efforts, including the geographic combatant commands and 
Special Operations Command. We also gathered and reviewed guidance, 
strategies, and data from State and USAID and contacted officials from 
a wide range of offices and a selection of 12 U.S. embassies. We 
selected 2 embassies within each of DOD's six geographic combatant 
commands' areas of responsibility that received the largest amount of 
OHDACA funding from fiscal years 2005 through 2010. To understand how 
much DOD has spent on its humanitarian assistance efforts, we obtained 
DOD's obligations for the OHDACA and HCA programs from fiscal years 
2005 through 2010. Specifically, for the OHDACA humanitarian 
assistance program obligations, we analyzed data from DOD's Program 
Budget Automated System and determined these data to be sufficiently 
reliable for presenting obligations from fiscal years 2005 through 
2010. To determine DOD's obligations for the HCA program, we used 
information from DOD's annual reports to Congress on the program for 
the same time period[Footnote 6]. To assess DOD's management of its 
humanitarian assistance programs, we obtained and reviewed DOD 
directives, reports, and guidance on management practices, as well as 
guidance, instructions, and other documents on interagency 
coordination between DOD and State and USAID. To assess the 
completeness of DOD's OHDACA and HCA project data, we obtained and 
analyzed data from DOD's Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared 
Information System to identify discrepancies and determine the 
accuracy of data entered in the system. We assessed these data for 
reliability and determined that the data were not sufficiently 
reliable for presenting cost and project status data, but were 
sufficiently reliable to present examples of DOD humanitarian 
assistance efforts. We discuss these data issues in this report. To 
assess the extent to which DOD measures the performance of its 
completed humanitarian assistance projects, we analyzed a 
generalizable random sample of DOD's OHDACA projects that DOD 
identified as likely to have been completed and that cost more than 
$10,000 to determine the extent to which DOD had recorded that 
performance of required project evaluations had been conducted after 
the projects were completed. We interviewed agency officials from the 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the Joint Staff, and the 
combatant commands to discuss the accuracy and completeness of project 
data in DOD's Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information 
System database and challenges to completing project evaluations. To 
assess the extent to which DOD, State, and USAID have visibility over 
each others' assistance efforts to avoid duplication, unnecessary 
overlap, or fragmentation, we reviewed guidance and documentation on 
information-sharing initiatives and interagency collaboration 
practices, and interviewed agency officials about their information-
sharing practices and challenges. We also analyzed DOD, State, and 
USAID project data to identify areas of potential overlap between the 
agencies, and interviewed DOD, State, USAID, and nongovernmental 
organization officials about the potential positive and negative 
consequences of DOD's involvement in humanitarian assistance efforts. 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2010 through 
February 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. Further details on our scope and methodology can be found 
in appendix I. 

Background: 

DOD operates two key humanitarian assistance programs: (1) the 
humanitarian assistance program funded through its OHDACA 
appropriation[Footnote 7] and (2) the HCA program.[Footnote 8] 
Projects for both the OHDACA and the HCA programs are generally 
planned and implemented at the geographic combatant command level, 
with initial project proposals developed at the embassy (country) 
level (see appendixes. II through VIII for information on each DOD 
geographic combatant command's OHDACA and HCA funding and efforts and 
appendix IX for information in non-interactive form). In addition, 
DOD's Special Operations Command conducts humanitarian assistance 
efforts through its Civil Military Support Elements, in support of 
DOD's geographic combatant commands.[Footnote 9] DOD's humanitarian 
assistance efforts have been largely performed outside of Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 

OHDACA-Funded Humanitarian Assistance Program: 

DOD uses authority provided in section 2561 of Title 10 of the United 
States Code to conduct its OHDACA program. The program is managed by 
the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, while the initial planning, 
prioritization, and implementation of projects are generally 
coordinated by the geographic combatant commands.[Footnote 10] DOD 
issued its most recent guidance on the OHDACA program in 2009 to 
provide a framework that the geographic combatant commands can use to 
evaluate the appropriateness of potential humanitarian assistance 
projects.[Footnote 11] DOD's humanitarian assistance efforts are aimed 
at: 

* improving DOD visibility, access, and influence while building 
and/or reinforcing security and stability in a host nation or region; 

* providing disaster mitigation training and/or bolstering host nation 
capacity to avert humanitarian crises and response to disasters; and: 

* generating collaborative relationships with a host nation's civil 
society as well as positive public relations and goodwill toward DOD. 

In addition to advancing U.S. defense interests, DOD's policy guidance 
states that humanitarian assistance efforts should address the 
humanitarian needs of the targeted population. As part of the OHDACA 
program, DOD conducts efforts that include disaster preparedness 
projects; basic construction; digging or improving water wells and 
other sanitation and drinking water projects; repairing/building 
rudimentary infrastructure such as roads or bridges; and the 
renovation of public facilities, such as schools, hospitals, clinics, 
and orphanages (see figure 1). 

Figure 1: Completed Construction of a Primary School in Vietnam: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: DOD. 

Notes: Kien Quoc Primary School is an OHDACA-funded school 
construction project in Vietnam that was completed in July 2010. This 
photograph illustrates a portion of a ceremony in which DOD turned 
over the completed school building to the local Vietnamese government. 

[End of figure] 

From fiscal years 2005 through 2010, DOD obligated about $328.4 
million to support the OHDACA humanitarian assistance program. In 
fiscal year 2005, DOD obligated about $45.2 million as compared with 
about $72.4 million in fiscal year 2010, which represented an increase 
in obligations of about 60 percent over the time period[Footnote 12] 
(see figure 2). Over this 6-year time period, DOD's Pacific and 
Southern Commands obligated the highest amounts--about $93.8 million 
and $75.8 million dollars, respectively (see appendix II). 

Figure 2: DOD's OHDACA-Funded Humanitarian Assistance Program 
Obligations: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2005: $45 million. 

Fiscal year: 2006: $34 million. 

Fiscal year: 2007: $56 million. 

Fiscal year: 2008: $55 million. 

Fiscal year: 2009: $63 million. 

Fiscal year: 2010: $72 million. 

Source: DOD. 

Notes: Figures represent obligations for the OHDACA humanitarian 
assistance program, as distinguished from the broader OHDACA program. 
Figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars. 

[End of figure] 

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program: 

DOD conducts its HCA program using authority provided in section 401 
of Title 10 of the United States Code. The HCA program was managed by 
the Defense Security Cooperation Agency through 2010, and Joint Staff 
officials said that the program has been managed by the Joint Staff 
since January 1, 2011. Initial planning, prioritization, and 
implementation of projects are generally coordinated by the geographic 
combatant commands. Two DOD instructions and implementing guidance 
provide direction for the HCA program.[Footnote 13] 

U.S. armed forces personnel participate in HCA efforts for strategic, 
operational, or tactical purposes that support military objectives 
while concurrently reinforcing skills required for the operational 
readiness of the forces executing an HCA mission. According to DOD 
guidance, when engaging in HCA efforts, U.S. military occupational 
specialists will provide services relevant to their specialties. For 
example, for HCA medical projects, DOD should utilize U.S. military 
doctors, dentists, nurses, pharmacists, or health administrators as 
appropriate. Furthermore, according to DOD, under existing guidance 
prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, HCA efforts should, among 
other things, 

* promote the security interests of the United States and the host 
nation as well as the specific operational readiness skills of the 
members of the U.S armed forces who participate in the efforts; 

* complement, and not duplicate, any other form of social or economic 
assistance that may be provided to the host nation by any other U.S. 
department or agency; 

* assist the civilian population, that is, projects cannot benefit any 
individual, group, or organization engaged in military or paramilitary 
activity; and: 

* be approved by the U.S. ambassador to the foreign country where the 
activity will occur or by the U.S. Secretary of State. 

HCA projects include basic construction and repair of public 
facilities; construction of surface transportation systems; 
construction of basic sanitation facilities; drilling wells for water; 
and the provision of medical, dental, surgical, and veterinary care 
(including education, training, and technical assistance) in rural or 
underserved areas of a foreign country (see figure 3). 

Figure 3: DOD Soldier Provides Medical Treatment to a Woman in Latin 
America While Engaging in an HCA Medical Readiness Activity: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 

From fiscal years 2005 through 2010 DOD obligated about $75.1 million 
in support of the HCA program. The obligations for the HCA program are 
about one quarter of the amount of the funds obligated to the OHDACA 
humanitarian assistance program, although obligations for DOD's HCA 
program have increased by about 75 percent from fiscal years 2005 to 
2010.[Footnote 14] In fiscal year 2005, DOD obligated about $8.5 
million compared with about $14.9 million in fiscal year 2010 (see 
figure 4). Over this 6-year period, obligations were the highest for 
HCA projects in DOD's Southern and Pacific Commands' geographical 
areas, at about $32.5 million and $21.9 million, respectively (see 
appendix II). 

Figure 4: DOD's Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Obligations: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Fiscal year: 2005: $9 million. 

Fiscal year: 2006: $10 million. 

Fiscal year: 2007: $12 million. 

Fiscal year: 2008: $15 million. 

Fiscal year: 2009: $14 million. 

Fiscal year: 2010: $15 million. 

Source: DOD. 

Note: Figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars. 

[End of figure] 

Other Humanitarian Assistance-Type Efforts: 

In addition to the OHDACA and HCA programs, DOD conducts other 
humanitarian assistance-type efforts, such as HIV/AIDS treatment and 
prevention assistance to foreign military personnel and their 
families. For example, from fiscal years 2005 through 2010, DOD 
obligated about $477.3 million to the President's Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and about $27.3 million on its Defense Health 
Program for HIV/AIDS efforts.[Footnote 15] DOD also conducts efforts 
to help nations in Africa and Asia respond to an influenza pandemic, 
using $15 million provided by USAID for efforts from fiscal years 2008 
through 2012. In addition, DOD has created a coordination group to 
develop global health guidance for the department and examine DOD's 
role in global health efforts. 

DOD's Humanitarian Assistance Program Management Incorporates Positive 
Practices, But Several Weaknesses Hinder The Effective Use Of 
Resources: 

DOD's management of its two key humanitarian assistance programs--
OHDACA and HCA--has incorporated positive practices, such as aligning 
project planning to U.S. and departmental strategic goals and 
collaborating with State and USAID on individual projects. However, 
DOD is unable to determine whether it is using its resources 
efficiently and effectively because of three key weaknesses in 
management oversight: (1) incomplete project information because of 
data management problems, (2) the absence of post-project evaluations 
for determining the effects of DOD's efforts, and (3) limited guidance 
for the OHDACA program. 

DOD Aligns Humanitarian Assistance Project Planning to Strategic Goals 
and Has Clearly Established Processes for Implementing Projects: 

Recognizing that strategic plans are the starting point and 
underpinning for setting program goals, DOD has generally aligned its 
OHDACA and HCA project planning to U.S. and departmental strategic 
goals, and it has clearly established processes for project 
implementation. DOD's policy guidance supports the use of DOD's 
humanitarian assistance efforts to achieve U.S. national security and 
foreign policy goals. Moreover, DOD's Guidance for Employment of the 
Force and its Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan require each 
geographic combatant command to produce a theater campaign plan and 
specific posture requirements for its given area of responsibility. 
[Footnote 16] Combatant command officials told us that they link the 
goals of their humanitarian assistance projects to specific goals or 
objectives identified in the command's theater campaign plan or in 
DOD's overarching strategic planning guidance. For example, Northern 
Command officials said they develop a prioritized list of potential 
humanitarian assistance projects each year based in part on identified 
missions, goals, and priorities from the command's theater campaign 
plan. Similarly, Central Command stated that requirements for its 
OHDACA projects are derived from the command's theater campaign plan 
objectives. 

In addition, DOD has clear processes in place for planning, 
prioritizing, and implementing OHDACA projects. Policies, procedures, 
techniques, and mechanisms that enforce management's directives are an 
integral part of an entity's planning, implementing, reviewing, and 
accountability for stewardship of government resources and achieving 
effective results.[Footnote 17] The overall OHDACA program is managed 
by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, while the planning, 
prioritization, and implementation of projects generally are 
coordinated through the geographic combatant commands. Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency officials explained that their office 
provides funding for the OHDACA program to the combatant commands in 
response to annual budget requests submitted by the commands. They 
said that when providing funds, they review factors such as the 
commands' past funding levels and how commands have executed past 
funding. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency also reviews and 
approves all individual projects that cost more than $10,000, and 
officials explained that its review considers the justifications for a 
command's project proposals and whether a project is aligned with the 
command's strategic guidance. The initial planning and development of 
OHDACA projects for all of the combatant commands, except for Northern 
Command, are generally conducted at the country level with input 
required from USAID officials.[Footnote 18] Some of the commands 
permit project proposals to be initiated by host nations or other 
government agencies, such as USAID. The processes for prioritizing 
individual OHDACA projects vary across the commands. For example, 
Pacific Command has recently developed an activity prioritization 
process that involves assigning points for the degree to which a 
project meets established criteria, while at Central Command, 
officials said that projects are prioritized according to the assets 
available to execute a project in a given country. Many of the 
commands use entities such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or the 
Naval Facilities Command to implement their projects. 

The HCA program was managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
through 2010, and Joint Staff officials said that the program has been 
managed by the Joint Staff since January 1, 2011. Joint Staff 
officials explained that they serve in a quality assurance role to 
ensure that projects have been coordinated among the combatant 
commands, interagency stakeholders, and host nations. They also said 
that the Joint Staff reviews and approves HCA projects. The overall 
planning, prioritization, and implementation of HCA projects generally 
are coordinated by the geographic combatant commands, similar to the 
OHDACA program.[Footnote 19] Initial project planning and development 
at all of the combatant commands are generally conducted at the 
country level, with input from State officials, and the processes for 
prioritizing and implementing HCA projects can vary across the 
commands. For example, Pacific Command's business rules require the 
same approach for prioritizing, approving, and implementing HCA 
projects that it uses for OHDACA projects, as discussed above, and 
European Command explained that it budgets its projects through the 
command's typical operation and maintenance budgeting process. 

DOD Is Coordinating with State and USAID When Implementing Projects, 
but Challenges Remain: 

Over the past several years, DOD has taken several steps to coordinate 
with State and USAID when planning and implementing its humanitarian 
assistance projects. For example, DOD guidance on its OHDACA program 
states that DOD will seek USAID concurrence on project proposals early 
in the project identification process, and certain information 
concerning that collaboration will be documented in DOD's project 
database. Moreover, DOD's guidance on its HCA program states that 
combatant commanders are responsible for ensuring that HCA projects 
that cost more than $10,000 are conducted with the approval of the 
Secretary of State or his/her designee. DOD has representatives from 
USAID or State embedded within each of its geographic combatant 
commands, and it has placed liaisons at State and USAID offices (see 
table 1). Officials from all three agencies said that these 
interagency personnel at the commands have helped improve coordination 
with DOD, although the roles and quantity of these interagency 
personnel may be limited. For example, some State and USAID officials 
explained that their advisors assigned to DOD's combatant commands are 
able to report on what is happening in their respective areas of 
responsibility but cannot make decisions or speak on behalf of their 
home agencies.[Footnote 20] Moreover, according to USAID officials, 
USAID made the decision to begin sending lower-ranking officials to 
serve as development advisors in most of the combatant commands 
because of staffing shortages. Officials from both USAID and DOD said 
that this decision could negatively affect interagency collaboration 
at the commands because DOD tends to place a heavy emphasis on rank, 
and lower-ranking USAID officials may not have as much access to 
senior command leadership. 

Table 1: State and USAID Representatives within DOD's Combatant 
Commands: 

Combatant command: Africa Command; 
State: 10; 
USAID: 3; 
Total: 13. 

Combatant command: Central Command; 
State: 3; 
USAID: 3; 
Total: 6. 

Combatant command: European Command; 
State: 3; 
USAID: 2; 
Total: 5. 

Combatant command: Northern Command; 
State: 3; 
USAID: 0; 
Total: 3. 

Combatant command: Pacific Command; 
State: 5; 
USAID: 2; 
Total: 7. 

Combatant command: Southern Command; 
State: 7; 
USAID: 2; 
Total: 9. 

Sources: DOD and USAID. 

Notes: Personnel are stationed at the combatant commands' 
headquarters. Also, USAID officials identified additional positions at 
some of the combatant commands, but these positions are currently 
vacant. 

[End of table] 

Each of the 12 U.S. embassies we contacted cited examples of efforts 
to promote interagency coordination. For example, the U.S. embassy in 
Kenya has created an Executive Steering Group consisting of officials 
from State, USAID, and DOD who meet monthly to discuss DOD's 
humanitarian assistance projects and other efforts that intersect with 
larger diplomatic and development objectives. Similarly, the U.S. 
embassies in the Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova have established 
assistance working groups made up of interagency officials who meet at 
least weekly to coordinate U.S. government assistance efforts, 
including DOD's humanitarian assistance projects, across the embassy. 
Several other embassies that we contacted have also established 
interagency groups to facilitate coordination, such as those in 
Albania, Peru, Uganda, and Djibouti. In addition, DOD's Pacific 
Command has begun its "3Ds Forward" initiative intended to improve 
coordination among DOD, State, and USAID efforts in the Asia Pacific 
region.[Footnote 21] 

Despite all of these various collaboration efforts, DOD faces 
challenges in interagency collaboration on its humanitarian assistance 
projects. Specifically, many officials stated that interagency 
collaboration tends to be personality driven; when staff are replaced, 
relationships have to be rebuilt and progress can be lost. Moreover, 
coordination on DOD's humanitarian assistance projects can be 
difficult given the differences in total numbers of personnel among 
DOD, State, and USAID. DOD has about 30 times more personnel than 
State and USAID combined.[Footnote 22] USAID officials said that their 
agency has staffing shortages, and it can be a burden on USAID 
personnel to have to coordinate and provide expertise to DOD on DOD's 
humanitarian assistance projects. Officials also said that the 
frequent rotation of personnel can lead to continuity challenges. 

DOD Does Not Have Complete Information on the Full Range of Its 
Humanitarian Assistance Projects: 

DOD does not have complete information on the full range of 
humanitarian assistance projects it conducts, which creates 
uncertainty as to whether DOD is able to provide accurate, complete 
project information to other offices within the department, to 
interagency stakeholders, or to Congress. 

DOD Does Not Know The Status Or Actual Costs Of All Of Its OHDACA 
Projects: 

DOD does not know the status of all of its OHDACA projects--such as 
when a project is going to be implemented, when it is in progress, or 
when and if it has been completed--or the actual costs of nearly one 
in three of its OHDACA projects because it does not consistently 
update project information in its database, the Overseas Humanitarian 
Assistance Shared Information System. It is important that agencies 
have complete, accurate, and consistent data to inform policy, 
document performance, and support decision making.[Footnote 23] Our 
analysis of a DOD list of OHDACA projects[Footnote 24] that had been 
marked as "completed" in DOD's database found the data to be 
incomplete and inaccurate. For example, DOD's list indicated that 35 
projects had been completed by Pacific Command in fiscal years 2005 
through 2010, fewer than had been completed by each of the other 
combatant commands except for Northern Command. Yet Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency officials told us that Pacific Command was one of 
the two commands that conducted the most projects in the same time 
frame. In addition, the total cost recorded in the database for these 
35 projects was about $5 million, while Pacific Command's actual 
obligation for its OHDACA projects during this same period was almost 
$89 million. In response to our efforts to clarify these 
discrepancies, the officials acknowledged that the number of projects 
that had actually been completed was likely underrepresented in the 
list. They explained that DOD personnel do not consistently update the 
projects' status in the database, and thus many projects that were 
completed had probably not been reflected as such in the database. 
Officials from several combatant commands confirmed that keeping DOD's 
database updated was a challenge because of issues such as having a 
limited number of personnel available to work on OHDACA projects. 
However, without updated project information, DOD does not have 
accurate information to make program management decisions or report 
information to other agencies or to Congress. 

In some cases, DOD may have better information about its OHDACA 
projects at the country level. When we sought information from some 
DOD personnel stationed at U.S. embassies who were responsible for 
OHDACA projects in those countries, officials at some embassies were 
able to provide us with additional details about whether projects had 
been completed. For example, officials from the U.S. embassies in 
Bangladesh and Moldova were able to provide us with more recent 
information than that found in DOD's database about the current status 
of projects. However, officials from U.S. embassies in Indonesia, 
Kenya, and Uganda responded to our inquiries with the same information 
that was available in DOD's database--which may not have been accurate. 

In addition to not knowing the status of all of its projects, DOD does 
not know how much it has spent on some OHDACA projects because its 
database is not consistently updated with actual cost information 
after projects have been completed. Across all of the geographic 
combatant commands from fiscal years 2007 through 2010, DOD had not 
updated its database with projects' actual cost information about 30 
percent of the time for projects that were identified as 
completed.[Footnote 25] Although DOD officials said that the Overseas 
Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System database is not used 
for financial management purposes,[Footnote 26] the database contains 
fields for estimated and actual project costs that officials said 
should be updated by personnel at the combatant commands. DOD 
officials explained that this project cost information is intended to 
be used for program management purposes, so that they can review the 
extent to which the projects' actual costs differed from the projects' 
estimated costs identified when they were submitted for approval. DOD 
officials acknowledged that the combatant commands do not consistently 
update the cost information in the database. They also said that 
maintaining accurate project cost information in the database is a 
challenge because information cannot be automatically pulled in from 
DOD's financial management systems. 

DOD's Data On HCA Projects Differ From Those Reported To Congress: 

DOD's database also does not provide complete information about HCA 
projects, with information in the database differing from what has 
been reported to Congress. DOD is required to submit reports annually 
to Congress on its HCA program.[Footnote 27] Officials from the Joint 
Staff and the combatant commands told us that they use the Overseas 
Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System database to manage 
and track their HCA projects.[Footnote 28] However, we found that the 
number of HCA projects marked as completed in DOD's database was far 
fewer than the number of completed HCA projects that were reported to 
Congress each year from fiscal years 2007 through 2009,[Footnote 29] 
which raises concerns about how HCA project records are being updated 
and tracked in DOD's database. Figure 5 shows the number of completed 
HCA projects identified in DOD's reports to Congress as compared with 
the number of HCA projects marked completed in DOD's database. 

Figure 5: Completed HCA Projects Reported to Congress as Compared with 
HCA Projects Marked "Completed" in DOD's Database, Fiscal Years 2007 
through 2009: 

[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph] 

Projects marked completed in database: 262; 
Projects reported complete to Congress: 848. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Notes: At the time of our review, DOD had not submitted a report to 
Congress on fiscal year 2010 HCA projects. Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency officials told us that the data for fiscal years 
2005 and 2006 might not be reliable, so we excluded those 2 fiscal 
years from this analysis. 

[End of figure] 

A Defense Security Cooperation Agency official said that the HCA 
project information reported to Congress was provided by each 
combatant command to the agency, and agency officials did not know 
from where the combatant commands obtained the information. However, 
when we asked officials from each of the combatant commands where they 
record information about their HCA projects, they all responded that 
they use the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information 
System database to manage their HCA projects. Our analysis of the 
information in DOD's database showed that the HCA data in the database 
varied by combatant command. For example, the database showed that 
only 2 HCA projects had been marked completed for Pacific Command and 
6 projects had been marked completed for Southern Command from fiscal 
years 2007 through 2009. However, DOD's reports to Congress listed at 
least 81 completed projects for each of these commands in each fiscal 
year over the same time frame. The HCA project data in the database 
appeared to be more comprehensive for Africa, European, and Central 
Commands from fiscal years 2007 through 2009, in that the number of 
projects marked completed or funded in the database was generally 
closer to the number of projects included in the report to Congress. 
Our analysis of the information in DOD's reports to Congress also 
showed that some inaccurate information about HCA projects may have 
been reported. For example, DOD's fiscal year 2008 report to Congress 
included descriptions for what appeared to be the same projects in 
both Tanzania and Uganda that were reported for both DOD's Africa and 
Central Commands. However, an Africa Command official stated that the 
projects should have been listed only for Central Command in DOD's 
report to Congress because Central Command funded the projects. 
[Footnote 30] 

DOD's combatant commands generally continue to program and budget for 
new projects, even though DOD lacks complete information in its 
database about past OHDACA or HCA projects. Officials said that DOD is 
currently in the process of updating its guidance for both of its 
humanitarian assistance programs, which provides the department a 
timely opportunity to develop procedures to ensure that the 
information in its database is complete, accurate, and consistent. 
However, without requiring complete data on its humanitarian 
assistance efforts and imposing consequences, such as requiring 
complete data on previous projects as part of the approval process for 
new projects, DOD may not have essential information to inform future 
planning about its projects and will not be well positioned to provide 
accurate information about its humanitarian assistance efforts to 
interested parties. 

DOD Is Not Consistently Evaluating Projects and Cannot Be Certain Its 
Projects Are Effective: 

DOD is not consistently evaluating its projects, and therefore it 
cannot determine whether its humanitarian assistance efforts are 
meeting their intended goals, having positive effects, or represent an 
efficient use of resources. 

Project Evaluation Requirements Are Not Consistently Followed: 

DOD has established project evaluation requirements but is not 
consistently following them. For the OHDACA program, DOD guidance 
states that "after-action reviews," or project evaluations, are to be 
conducted for all projects within 30 days of project completion. 
[Footnote 31] For projects costing more than $10,000, a second 
evaluation should be conducted 1 year after project completion to 
document sustained outcomes. We drew a generalizable random sample of 
OHDACA projects that DOD identified as likely to have been completed 
and that cost more than $10,000. From fiscal year 2005 through fiscal 
year 2009, we estimated that 1-year evaluation reports were not 
completed for 90 percent of these projects, and that the 30-day 
evaluation reports were not completed for about half, or about 53 
percent of these projects (see figure 6).[Footnote 32] Officials 
across DOD acknowledged that project evaluation was an area of 
weakness and cited several reasons why the department was not 
consistently performing project evaluations, including lack of 
personnel available to conduct evaluations, difficulties visiting 
project sites because of political instabilities within some 
countries, and confusion concerning the amount of funding available to 
perform project evaluations.[Footnote 33] 

Figure 6: Estimates of Post-Project Evaluations for OHDACA Projects 
Costing over $10,000 for Fiscal Years 2005 through 2009: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

30-day evaluations: 
47% of 579 projects (270) had completed evaluations. 

1-year evaluations: 
10% of 579 projects (60) had completed evaluations. 

Source: GAO analysis of Defense Security Cooperation Agency data. 

Notes: Figure is based on a generalizable random sample of projects 
that DOD identified as likely to have been completed. The margin of 
error for these estimates is no more than plus or minus 10 percentage 
points at the 95 percent level of confidence. In addition, we estimate 
that 10 percent of the projects identified as likely to have been 
completed had not in fact been completed, meaning that no assessments 
were due at the time that we reviewed the project files. 

[End of figure] 

Because of concerns over the completeness and reliability of data in 
DOD's database of HCA project information, we did not generate and 
analyze a sample of HCA projects from the database. However, it is 
also likely that DOD is not conducting evaluations for HCA projects. 
DOD's combatant commands are required to prepare midyear and end-of-
year reports that cover all HCA projects conducted during those time 
frames, and to broadly assess their overall HCA efforts within 2 
fiscal years. Joint Staff officials told us that they did not monitor 
whether evaluations of HCA projects have been completed prior to 
January 1, 2011, when they began managing the HCA program, and that 
completing the evaluations is a combatant command responsibility. 
Joint Staff officials said that they are currently reviewing project 
evaluations at each combatant command, and that beginning in February 
2012, they plan to address project evaluations in their monthly 
teleconferences with the commands. However, officials from several 
combatant commands told us that evaluations of HCA projects are often 
not completed or that there is minimal follow-up after projects are 
completed. While one of the purposes of HCA projects is to train 
military personnel, Joint Staff officials said that determining the 
long-term effects of their projects is important and that they plan to 
propose language emphasizing the importance of long-term project 
evaluations in DOD's updated HCA policy guidance. The lack of 
consistent project evaluations appears to be a long-standing problem 
in the HCA program. In 1993, we reported that DOD's combatant commands 
were not evaluating their HCA programs. Moreover, we reported that HCA 
projects did not always meet the host country's needs, and that some 
projects were not being maintained or used. We recommended at that 
time that the commands evaluate their HCA projects and determine their 
effectiveness, and that DOD ensure that projects contribute to U.S. 
foreign policy objectives and have the full support of the host 
nation.[Footnote 34] 

Agency managers need performance information to ensure that programs 
meet intended goals, assess the efficiency of processes, and promote 
continuous improvement.[Footnote 35] Without consistently evaluating 
its projects, DOD lacks information to demonstrate tangible positive 
or negative effects of many of its projects. Furthermore, Congress 
needs information to determine whether a program is working well in 
order to support its oversight of agencies and their budgets. 
Officials from many of DOD's combatant commands told us that 
humanitarian assistance projects help them gain access and influence 
in foreign nations, build valuable relations, or promote stability in 
foreign countries or regions. For example, DOD officials asserted that 
vaccinating cattle in Uganda helps counterterrorism efforts in 
Somalia, but they did not provide any documentation to support this 
position.[Footnote 36] Moreover, we have previously reported instances 
of unintended consequences because of problems such as the lack of 
information on past DOD projects.[Footnote 37] For example, DOD 
officials had discovered a dilapidated school in Kenya with a placard 
noting that the school had been donated by the department. However, 
the existence of the school was unknown to current DOD staff in the 
region, and its poor condition could promote unfavorable views of the 
U.S. military. While DOD officials, for example, expressed confidence 
that such instances were no longer occurring, without consistently 
evaluating projects, DOD cannot be certain of project consequences--
whether positive or negative. 

DOD Has Not Addressed Lack Of Project Evaluations Or Assessments Of 
Long-Term Effects: 

Although there is widespread consensus among DOD offices and all of 
the geographic combatant commands that project follow-up is an area of 
weakness, DOD has not assessed its evaluation process or requirements 
to determine whether changes are needed to employ a more risk-based 
evaluation approach in order to strategically allocate resources. 
Given concerns expressed by officials from several combatant commands 
regarding the costs associated with conducting project evaluations and 
their resource limitations, it may be inefficient to evaluate some of 
DOD's lower-cost humanitarian assistance projects, as there might not 
be a sufficient return on investment to justify the expenses 
associated with performing the follow-up. We have advocated for a 
comprehensive risk management approach as a framework for decision 
making that assesses the values and risks of various courses of action 
as a tool for reexamining defense programs, setting priorities, and 
allocating resources, and that provides for the use of performance 
measures to assess outcomes.[Footnote 38] Under such a risk-based 
approach, it is possible that not all humanitarian assistance projects 
would need to be evaluated. 

Moreover, officials from several combatant commands said that it is 
difficult for them to measure the long-term effects of DOD's 
humanitarian assistance efforts. However, several resources exist that 
DOD could potentially leverage to assess its humanitarian assistance 
efforts over the long term.[Footnote 39] For example, in 2011, the 
RAND Corporation developed the Prototype Handbook for Monitoring and 
Evaluating DOD Humanitarian Assistance Projects that was designed as a 
guide for planning and executing project assessments for both OHDACA 
and HCA projects. Some combatant command officials said that they were 
aware of the RAND Corporation handbook and were beginning to use it. 
In addition, State and nongovernmental organization officials 
suggested that DOD examine resources such as the Sphere 
Project,[Footnote 40] which has developed minimum standards to achieve 
in humanitarian response as well as key indicators that can be used to 
show whether a standard has been attained. Furthermore, USAID requires 
performance management plans, which are tools to plan and manage the 
process of monitoring, evaluating, and reporting on progress toward 
achieving its assistance objectives. It has also developed performance 
indicators in areas such as democracy and governance and for the 
HIV/AIDS programs to help assess their progress.[Footnote 41] USAID 
and State both recently issued new evaluation policies that emphasize 
the importance of project follow-up. 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency officials said that the new 
version of DOD's project database, the Overseas Humanitarian 
Assistance Shared Information System, will have expanded features that 
will better enable DOD to capture whether the long-term goals of its 
humanitarian assistance projects have been met. For example, the 
agency stated that in developing the new version of the database, 
particular attention has been paid to facilitating and simplifying 
ease of use in order to encourage the capture of relevant data from 
users. Specifically, officials said that there will be check boxes to 
indicate whether project evaluations have been completed, and the 
database will automatically send e-mail messages to project 
stakeholders to alert them of the need to complete the required 
evaluations. In addition, the officials said that the database will 
contain specific evaluation questions based on the project's goals. 
These aspects of the database were still under development at the time 
of our review, and thus we were unable to review the evaluation 
questions or assess whether they will incorporate some of the 
indicators mentioned above. While these changes, if implemented, could 
help address some of DOD's project evaluation weaknesses, until DOD 
reviews its project evaluation requirements to make any necessary 
changes, measures the long-term impact of its efforts, and 
consistently conducts its required evaluations, the department will be 
unable to determine whether these efforts are an effective use of 
DOD's resources in an increasingly constrained fiscal environment. 

DOD's Guidance for Its Largest Humanitarian Assistance Program Is 
Limited: 

DOD has not issued a departmental instruction to guide the OHDACA 
program. The two primary sources of guidance that DOD uses for the 
OHDACA program--a policy cable and a chapter in DOD's security 
assistance management manual[Footnote 42]--have not been updated in 
several years. The guidance is limited and not easily accessible to 
all DOD personnel, which could contribute to misinterpretation. For 
example, several officials told us they believed that OHDACA funds 
could not be used to perform assessments of completed humanitarian 
assistance projects. While there are some restrictions on the use of 
OHDACA funds for program evaluation, DOD attorneys confirmed that two 
required OHDACA project evaluations--at 30 days and at 1 year after 
project completion--could be properly funded as part of the OHDACA 
program. Furthermore, the cable, last updated in 2009, is only 
disseminated to a limited number of people and is not readily 
accessible to all DOD personnel. Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
officials also acknowledged that the guidance in the security 
assistance management manual, last updated in 2003, is out of date and 
does not reflect the current operating environment. 

DOD has issued two departmental instructions for the HCA program, 
which receives less funding than the OHDACA program. As a departmental 
practice, DOD issues instructions for certain programs, which 
establish policy or provide general procedures for implementing 
policy. Defense Security Cooperation Agency officials explained--and 
officials from several combatant commands agreed--that issuing a 
departmental instruction would be helpful in ensuring that everyone 
shares a common understanding of the humanitarian assistance program, 
the processes and guidelines for these projects, and the roles and 
functions of the relevant players and agencies. Moreover, an 
instruction could help facilitate consistency in program 
implementation, which is especially important given the frequent 
rotations of military personnel. Officials indicated that DOD is in 
the process of reexamining the existing guidance and plans to issue an 
instruction and updated guidance for the OHDACA program in early 2012. 
Until DOD issues an instruction and updated guidance for the ODHACA 
humanitarian assistance program, there could be continued confusion or 
inconsistency in how the combatant commands implement the program. 

Information-Sharing Challenges And Potential For Overlap Among The 
Agencies' Efforts Could Result In A Fragmented Approach To U.S. 
Assistance Efforts: 

DOD, State, and USAID do not have full visibility over each others' 
assistance efforts, which could result in a fragmented approach to 
U.S. assistance. While the agencies have various initiatives under way 
to share information about their humanitarian or development 
assistance efforts, they face two main challenges: (1) the initiatives 
are not interoperable or coordinated across the agencies and (2) the 
agencies use different terminology to describe similar assistance 
efforts. Without full visibility over each others' efforts, the 
potential exists for unnecessary overlap in U.S. assistance efforts, 
which ultimately raises questions about DOD's expanding role in 
providing humanitarian assistance. 

Initiatives Are Under Way to Improve Interagency Information Sharing, 
but Challenges Remain: 

Various initiatives are under way to improve visibility over the 
agencies' assistance efforts, but there is no framework, such as a 
common database, to readily share information across the agencies. DOD 
guidance requires collaboration and coordination with USAID, and with 
State as appropriate, when planning humanitarian assistance efforts. 
[Footnote 43] Our prior work has also cited the importance of 
information sharing to facilitate interagency collaboration on 
national security issues.[Footnote 44] Interagency information sharing 
can be especially important given the shift toward transnational 
threats that may require a broader perspective to effectively plan and 
implement humanitarian assistance efforts. For example, issues such as 
pandemic outbreaks, disaster response and management, and food 
security are all complex issues that necessitate coordination across 
the agencies. In addition, we have identified as a good collaborative 
practice the need to establish compatible policies, procedures, and 
other means to operate across agency boundaries, including compatible 
standards and data systems.[Footnote 45] 

Several Initiatives Are In Progress To Improve Information Sharing, 
But They Lack Coordination: 

DOD, State, and USAID recognize the need to improve information 
sharing, and they have begun to take steps to address the challenge. 
For example, officials within the agencies are attempting to enhance 
working-level coordination through efforts such as the 3D Planning 
Group,[Footnote 46] which aims to examine DOD's, State's, and USAID's 
different strategic planning efforts. The 3D Planning Group works to 
develop an environment where the agency officials can resolve 
interagency planning challenges and institutionalize processes to 
improve collaboration on interagency planning. However, according to 
participants, the planning group is an ad hoc effort--participation is 
voluntary, outside of other responsibilities, and it may not be a high 
priority for the agencies. Moreover, as shown in table 2, the agencies 
have various technological initiatives under way to improve 
information sharing. 

Table 2: Key DOD, State, and USAID Information-Sharing Initiatives: 

Information-sharing initiative: Foreign Assistance Dashboard; 
Goals: Collect and provide all U.S. government foreign assistance 
information in a standard, accessible, and easy-to-use format; 
Lead agency: Initiative directed by the National Security Council and 
implemented by State and USAID; 
Participating agencies: Currently limited to State, USAID, and the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation; 
Intended audience: General public, foreign nations, Congress, U.S. 
government agencies, and donors. 

Information-sharing initiative: Foreign Assistance Coordination and 
Tracking System (FACTS Info)[A]; 
Goals: Collect and report data on PEPFAR foreign assistance funding 
for HIV/AIDS; 
Lead agency: State and USAID; 
Participating agencies: All PEPFAR implementing agencies; 
Intended audience: Currently limited to PEPFAR implementing agencies, 
with the intent to share information with all FACTS Info users. 

Information-sharing initiative: Overseas Humanitarian Assistance 
Shared Information System; 
Goals: Manage the life cycle of DOD's OHDACA-funded and HCA 
humanitarian assistance projects; 
Lead agency: DOD; 
Participating agencies: DOD supplies project data; 
State and USAID have access to review data; 
Intended audience: DOD and U.S. government agencies. 

Information-sharing initiative: Global Theater Security Cooperation 
Management Information System; 
Goals: Link all of the combatant commands' and DOD components' 
security cooperation efforts in one system; 
Lead agency: DOD; 
Participating agencies: Initially limited to DOD; 
Intended audience: Initially to be an internal database for DOD, with 
the intent to share information across all interagency partners. 

Information-sharing initiative: Foreign Assistance Database; 
Goals: Compile and report U.S. foreign assistance data annually; 
Lead agency: USAID; 
Participating agencies: Nineteen agencies; 
Intended audience: Donor countries from the Development Assistance 
Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; 
the database is also available to the general public. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD, State, and USAID data. 

Notes: PEPFAR is the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. 
PEPFAR is led by State, but is an interagency effort to prevent and 
treat HIV/AIDS around the world. 

DOD's two key humanitarian assistance programs are the humanitarian 
assistance program funded through DOD's OHDACA appropriation and the 
HCA program, which is funded by the military services through their 
operation and maintenance funds appropriations. 

[A] FACTS Info supports U.S. foreign assistance budget formulation and 
execution for State and USAID, and enables the management of planning 
and reporting requirements, and is not limited to PEPFAR data. We 
chose to highlight the use of FACTS Info to share PEPFAR data as an 
example of how the system can be used to share information. 

[End of table] 

While these initiatives may help improve information sharing, many 
involve similar stakeholders and audiences, and officials told us that 
currently the various agencies' initiatives are not interoperable or 
coordinated. For example, State officials told us that there is some 
overlap between the data compiled for the Foreign Assistance Database 
and those compiled for the Foreign Assistance Dashboard. Furthermore, 
while the Foreign Assistance Dashboard and Foreign Assistance Database 
will contain information from the same data request, it is not 
expected that the two systems will be able to share information, and 
officials from DOD, USAID, and State confirmed that their information-
sharing initiatives are not interoperable with other agencies' 
initiatives. Officials responsible for the Foreign Assistance 
Dashboard, Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking System, and 
Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System said 
that as these systems are refined, their intended audiences will 
expand to include many of the same participants and users, and thus 
coordination will be critical in order to avoid unnecessary overlap. 

Officials said that interagency information sharing can be challenging 
at the agency headquarters level because communication can be 
informal, ad hoc, or personality driven. For example, State officials 
said that the agencies generally do not share information or 
communicate their budgetary plans for humanitarian and development 
assistance. Officials from DOD, State, and USAID thought that the 
extent to which interagency communication occurs tends to be 
personality driven and can vary based on the individuals involved. 
Furthermore, DOD officials said that collaboration can be difficult 
because when new staff members arrive, they have to rebuild 
relationships to facilitate information sharing, and progress in 
coordinating humanitarian assistance projects across the agencies can 
be lost. USAID officials also stated that coordination with DOD varies 
by country and can depend largely on how well stakeholders within the 
country share information. According to National Security Staff, 
different agencies have said that there would be benefits to having 
information about all U.S. government foreign assistance efforts 
readily available in a centralized manner, but that there are 
challenges to developing a framework for formal interagency 
information sharing because the agencies collect data on their efforts 
differently and the data are not always readily available. 

However, our outreach to 12 U.S. embassies identified practices at the 
country level to facilitate information sharing among DOD, State, and 
USAID officials, and all cited specific examples of positive 
collaboration and coordination occurring within the embassies. For 
example, officials from the U.S. embassy in Bangladesh engage in 
weekly working group meetings in which DOD, State, and USAID officials 
plan, prioritize, and coordinate how to implement humanitarian 
assistance efforts in the country. Officials cited examples of 
cooperation between USAID and DOD to build cyclone shelters and 
provide medical relief to poor populations as instances where 
information sharing across the agencies has led to the effective 
coordination of efforts. U.S. embassy officials in Kenya said that as 
a result of the information sharing that occurs during their 
interagency working group meetings, they were able to ensure that DOD 
and USAID did not duplicate each others' efforts to sponsor exchanges 
among religious figures in Kenya. However, there may also be 
information-sharing challenges at the embassy level. For example, 
officials from the U.S. embassy in Indonesia cited several challenges 
to interagency collaboration, including the lack of formalized 
coordination and information-sharing mechanisms. 

Agencies Use Different Terminology To Describe Similar Efforts: 

Officials from DOD, State, and USAID told us that a basic challenge 
affecting their ability to share information is that the agencies use 
different terminology to describe similar assistance efforts. To 
facilitate collaboration, agencies need to address the compatibility 
of standards, policies, procedures, and data systems that will be used 
in the collaborative efforts. Collaborating agencies may need to find 
common ground while still satisfying their respective operating 
needs.[Footnote 47] Yet the use of different terminology among federal 
agencies as well as nongovernmental organizations can hinder 
communication and can be especially challenging with the frequent 
rotation of personnel. For example, according to DOD officials, DOD 
uses the term humanitarian assistance to describe its strategically 
planned assistance, such as OHDACA-funded and HCA efforts. DOD also 
conducts foreign humanitarian assistance to relieve or reduce the 
results of natural or man-made disasters or endemic conditions. By 
contrast, USAID and State refer to immediate, life-saving relief as 
"humanitarian assistance" but other capacity building efforts as 
"development assistance." According to State, the international 
community--including nongovernmental organizations, national 
governments, the United Nations, and other international 
organizations--generally use the same terminology as USAID and State 
when referring to their assistance efforts. 

DOD officials explained that the terminology they use to describe 
their efforts is derived from their legislative authority to perform 
humanitarian assistance, and DOD and USAID officials said that DOD 
uses "humanitarian assistance" rather than "development assistance" to 
ensure that the department is not perceived as performing development 
efforts that are outside of its legislatively prescribed areas of 
responsibility. In addition, officials from DOD, State, and USAID said 
they use different terminology to refer to similar efforts, in part 
because they do not have the same goals or funding sources for their 
efforts. However, officials from all three agencies agreed that this 
differing terminology is an obstacle to the effective sharing of 
information. For example, DOD officials who were engaged in 
implementing some of DOD's humanitarian assistance efforts told us 
that differences in terminology can create challenges in understanding 
the scope and nature of each others' efforts. State officials said 
that the differing terminology creates challenges to setting goals or 
objectives when planning with each other. USAID officials said that an 
interagency working group was formed a few years ago to try to develop 
a common terminology, but the task proved too difficult and the group 
dissolved. Several officials agreed that having a better understanding 
of other agencies' terminology for assistance efforts would facilitate 
information sharing or collaboration across the agencies. 

Without guidance to understand each others' terminology and a 
framework to effectively share information, the agencies do not have 
full visibility over each others' assistance efforts, which could lead 
to "stove-piped" planning, uninformed budgetary decisions, and a 
fragmented approach to the U.S. government's humanitarian and 
development assistance efforts. 

DOD Has Military Goals for Humanitarian Assistance, but Potential for 
Overlap Exists with State and USAID in Four Key Areas: 

DOD conducts humanitarian assistance efforts to advance U.S. military 
interests, but performs efforts similar to those of State/USAID. 
Without full visibility over each others' efforts, the potential for 
unnecessary overlap may exist.[Footnote 48] 

DOD Has Several Goals For Humanitarian Assistance: 

DOD generally conducts humanitarian assistance efforts through its 
OHDACA and HCA programs to advance U.S. military interests, and its 
efforts can primarily be grouped into four sectors of assistance: 
health, education, infrastructure, and disaster preparation. DOD's 
humanitarian assistance efforts are aimed at improving DOD visibility, 
access, and influence while building and/or reinforcing security and 
stability in a host nation or region; providing disaster mitigation 
training and/or bolstering host nation capacity to avert humanitarian 
crises and response to disasters; and generating collaborative 
relationships with a host nation's civil society as well as positive 
public relations and goodwill toward DOD. DOD's combatant commands 
identified additional goals for the humanitarian assistance program. 
For example, Africa Command stated that by improving the living 
conditions of local populations, some humanitarian assistance programs 
may help in countering terrorists or violent extremist organizations. 
European and Southern Command officials stated that a primary goal of 
their humanitarian assistance programs is to gain access to certain 
areas in order to engage with local governments, militaries, and 
populations in support of U.S. strategic objectives. Central Command 
officials said that a benefit of performing humanitarian assistance is 
that in addition to building the capacity of a foreign nation, the 
efforts can also build trust and confidence of the local populations 
in their government. One of the primary goals of DOD's HCA program is 
to promote operational readiness skills of U.S. servicemembers, along 
with improving basic economic and social needs of foreign nations. 

In comparison, State and USAID, as the lead agencies for foreign 
relations and development, respectively, generally perform similar 
development assistance efforts as DOD, but on a much larger scale to 
benefit foreign nations and advance development goals. For example, to 
further its diplomatic mission, State provides assistance to build and 
sustain more democratic, secure, and prosperous foreign nations that 
respond to the needs of their people. State's efforts address a wide 
range of foreign policy issues, including those related to climate 
change, counterterrorism, democracy and human rights, economics, 
energy security, food security, health, narcotics, trafficking in 
persons, and women's issues. USAID, to further its development 
mission, provides economic, development, and disaster response 
assistance around the world in support of U.S. foreign policy and 
development goals. USAID provides assistance in areas such as 
agriculture, democracy and governance, economic growth and trade, the 
environment, education and training, global health, humanitarian 
assistance, and disaster response. Overall, State and USAID obligated 
almost $50 billion to certain development assistance efforts outside 
of Iraq and Afghanistan from fiscal years 2005 through 2010.[Footnote 
49] 

DOD'S Efforts Could Potentially Overlap With Those Of State/USAID: 

Although the agencies have different reasons for conducting their 
humanitarian assistance or development efforts, they perform similar 
efforts in the areas of health, education, infrastructure, and 
disaster preparation, and without full visibility over each others' 
efforts, there is the potential for some overlap (see figure 
7).[Footnote 50] Overlap in efforts may be appropriate in some 
instances, especially if agencies can leverage each others' efforts. 
In other instances, overlap may be unintended, may be unnecessary, or 
may represent an inefficient use of U.S. government resources. For 
example, USAID officials said that the agencies' having differing 
goals for assistance can create foreign policy challenges in sending a 
clear and coherent message to the country receiving assistance. 

Our review of DOD's humanitarian assistance projects from 2005 through 
2010 revealed that DOD and State/USAID are engaging in similar efforts 
within the four sectors. For example, DOD and State/USAID are 
performing similar education projects by building schools and 
supplying school supplies, and they are both improving health care by 
training medical personnel, building hospitals, and providing medical 
supplies and vaccinations. DOD and State/USAID are also performing 
similar infrastructure projects, such as drilling wells and 
constructing sanitation facilities, and similar disaster preparation 
projects by training first responders and helping communities 
establish plans to respond to natural disasters. 

Figure 7: Potential for Agency Overlap in Some Peacetime Humanitarian 
and Development Assistance Efforts: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration: data and overlapping spheres] 

Selected agencies' missions: 

USAID: 
USAID's mission is to accelerate human progress in developing 
countries by reducing poverty, advancing democracy, building market 
economies, promoting security, responding to crises, and improving 
quality of life.  

State: 
State's mission is to advance freedom for the benefit of the American 
people and the international community by helping to build and sustain 
a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed of well-
governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce 
widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international 
system.  

DOD: 
DOD's mission is to provide the military forces needed to deter war 
and to protect the security of  the United States. 

USAID/State: DOD: 
Areas of overlap: 
* Health care; 
* Infrastructure; 
* Disaster preparation; 
* Education. 
    
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and USAID data. 

Notes: Graphic does not represent a numerical calculation. 

For the purposes of our analysis, we defined health care efforts as 
providing medical care, assistance, and education on basic health care 
issues, building hospitals and clinics, or providing medical 
equipment; education efforts as training teachers, providing school 
supplies, or building educational facilities; infrastructure efforts 
as drilling wells and building roads, bridges, or rudimentary 
structures; and disaster preparation efforts as helping foreign 
nations plan for, prepare for, and respond to natural disasters. 

[End of figure] 

We also found several examples of overlap in the types of efforts 
conducted by DOD and USAID within specific countries. For example, in 
Haiti, both USAID and DOD have performed efforts to improve disaster 
response preparation: USAID has worked with the Haitian government to 
improve early warning systems and develop comprehensive plans to 
prepare and respond to disasters, and DOD has developed an earthquake 
preparedness program for internally displaced Haitians. DOD has also 
performed disaster preparation efforts in Indonesia, where USAID is 
developing disaster risk reduction programs to support U.S. government 
climate change goals in the country. Officials from the U.S. embassy 
in Indonesia stated that the efforts between DOD and USAID on their 
disaster management efforts will need to be well coordinated to 
prevent duplication because there is not currently a formal method for 
the agencies to coordinate and communicate about these efforts. In 
Yemen, USAID has renovated health clinics and provided medical 
supplies to support pre-and postnatal care and other basic health care 
services, while DOD has used mobile health care clinics to provide 
basic medical care to rural populations (see figure 8). In addition, 
both DOD and USAID have built schools and education facilities in 
Azerbaijan and have worked to upgrade and rehabilitate water wells in 
Pakistan. 

Figure 8: Similar USAID and DOD Health Efforts in Yemen: 

[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs] 

USAID: 
A Yemeni doctor vaccinates an infant in a USAID-sponsored clinic.  

DOD: 
A local doctor explains medicine dosage amounts to patients at the 
Sahab clinic in Bani Momon, Yemen, during a DOD Medical Civic Action 
Plan project to provide free health care to local villagers. 

Sources USAID and DOD. 

[End of figure] 

Officials from DOD, State, USAID, and nongovernmental organizations 
identified some areas where they believed that DOD is well suited to 
provide foreign assistance, such as providing military-to-military 
assistance to foreign militaries or helping foreign nations respond to 
natural disasters in their countries. For example, DOD provides 
military-to-military support by educating foreign militaries on 
HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention and training them in disaster 
response techniques. Officials from State, USAID, and nongovernmental 
organizations also stated that DOD's greater resources, personnel, and 
logistics support capabilities can be helpful when responding to a 
disaster. In addition, State and nongovernmental organization 
officials said that with its greater resources and personnel, DOD 
could help to fill gaps in areas not met by State and USAID efforts 
because of differences in the agencies' capacities. For example, 
nongovernmental organization officials said that DOD's greater 
capacity can be beneficial when undertaking large infrastructure 
projects, such as constructing roads and bridges. An official from 
State cited similar benefits, stating that DOD can be helpful when 
civilian capacity is overwhelmed or when rapid infrastructure projects 
are necessary to repair roads and bridges, which would then help 
facilitate civilian relief efforts. USAID officials also said that DOD 
can play an important role in supporting USAID's development work by 
providing security for USAID staff in hostile environments, such as in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, where USAID staff are unable to move as freely. 

Potential Negative Effects Heighten Concern About DOD's Efforts: 

DOD has recognized that, in the past, mistakes have occurred within 
its humanitarian assistance programs, and DOD officials said they have 
tried to incorporate lessons learned into the programs' management. 
However, officials from State, USAID, and nongovernmental 
organizations cited a number of potential negative consequences that 
could result from DOD performing humanitarian assistance efforts. 
Officials from DOD, State, and USAID said that some DOD personnel may 
lack expertise and education on performing development assistance-type 
work in foreign nations.[Footnote 51] Officials from USAID and State 
also said that because of DOD's military goals for humanitarian 
assistance efforts, the department may view its efforts from a more 
short-term, security-oriented perspective, as compared with the long-
term, development-oriented perspective generally taken by civilian 
agencies. For example, the officials said that DOD may not fully 
consider the potential political or social implications of performing 
humanitarian assistance projects in a country, which could lead to 
unintended consequences or misused resources. A State official 
explained that foreign assistance is often provided to fragile 
communities with complex dynamics, and even seemingly small projects, 
such as distributing soccer balls or candy, can have consequences, 
such as neighboring villages interpreting the U.S. government as 
favoring one community over another. Officials cited a few examples 
where negative effects had occurred because of DOD projects: 

* European Command officials said that DOD had built a hospice care 
center for HIV/AIDS patients in a town in the Ukraine that was 
received negatively based on the local community's perspective on the 
disease. Officials said that because these cultural sensitivities were 
not considered, the local community was not supportive of the project 
and European Command did not achieve the intended goal of gaining 
access and influence in the Ukraine. 

* U.S. embassy officials in Uganda said that DOD personnel had built a 
library but did not ensure staffing of a librarian or provide books 
and bookshelves. The library sat empty for a year before USAID 
renovated the structure as a war memorial and research center for 
victims of the Lord's Resistance Army insurgency. 

* U.S. embassy officials in Lebanon described an incident in which DOD 
officials did not coordinate with USAID on a school renovation project 
and demolished a portion of the school's roof that had previously been 
built by USAID. 

USAID and nongovernmental organization officials also stated that 
DOD's involvement in humanitarian assistance efforts to advance 
military interests like counterterrorism or global security can cause 
distrust among the communities receiving assistance. Moreover, 
officials from several nongovernmental organizations expressed concern 
about experiencing distrust from the local population or having their 
safety jeopardized when DOD personnel perform humanitarian assistance 
efforts. Furthermore, State, USAID, and nongovernmental organization 
officials stated that DOD's projects may not be well sustained because 
they may not be monitored and evaluated once they are completed. We 
have previously reported on similar concerns about the sustainability 
of USAID's projects because of challenges in monitoring and evaluating 
some of their development projects.[Footnote 52] 

DOD's Role in Humanitarian Assistance May Need Reexamination: 

GAO is required to identify federal agencies, programs, and 
initiatives that may have duplicative goals or activities in order to 
assist Congress as it reexamines federal priorities and policy 
decisions in a fiscally-constrained environment. The current 
legislation guiding DOD's OHDACA program was originally enacted in the 
early 1990s and has been amended several times, most recently in 2003, 
but does not provide detailed guidance on DOD's role in providing 
humanitarian assistance. The legislation allows DOD to, among other 
things, use funds authorized for humanitarian assistance to provide 
transportation of humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian 
purposes worldwide. DOD's various humanitarian assistance efforts 
currently performed under the OHDACA program are carried out under 
this authorization. Moreover, DOD's OHDACA program has grown by about 
60 percent from fiscal years 2005 through 2010 even though it faces 
several management issues cited in this report. DOD's Quadrennial 
Defense Review states that while DOD can and should have the expertise 
and capacity to perform capacity-building activities in foreign 
nations, civilian leadership of humanitarian assistance, development, 
and governance is essential.[Footnote 53] State officials expressed 
concern that DOD's involvement in foreign assistance has increased 
significantly, especially with its involvement in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Furthermore, officials from DOD, State, and USAID all 
suggested that Congress provide additional clarification on the roles, 
missions, and responsibilities of the agencies involved in 
humanitarian and development assistance. 

In some cases, DOD has recognized that some humanitarian assistance-
type projects may be better performed by civilian agencies. For 
example, a Southern Command official stated that the command suggested 
a reduction in its 2011 OHDACA funding for its humanitarian assistance 
program because the Combatant Commander had perceived that certain 
routine humanitarian assistance efforts (such as building schools and 
hospitals) would be better performed by USAID. The Southern Command 
Commander instead wanted to focus the command's humanitarian 
assistance efforts and funds on helping foreign nations respond to 
natural disasters. In addition, USAID officials cited examples in 
which DOD transferred funding to USAID to perform humanitarian 
assistance efforts. For example, in Sri Lanka in fiscal years 2008 and 
2009, DOD transferred OHDACA funding to USAID to build schools, 
hospitals, and clinics; and in Morocco, USAID officials said that, in 
fiscal year 2009, DOD transferred funding to USAID when the agencies 
learned that they were performing similar infrastructure projects in 
the country. 

While there is limited guidance on DOD's role in performing 
humanitarian assistance activities, the U.S. government has clearly 
identified the importance of development to achieving the nation's 
strategic goals and the agencies responsible for development 
activities. For example, the Presidential Policy Directive on Global 
Development highlights the importance of development activities toward 
achieving U.S. national security interests and expresses a commitment 
to rebuilding USAID as the lead U.S. agency for development.[Footnote 
54] The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review further states 
that State and USAID are called upon to lead and advance U.S. foreign 
policy objectives (as set forth in the National Security Strategy and 
the Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development) through 
diplomacy and development, with USAID serving as the lead agency for 
development.[Footnote 55] While USAID is described as the lead agency 
for development assistance, USAID planning officials told us that in 
their view they do not have the ability to control or monitor DOD's 
humanitarian assistance efforts. Without visibility or oversight over 
DOD's humanitarian assistance projects, it can be difficult to 
determine whether DOD's projects necessarily or unnecessarily overlap 
with those of the other agencies and whether DOD's projects are 
achieving their desired goals. Given several factors--the fiscally-
constrained environment, the President's recently expressed commitment 
to rebuilding USAID as the lead U.S. development agency, and the 
similarity of assistance efforts being performed by DOD, State, and 
USAID--DOD and the other agencies involved in foreign assistance could 
benefit from additional direction from Congress on DOD's role in 
performing humanitarian assistance in peacetime environments. Such 
additional direction could help maximize the use of resources and 
reduce the potential for the unnecessary overlap of efforts. 

Conclusions: 

At a time of severe budget challenges, improved management and an 
examination of the U.S. military's expanding role in providing 
humanitarian assistance outside of wartime or disaster environments 
are warranted. DOD aligns its two main peacetime humanitarian 
assistance programs, OHDACA and HCA, with its departmental strategic 
goals and coordinates projects with USAID or State. However, until DOD 
addresses several management weaknesses--such as inaccurate project 
information, absent project evaluations, and limited departmental 
guidance--it cannot readily inform the Congress or the U.S. taxpayer 
as to whether its humanitarian assistance efforts represent the most 
efficient and effective use of resources. Moreover, employing a risk-
based approach to project evaluations and consistently measuring the 
long-term effects of its humanitarian assistance efforts could help 
DOD determine whether its efforts are achieving their goals and having 
lasting benefits, or whether changes are needed in the planning or 
implementation of its projects. 

On a broader level, while the funding devoted to DOD's humanitarian 
assistance efforts outside of Iraq and Afghanistan is small relative 
to State's and USAID's larger-scale development programs, DOD has 
nonetheless spent hundreds of millions of dollars over the past few 
years on efforts that could potentially overlap with those conducted 
by the civilian agencies. As the boundaries continue to blur between 
U.S. diplomacy, development, and defense efforts, interagency 
information sharing becomes paramount. Working together to develop a 
common terminology and framework to share information on their 
respective humanitarian and development assistance efforts could 
provide DOD, State, and USAID with an increased understanding of each 
others' programs as well as improved transparency, enhanced 
interagency planning, and a more efficient use of U.S. tax dollars for 
foreign assistance. Notwithstanding the importance of improving 
interagency communication, potential for overlap among some DOD 
efforts and those of State and USAID is still likely to exist even 
with the establishment of a framework to readily share information. In 
some cases, overlap among the agencies' efforts may be appropriate. 
However, given the current budget climate and concerted efforts by the 
administration and Congress to reduce government spending, a 
congressional examination of the legislation governing DOD's OHDACA 
program could help clarify the intended role of DOD in performing 
humanitarian assistance, taking into account the efforts of the 
civilian agencies and budgetary circumstances. 

Matter For Congressional Consideration: 

As part of an examination of multiple programs and government 
functions at a time of fiscal constraint, and to help reduce the 
potential for overlap among agencies' efforts, Congress should 
consider the role of DOD in conducting humanitarian assistance efforts 
and consider amending the legislation that supports the OHDACA program 
to more specifically define DOD's role in humanitarian assistance, 
taking into account the roles and similar types of efforts performed 
by the civilian agencies. If Congress chooses to modify the 
legislation, Congress may wish to consider clarifying the different 
terminology used by DOD, other federal agencies, and the international 
community regarding such efforts. 

Recommendations For Executive Action: 

To improve the management of DOD's humanitarian assistance efforts and 
ensure that projects are having lasting, beneficial effects, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five 
actions: 

* Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to help improve 
consistency in program implementation by issuing a departmental 
instruction and updating accompanying guidance on DOD's OHDACA 
humanitarian assistance program. In issuing the updated guidance, the 
department may wish to consider further clarifying the use of OHDACA 
funds for specific project evaluation purposes. 

* Direct the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency to take the 
following actions: 

- Require that the combatant commands and other DOD users of the 
Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System database 
provide complete and timely updates to OHDACA humanitarian assistance 
project information within the system. 

- Employ a risk-based approach to review and modify project evaluation 
requirements for the OHDACA humanitarian assistance program to measure 
the long-term effects of humanitarian assistance projects, and take 
steps to ensure compliance with the requirements. 

* Direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to take the following 
actions: 

- Require that the combatant commands and other DOD users of the 
Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System database 
provide complete and timely updates to HCA project information within 
the system. 

- Employ a risk-based approach to review and modify project evaluation 
requirements for the HCA program to measure the long-term effects of 
projects and take steps to ensure compliance with the requirements. 

To improve transparency and oversight and to maximize the benefits 
derived from U.S. government resources devoted to humanitarian and 
development assistance efforts, we recommend that the Secretaries of 
Defense and State and the Administrator of USAID take the following 
two actions: 

* Develop a framework to formalize interagency information sharing on 
humanitarian/development assistance efforts, such as a common 
database. Such a framework could involve selecting an existing 
initiative, such as the Foreign Assistance Dashboard, to be used by 
all agencies for their assistance efforts or taking steps to 
facilitate interoperability among the agencies' existing independent 
mechanisms. 

* Collaborate to develop guidance that provides a common understanding 
of the terminology used by DOD, State, and USAID related to their 
humanitarian and development assistance efforts. 

Agency Comments And Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, USAID, the Office of 
Management and Budget, and the National Security Staff for review and 
comment. DOD partially agreed with our recommendations and cited some 
actions that it was taking to address the issues we identified in this 
report. State and USAID agreed with the two recommendations addressed 
to State, USAID, and DOD to improve interagency transparency and 
oversight, and also cited some actions that the three agencies were 
taking to address these concerns. The National Security Staff did not 
provide comments. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix X, State's 
comments are reprinted in appendix XI, and USAID's comments are 
reprinted in appendix XII. Technical comments were provided separately 
by DOD, State, USAID, and the Office of Management and Budget and were 
incorporated as appropriate. 

DOD partially agreed with our first recommendation that DOD issue a 
departmental instruction and update guidance on the OHDACA 
humanitarian assistance program to improve consistency in program 
implementation. The department said that it is currently in the 
process of updating the policy guidance for the OHDACA humanitarian 
assistance program, with the intent to use this guidance as the 
foundation for a DOD instruction on humanitarian assistance. DOD 
further stated that the updated guidance will clarify current guidance 
requiring the combatant commands to assess the performance and 
effectiveness of humanitarian assistance projects in meeting their 
intended objectives. We note in our report that DOD is in the process 
of reexamining the existing policy guidance for its humanitarian 
assistance projects, and agree that the updated guidance should serve 
as the foundation for a DOD instruction to provide consistency in 
program implementation, clearly distinguish the processes and 
guidelines for humanitarian assistance projects, and identify the 
roles and functions of relevant stakeholders and agencies. However, 
the department is unclear when the guidance will be finalized and when 
a formal DOD instruction will be developed or issued. Without clear 
guidance on how the combatant commands should implement and evaluate 
the OHDACA humanitarian assistance program, there will likely continue 
to be confusion and inconsistency in the program's execution. 
Moreover, the department's response does not clearly state whether the 
updated guidance will clarify the ability to use OHDACA funds to 
conduct project evaluations, which was a source of confusion 
identified by the combatant commands and DOD officials. The department 
also noted in its response that we had addressed the recommendation to 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and 
Stability Operations in our draft report but that this official does 
not issue departmental instructions. We agree with DOD's comment and 
have updated our report to state that the Secretary of Defense should 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to issue the 
departmental instruction and accompanying program guidance. 

DOD partially agreed with our second recommendation that the combatant 
commands and other DOD users be required to provide complete and 
timely updates on OHDACA humanitarian assistance projects in the 
Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System database. 
The department stated that it recognizes that providing complete and 
timely updates to its database is a concern, and that the Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency has begun developing a second version of 
the database to address these deficiencies for data beginning in 
fiscal year 2012. The department also stated that it believes the new 
database, the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information 
System 2.0, will address the concern of ensuring complete and timely 
updates, and that there is no need to direct the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency to implement a requirement for users to update the 
database. The department further noted that it intends to utilize the 
capabilities of the new Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared 
Information System to tie humanitarian assistance funding for the 
combatant commands and other DOD users to the completion of timely 
information in the system. Our report acknowledges that the Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency is developing a new version of the 
Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System but noted 
that many of the improvements to the system are still under 
development and unproven at this time. We agree that many of the 
planned improvements for the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared 
Information System, such as e-mail alerts to users to update 
evaluations and simplifying the ease of using the database, could make 
for a more complete management and reporting system. Our review also 
states that requiring complete data on previous projects could be 
included as part of the process for approving new projects to ensure 
that combatant commands and DOD users are updating information about 
their humanitarian assistance projects. However, we remain concerned 
that, without explicit guidance from the Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency--the OHDACA program manager--or a set time frame for complete 
data on humanitarian assistance projects to be entered into the 
Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System, the 
department may continue to program and budget for new efforts without 
complete and accurate information about projects' costs, status, and 
effects. 

DOD also partially agreed with our third recommendation that the 
Secretary of Defense direct the Director of the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency to employ a risk-based approach to review and 
modify project evaluation requirements for the OHDACA humanitarian 
assistance program to measure the long-term effects of humanitarian 
assistance projects and to take steps to ensure compliance with the 
project evaluation requirements. In its response, the department 
stated that it is in the process of refining its project evaluation 
requirements, and current efforts include identifying ways to make 
project evaluations less burdensome to encourage completion, 
establishing methods to ensure compliance with evaluation 
requirements, and refining data collection methods to make project 
evaluations more useful. According to DOD, key components of these 
efforts are expected to be completed by the third and fourth quarters 
of fiscal year 2012. The department also noted that given the lack of 
project evaluation data currently available, it may take some time to 
formulate a complete and reliable risk-based approach to project 
evaluation requirements, and more data must first be collected. We 
agree that the efforts identified by DOD are necessary to ensure 
compliance with project evaluation requirements and accurately measure 
and monitor the long-term effects of the department's humanitarian 
assistance projects. Furthermore, we understand that implementing a 
comprehensive risk-based approach may take some time, and as our 
report noted, it will be important for the department to consider 
changes to its current evaluation process to more strategically 
allocate resources, as it may be inefficient to evaluate some lower-
cost humanitarian assistance projects. We maintain that until the 
department reviews and updates its project evaluation requirements, 
and ensures compliance with the requirements, it will be unable to 
determine whether its efforts are achieving their goals, or whether 
the projects are an effective use of DOD's resources in an 
increasingly constrained fiscal environment. 

DOD agreed with our fourth recommendation that the Secretary of 
Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to require 
the combatant commands and other DOD users to provide complete and 
timely updates on HCA projects in the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance 
Shared Information System database. The department stated that since 
taking responsibility for the HCA program in January 2011, the Joint 
Staff has begun making improvements to address management issues 
identified in our review. Its response states that the release of the 
upgraded version of DOD's Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared 
Information System database in December 2011 standardizes input for 
project reviews and improves communication and coordination within DOD 
and across other agencies. As noted in our review, there are 
significant differences between the HCA data reported in the Overseas 
Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System and the data 
reported to Congress, despite the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance 
Shared Information System being used by each of the combatant commands 
to record information on its HCA projects. Moreover, we reported that 
DOD officials were uncertain where the combatant commands obtained the 
information on HCA projects that was reported to Congress. While 
upgrades to the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information 
System represent a positive step toward improving communication and 
coordination over the HCA program, until the department establishes 
and enforces requirements for the combatant commands to enter complete 
data on their HCA projects in the database, the department risks not 
having the information necessary to plan its projects and may continue 
to provide incomplete information to Congress on its HCA activities. 

DOD also agreed with our fifth recommendation that the Secretary of 
Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to employ a 
risk-based approach to review and modify project evaluation 
requirements for the HCA program to measure the long-term effects of 
projects and to take steps to ensure compliance with the project 
evaluation requirements. The department noted that the Joint Staff has 
made improvements in the management of the HCA program, including 
addressing data gaps and coordinating with the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations 
to revise the HCA guidance. In addition, the department stated that 
the Joint Staff has established monthly teleconferences with the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and 
Stability Operations, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and the 
combatant commands to clarify policy guidance and discuss best 
practices. We noted these monthly teleconferences in our report, as 
well as the Joint Staff's intention to begin reviewing project 
evaluations for each combatant command starting in February 2012 as 
positive steps. The department also stated that in January 2012 the 
Joint Staff would begin developing an updated version of the Overseas 
Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System for HCA projects, 
and additional guidance for assessing HCA projects, to be informed by 
the Defense Security Cooperation Agency's concurrent risk-based 
approach for evaluating project effectiveness. The department's 
response also notes that the Global Theater Security Cooperation 
Management Information System may provide a solution to the problems 
of reporting and tracking HCA projects; however, according to DOD 
officials, this system is still under development with no identified 
time frame for implementation. We state in our report that the lack of 
consistent HCA project evaluations is a long-standing problem that 
will require additional guidance and enforcement by the Joint Staff to 
ensure that HCA projects are effective at both training military 
personnel and contributing to U.S. foreign policy objectives. While 
progress is being made to establish assessment guidance and begin 
consistently reviewing whether the combatant commands have completed 
required project evaluations, these actions alone may not result in an 
increased number of completed evaluations. Until there is clear 
guidance and enforcement of project evaluation requirements, the 
department will continue to lack information about the long-term 
effects of its HCA projects, and the Joint Staff and Congress will be 
challenged to provide oversight to determine whether the program is 
meeting its intended goals and represents an effective use of 
resources. 

DOD, State, and USAID agreed with our sixth recommendation that the 
three agencies develop a framework to formalize interagency 
information sharing, such as using a common database, for humanitarian 
and development assistance efforts. DOD, State, and USAID noted that 
the agencies have taken steps to improve information sharing across 
the agencies, which we cite in our report, and that all three agencies 
will continue to explore additional venues to coordinate their 
efforts. DOD stated that it will engage with State and USAID to 
determine what information-sharing mechanisms could be used to enhance 
information sharing, and noted that it has already taken some steps to 
do so by providing State and USAID with access to DOD's Overseas 
Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System database. They also 
noted that DOD's database has a framework in place to be able to share 
data with systems such as the Foreign Assistance Dashboard, and that 
attributes in the Foreign Assistance Dashboard could be adopted in the 
Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System to 
facilitate information sharing. While our report notes that DOD's 
database is not currently interoperable with State and USAID's 
databases, it is encouraging that there are opportunities for the 
agencies to restructure their systems to facilitate information 
sharing as our report recommends. State's response noted that it is 
currently in discussions with DOD and USAID about broadening the 
Foreign Assistance Dashboard to include DOD's efforts, and that it is 
working on developing country-specific strategic plans to facilitate 
coordination and planning across the agencies. We note in our report 
that information sharing, planning, and coordination appear to work 
well at the country level, but a standardized approach to information 
sharing across the agencies is needed for full visibility over each 
others' humanitarian and development assistance efforts. USAID stated 
that it will continue to explore information-sharing opportunities 
with DOD and State, but said that there are challenges to sharing 
information because each agency has separate databases that are not 
integrated, a challenge we recognize in our report. Our report 
underscores that the development of a framework to formalize 
interagency information sharing, in the form of a common, 
interoperable database, is necessary to improve coordination of each 
of the agencies' programs, as well as to prevent overlap and an 
inefficient use of resources. 

DOD, State, and USAID also agreed with our seventh recommendation that 
the three agencies collaborate to develop guidance that provides a 
common understanding of the different terminology used by DOD, State, 
and USAID to describe their humanitarian and development assistance 
efforts. DOD stated that although the agencies use different 
terminology because of differences in their authorities and mission 
sets, that a better understanding of the terms the agencies use would 
help to facilitate coordination on similar types of projects. DOD 
further stated that it will work with State and USAID to identify a 
scope and time frame for issuing guidance on a common terminology. We 
state in our report that DOD's terminology is derived from DOD's 
legislative authority to perform humanitarian assistance, and 
officials from DOD, State, and USAID agreed that differences in the 
agencies' terminology are an obstacle to basic communication and 
information sharing. For example, State noted in its technical 
comments that while DOD uses different terminology to ensure that it 
is not perceived as performing development efforts that are outside of 
its legislative authority, DOD's activities do not conform with the 
definition of humanitarian assistance used by State, USAID, and the 
international community, and this can be a barrier to cooperation 
across the agencies. USAID noted that development and humanitarian 
assistance are the domain of the civilian authorities, with a limited 
role for DOD where its unique capabilities are needed. USAID stated 
that clarification of distinct objectives, conditions, and terms of 
engagement of civilians and military in what is called humanitarian 
assistance by both DOD and USAID would be helpful, and new terminology 
would also help distinguish the distinct goals and roles and 
responsibilities. State and USAID both stated that the agencies are 
working toward improving collaboration and coordination across the 
agencies through the 3D Planning Group, and that this group could 
potentially work to develop guidance on a common set of terminology. 
We recognize efforts of the 3D Planning Group in our report, but note 
that officials from the group said it is an ad hoc effort that is not 
a high priority for the agencies. Our report highlights that the use 
of different terminology can hinder communication across the agencies, 
and we maintain that without guidance that promotes a better 
understanding of each others' terminology, the agencies are at risk of 
taking a fragmented approach to their humanitarian and development 
assistance efforts. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the 
Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development. In 
addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions 
to this report are listed in appendix XIII. 

Signed by: 

John H. Pendleton: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable John Kerry: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Relations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Howard L. Berman: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To conduct our work, we reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) guidance, 
including the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review; DOD guidance on the 
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) humanitarian 
assistance and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) programs; and 
the combatant commands' theater campaign plans and other command 
guidance. We also reviewed relevant legislation authorizing the OHDACA 
and HCA programs found in sections 2561 and 401 of Title 10 of the 
United States Code, respectively. We chose to focus on these two key 
DOD humanitarian assistance programs based on discussions with 
officials at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations. During the course 
of our review, we contacted officials at a wide range of agencies and 
offices, including officials at 12 U.S. embassies. Our selection of 
embassies consisted of 2 embassies located with each combatant 
command's geographical area of responsibility that resided in 
countries with the largest amounts of OHDACA-funded humanitarian 
assistance projects from fiscal years 2005 through 2010. We decided to 
limit the scope of our review of other federal offices to the 
Department of State (State) and United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) because DOD guidance for its OHDACA and HCA 
programs provides requirements for coordination with these agencies. 
We met with officials at the Department of Health and Human Services 
early during the review before making the decision to limit the scope 
to State and USAID. 

To understand how much DOD had obligated for its OHDACA humanitarian 
assistance efforts, we analyzed data from DOD's Program Budget 
Automated System and determined these data to be sufficiently reliable 
for presenting obligations from fiscal years 2005 through 2010. To 
determine DOD's obligations for the HCA program, we used information 
from DOD's annual reports to Congress on the program for the same time 
period.[Footnote 56] We limited our analysis to DOD's obligations in 
fiscal years 2005 through 2010 because DOD issued guidance in 2005 
that emphasized the importance of stability operations, which include 
humanitarian assistance, and DOD officials also told us that data 
prior to fiscal year 2005 may not be reliable. We also included 
context information on other selected DOD military-to-military 
humanitarian assistance-type efforts that help improve the well-being 
of foreign populations, including HIV/AIDS efforts. We performed data 
reliability checks on the information DOD officials gathered from 
financial databases by requiring officials to complete questionnaires 
about data entry and quality control procedures. We determined that 
the data were reliable to present annual obligations for DOD 
humanitarian assistance for fiscal years 2005 through 2010. 

To understand the strategic goals and assistance efforts of State and 
USAID, we reviewed guidance and documents from these agencies, 
including the fiscal years 2007-2012 State/USAID joint strategic plan; 
State's 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review; the USAID 
Policy Framework 2011-2015; several U.S. embassy mission resource 
strategic plans and country operational plans; State and USAID's 
evaluation policies for their programs; and USAID descriptions of 
programs within specific countries.[Footnote 57] We also reviewed a 
fact sheet on the 2010 Presidential Policy Directive on Global 
Development and relevant legislation on foreign assistance. We met 
with State and USAID officials to identify funding accounts for 
development efforts similar to those performed by DOD, and obtained 
State and USAID obligations by funding account for fiscal years 2005 
through 2010. We analyzed USAID's and State's obligations by account 
and fiscal year to identify these agencies' total spending on 
development assistance activities comparable to the humanitarian 
assistance projects performed by DOD. 

To assess DOD's management of the OHDACA and HCA programs, we 
considered successful management practices, as identified in our prior 
work. Specifically, we identified critical management steps and 
practices that can help agencies to achieve success, including (1) 
aligning projects to strategic goals and establishing procedures and 
mechanisms, (2) coordinating with stakeholders, (3) collecting 
complete and accurate data, (4) measuring performance, and (5) 
developing policies to help achieve results. To determine the extent 
to which DOD aligned projects to strategic goals, established 
processes for its programs, coordinated with interagency stakeholders, 
and established guidance, we analyzed relevant documents and 
interviewed DOD, State, and USAID officials at the headquarters and 
combatant command levels. To assess DOD's processes and guidance for 
the OHDACA and HCA programs, we reviewed relevant statutes; DOD 
directives, instructions, joint publications, and other guidance; and 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency and combatant command guidance, 
business rules, and other documentation pertaining to the OHDACA and 
HCA programs. To assess coordination of projects with stakeholders, we 
analyzed documentation, such as guidance, organizational charts, 
budgetary documents, and interagency memorandums of understanding, and 
other relevant documents, and determined the number of interagency 
personnel located at each of DOD's geographic combatant commands. In 
addition, we interviewed officials from many DOD offices involved in 
these two programs, such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
the Joint Staff, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense's Office of General Counsel, and each of 
DOD's six geographic combatant commands and its Special Operations 
Command, as well as officials from State and USAID at both the 
headquarters and combatant command levels, to obtain their 
perspectives on DOD's processes, guidance, and coordination in 
planning and implementing its humanitarian assistance efforts. 

To evaluate DOD's information management of its humanitarian 
assistance projects, we analyzed reports from DOD's Overseas 
Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System database of all 
OHDACA and HCA projects that were identified as completed in the 
database from fiscal years 2005 through 2010.[Footnote 58] To 
determine the extent to which OHDACA project information was complete 
and accurate in the database, we reviewed a report of OHDACA projects 
that had been marked as completed, and noted that the number of 
projects listed for some combatant commands was small compared to what 
we had expected based on our discussions with DOD officials. We then 
compared the total amount of funding for OHDACA projects conducted by 
each combatant command in the reports of completed projects to the 
total obligation amounts that appeared in the program funding data 
provided by DOD officials and identified discrepancies. To determine 
the extent to which actual costs for OHDACA projects were recorded in 
DOD's database, we analyzed the reports of OHDACA projects that had 
been marked as completed in the database from fiscal years 2007 
through 2010.[Footnote 59] We determined that actual cost information 
was present in the database if the actual cost field contained any 
value greater than $1.[Footnote 60] To determine the extent to which 
DOD had complete and accurate data about its HCA projects, we compared 
the total number of HCA projects that had been marked as completed in 
the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System HCA 
project reports to the total number of completed projects identified 
in DOD's HCA reports submitted annually to Congress in fiscal years 
2007 through 2009.[Footnote 61] Although we found that data on project 
status and cost were not sufficiently reliable for our report, we did 
determine that the data were reliable for the purposes of presenting 
examples of humanitarian assistance efforts conducted by DOD. 

To assess the extent to which DOD conducted its required project 
evaluations, we analyzed a generalizable random sample of OHDACA 
projects. We began with the reports from DOD's Overseas Humanitarian 
Assistance Shared Information System database of projects from fiscal 
years 2005 through 2009 that were marked as funded by the combatant 
commands, because Defense Security Cooperation Agency officials said 
that this would provide a more comprehensive list of projects than the 
list of projects marked as completed. We then excluded from that all 
projects that recorded either an actual cost value of $10,000 or less, 
or if no actual cost information was available, projects that had an 
estimated cost of $10,000 or less in the database, because DOD 
guidance does not require a 1-year project evaluation for those 
projects. We also excluded projects that had a status of "canceled" by 
the combatant command in the database, because a Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency official told us it was likely that such projects 
had not been implemented and thus project evaluations would not have 
been conducted. Of the 579 projects that remained after these 
exclusions, we sampled 97 projects for review. Because different 
samples could have provided different estimates, we expressed our 
confidence in the precision of our particular sample results as a 95 
percent confidence interval. The margin of error for these estimates 
is no more than plus or minus 10 percentage points. This is the 
interval that would contain the actual population values for 95 
percent of the samples that we could have drawn. Two analysts 
independently reviewed DOD's complete database files for these 97 
projects to determine whether the 30-day and 1-year project 
evaluations were present. Because the database did not specifically 
identify whether a project evaluation was a 30-day or a 1-year 
evaluation, we exercised our judgment to categorize the assessments 
based on factors such as the nature of the information in the 
evaluation and the date the evaluation was completed. The two analysts 
compared their results, and all initial differences regarding the 
categorization of the assessments and their presence were discussed 
and reconciled. Because of concerns about the completeness and 
reliability of data in DOD's database of HCA project information, we 
did not generate and analyze a sample of projects from the database. 

To analyze the extent to which DOD, State, and USAID have visibility 
over each others' assistance efforts to avoid duplication, unnecessary 
overlap, or fragmentation, we reviewed documentation related to 
various information-sharing initiatives and interviewed relevant 
officials from DOD, State, USAID, and the National Security Staff to 
discuss the initiatives and information-sharing challenges, including 
the use of differing terminology among the agencies to describe 
similar assistance efforts. To identify the potential for overlapping 
efforts among the agencies, we identified DOD's humanitarian 
assistance projects by sector--for example, health, education, 
infrastructure, and disaster preparation--from fiscal years 2005 
through 2010 and examined information on State/USAID's development 
efforts within geographical regions and countries to determine if 
State/USAID had performed similar types of projects in the areas as 
DOD. For the purposes of our review, we combined the activities 
performed by State and USAID because while USAID performs a 
significant amount of foreign assistance activities, it performs them 
in close coordination with State and some projects are funded by 
State. To identify specific examples of overlap between DOD and 
USAID's efforts in the same country, we compared DOD's projects in a 
country to those performed by USAID in the same country, and found 
examples of similar activities being performed in the four sectors. We 
did not evaluate whether overlap would have positive or negative 
effects. We interviewed relevant officials from DOD, State, USAID, the 
Office of Management and Budget, the National Security Staff, and 
nongovernmental agencies to identify potential benefits and 
consequences to DOD's humanitarian assistance program. 

In addressing our objectives, we contacted officials representing a 
wide range of offices (see table 3). 

Table 3: List of Organizations Contacted: 

DOD: DOD offices/agencies: 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency; 
International Health Division; 
Joint Staff; 
National Guard Bureau; 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command; 
Naval Health Research Center; 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Financial Management 
and Comptroller; 
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Health 
Protection and Readiness[A]; 
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership 
Strategy and Stability Operations; 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); 
Pacific Command Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and 
Humanitarian Assistance; 
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. 

DOD: Combatant commands. 

Africa Command; 
Central Command; 
European Command; 
Northern Command; 
Pacific Command; 
Southern Command; 
Special Operations Command. 

State: Bureaus/offices: 

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; 
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration; 
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs; 
Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance; 
Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator. 

State: U.S. embassies: 

Albania; 
Bahamas; 
Bangladesh; 
Haiti; 
Indonesia; 
Kenya; 
Kyrgyz Republic; 
Lebanon; 
Mexico; 
Moldova; 
Peru; 
Uganda. 

USAID: 

Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning; 
Office of Military Affairs; 
Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance; 
Select regional bureaus; 
Senior development advisors stationed at various combatant commands; 
USAID/East Africa Mission - Djibouti. 

Other U.S. government organizations: 

National Security Staff; 
Office of Management and Budget; 
Department of Health and Human Services. 

Nongovernment organizations: 

InterAction[B]; 
Refugees International. 

Source: GAO. 

[A] We contacted the International Health Division of the Office of 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Health Protection 
and Readiness. 

[B] InterAction is an alliance of U.S.-based international 
nongovernmental organizations with more than 190 members working in 
developing countries around the world. We met with InterAction 
representatives from six nongovernment organizations that engage in a 
variety of development assistance-type efforts globally. 

[End of table] 

We conducted this performance audit from November 2010 through 
February 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: DOD's Obligations for Humanitarian Assistance Efforts by 
Combatant Command: 

Figure 9 represents DOD's obligations by geographic combatant command 
for efforts under the OHDACA program from fiscal years 2005 through 
2010. Over this 6-year period, DOD's Pacific and Southern Commands 
obligated the highest amounts, about $93.8 million and $75.8 million, 
respectively. 

Figure 9: DOD's OHDACA-Funded Humanitarian Assistance Obligations by 
Combatant Command for Fiscal Years 2005 through 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Africa Command: $30 million; 
Central Command $61 million; 
European Command $64 million; 
Northern Command $4 million; 
Pacific Command $94 million; 
Southern Command $76 million. 

Source: DOD. 

Notes: Figures represent obligations for the OHDACA humanitarian 
assistance program, as distinguished from the broader OHDACA program. 
Figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars. 

Combatant commands and their corresponding areas of responsibility are 
identified as follows: U.S. Africa Command (Africa); U.S. Central 
Command (Middle East and Egypt); U.S. European Command (Europe and 
Israel); U.S. Northern Command (North America and the Bahamas); U.S. 
Pacific Command (Asia and the Pacific region); and U.S. Southern 
Command (Central America, South America, and the Caribbean). 

U.S. Africa Command was not fully operational until 2008, so U.S. 
Africa Command's obligations for the OHDACA-funded humanitarian 
assistance program are from fiscal years 2008 through 2010. Also, 
obligations for U.S. Central Command do not include funding to Iraq 
and Afghanistan with the exception of one project performed in 
Afghanistan, which DOD recorded at a cost of $27,000. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 10 represents DOD's obligations for HCA projects conducted 
within its geographic combatant commands' areas of responsibility from 
fiscal years 2005 through 2010. Over this 6-year period, obligations 
were the highest for HCA projects in DOD's Southern and Pacific 
Commands' geographical areas, about $32.5 million and $21.9 million, 
respectively. 

Figure 10: DOD's Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Obligations for 
Projects Conducted within the Combatant Commands' Geographic Areas for 
Fiscal Years 2005 through 2010: 

[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph] 

Africa Command: $16 million; 
Central Command $0.3 million; 
European Command $4 million; 
Pacific Command $22 million; 
Southern Command $33 million. 

Source: DOD. 

Notes: Figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars. 

Combatant commands and their corresponding areas of responsibility are 
identified as follows: U.S. Africa Command (Africa); U.S. Central 
Command (Middle East and Egypt); U.S. European Command (Europe and 
Israel); U.S. Pacific Command (Asia and the Pacific region); and U.S. 
Southern Command (Central America, South America, and the Caribbean). 
U.S. Northern Command (North America and the Bahamas) does not engage 
in humanitarian and civic assistance efforts. 

U.S. Africa Command was not fully operational until 2008. Dollar 
amounts in figure 10 include projects performed in Africa from fiscal 
years 2005 through fiscal years 2010, even though projects were 
managed by other combatant commands in Africa prior to fiscal year 
2008. Also, obligations for U.S. Central Command do not include 
funding for efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Humanitarian Assistance Efforts in U.S. Africa Command's 
Area of Responsibility: 

Overview: 

Africa Command (AFRICOM) operates in 52 countries on the African 
continent. The continent faces a wide range of challenges, including 
poverty; high birth rates; an increasingly large youth population; 
pandemic disease; and transnational threats, such as violent 
extremism, piracy, and narcotics trafficking. AFRICOM has conducted 
humanitarian assistance projects in the areas of health, education, 
infrastructure, and disaster preparation. 

[Photograph: Servicemembers unload cases of books for the Damerjog 
Schoolhouse in Djibouti. DOD delivered 1,400 books and 14 bookcases] 

Select AFRICOM and USAID Projects: 

[Interactive graphic: refer to Appendix IX for content] 

Funding[A]: 

Spending on AFRICOM’s humanitarian assistance efforts has increased in 
recent years. Obligations for these efforts under AFRICOM’s
OHDACA program increased from about $7.5 million in fiscal year 2008 
to about $11.4 million in fiscal year 2010. In addition, AFRICOM spent 
about $16 million on HCA projects during the same time period. AFRICOM 
is also receiving a total of $7.5 million from USAID from fiscal years 
2008 through 2012 to help African nations respond to an influenza 
pandemic. 

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD and USAID data; DOD (photo). 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Humanitarian Assistance Efforts in U.S. Central Command's 
Area of Responsibility: 

Overview: 

U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) area of responsibility comprises 20 
countries in three subregions: (1) Central and South Asia; (2) 
Southwest Asia, and (3) the Arabian Peninsula. Over the past several 
years, CENTCOM has been engaged in combat efforts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Other challenges within CENTCOM’s area of responsibility 
include the lack of progress in achieving comprehensive Middle East 
peace, social, and economic instability; expanding youth populations; 
piracy; arms smuggling; human trafficking; narcotics; and weapons 
proliferation. CENTCOM has conducted humanitarian assistance projects 
in the areas of health, education, infrastructure, and disaster 
preparation outside of Iraq and Afghanistan. 

[Photograph: U.S. and local officials cut the ribbon to the Birdik 
Village School in Kyrgyzstan. U.S. military personnel and Kyrgyz 
citizens worked together to renovate the school in 2009] 

Select CENTCOM and USAID Projects: 

[Interactive graphic: refer to Appendix IX for content] 

Funding[A]: 
Spending on CENTCOM’s humanitarian assistance efforts has fluctuated 
in recent years. Obligations for these efforts under CENTCOM’s OHDACA 
program were about $15.3 million in fiscal year 2005. In fiscal year 
2007, funding peaked at about $16.7 million and then dropped to 
approximately $4.1 million in fiscal year 2010. In addition, CENTCOM 
spent $342,870 on HCA projects outside of Iraq and Afghanistan during 
the same time period. 

[A] All figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars. OHDACA 
figures represent obligations for the OHDACA humanitarian assistance 
program, as distinguished from the broader OHDACA program. This figure 
includes one project performed in Afghanistan, which DOD recorded at a 
cost of $27,000. 

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD and USAID data; DOD (photo). 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Humanitarian Assistance Efforts in U.S. European Command's 
Area of Responsibility: 

Overview: 

U.S. European Command (EUCOM) is responsible for U.S. military 
relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 51 
countries in Europe, as well as parts of Asia and the Middle East. 
Countries in EUCOM’s area of responsibility face challenges such as 
transnational and indigenous terrorism, ballistic missile threats, and 
ensuring cybersecurity among U.S. allies. EUCOM has conducted 
humanitarian assistance projects in the areas of health, education, 
infrastructure, and disaster preparation. 

[Photograph: Hungarian and U.S. Army engineers work together to 
replace the roof of the Zalahalap Elementary School in the Hungarian 
village of Tapoica] 

Select EUCOM and USAID Projects: 

[Interactive graphic: refer to Appendix IX for content] 

Funding[A]: 

Spending on EUCOM’s humanitarian assistance efforts has fluctuated in 
recent years. Obligations for these efforts under EUCOM’s OHDACA 
program were about $9.1 million in fiscal year 2005. In fiscal year 
2008, funding dropped to about $5.2 million and then increased to 
about $16.6 million in fiscal year 2010. In addition, EUCOM spent 
about $4.3 million on HCA projects during the same time period. 

[A] All figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars. OHDACA 
figures represent obligations for the OHDACA humanitarian assistance 
program, as distinguished from the broader OHDACA program. 

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD and USAID data; DOD (photo). 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: Humanitarian Assistance Efforts in U.S. Northern 
Command's Area of Responsibility: 

Overview: 

U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) conducts homeland defense, civil 
support, and security cooperation to defend and secure the United 
States and its interests. NORTHCOM is also responsible for supporting 
U.S. civil authorities and state national guard units in responding to 
natural and man-made disasters within the United States. NORTHCOM’s 
area of responsibility includes the United States, Canada, Mexico, and 
the Bahamas. Challenges in NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility include 
transnational criminal organizations responsible for illicit 
trafficking of drugs, people, money, and weapons. In addition, 
NORTHCOM has conducted humanitarian assistance projects in Mexico and 
the Bahamas in the areas of health, education, infrastructure, and 
disaster preparation. 

[Photograph: U.S. Northern Command donates school supplies to a 
primary school in the Bahamas as part of a humanitarian assistance 
project] 

Select NORTHCOM and USAID Projects: 

[Interactive graphic: refer to Appendix IX for content] 

Funding[A]: 

NORTHCOM’s humanitarian assistance program under OHDACA began in 
fiscal year 2008. Obligations for these efforts under NORTHCOM’s 
OHDACA program were $437,507 in fiscal year 2008 and more than $2.9 
million in fiscal year 2010. NORTHCOM does not conduct HCA projects 
within its area of responsibility. 

[A] All figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars. OHDACA 
figures represent obligations for the OHDACA humanitarian assistance 
program, as distinguished from the broader OHDACA program. 

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD and USAID data; DOD (photo). 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: Humanitarian Assistance Efforts in U.S. Pacific 
Command's Area of Responsibility: 

Overview: 

U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) operates in 36 countries in the Asia 
Pacific region, which encompasses about 50 percent of the world’s 
population. This region faces several threats, including those posed 
by North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities; transnational 
violent extremist organizations; China’s significant military 
modernization with unclear intent; territorial disputes; transnational 
criminal activity; and humanitarian crises, such as pandemics, 
famines, and natural disasters. PACOM has conducted humanitarian 
assistance projects in the areas of health, education, infrastructure, 
and disaster preparation. 

[Photograph: With the help of local Cambodians, Navy engineers work to 
complete a well-drilling humanitarian and civic assistance project as 
part of the Pacific Partnership 2010 exercise] 

Select PACOM and USAID Projects[A]: 

[Interactive graphic: refer to Appendix IX for content] 

Funding[A]: 

Spending on PACOM’s humanitarian assistance efforts has increased in 
recent years. Obligations for these efforts under PACOM’s OHDACA 
program increased from about $17.3 million in fiscal year 2005 to 
about $19.9 in fiscal year 2010. In addition, PACOM spent almost $22 
million on HCA projects during the same time period. PACOM is also 
receiving a total of $7.5 million from USAID from fiscal years 2008 
through 2012 to help nations in the Asia-Pacific region respond to an 
influenza pandemic. 

[A] This map does not include Antarctica, which is also included in 
Pacific Command’s area of responsibility. 

[B] All figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars. OHDACA 
figures represent obligations for the OHDACA humanitarian assistance 
program, as distinguished from the broader OHDACA program. 

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD and USAID data; DOD (photo). 

[End of section] 

Appendix VIII: Humanitarian Assistance Efforts in U.S. Southern 
Command's Area of Responsibility: 

Overview: 

U. S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) operates in Central America, the 
Caribbean, and South America. These regions face challenges such as 
poverty, illicit trafficking, natural disasters; and violent extremist 
organizations. SOUTHCOM officials stated that its role in humanitarian 
assistance has greatly expanded over the past 5 years, in part because 
of increased awareness of the command’s program. SOUTHCOM has 
conducted humanitarian assistance projects in the areas of health, 
education, infrastructure, and disaster preparation. 

[Photograph: Military Sealift Command hospital ship USNS Comfort is 
pushed from the pier by tugboats after completing nearly a week of 
medical aid in Trinidad and Tobago as part of the 4-month humanitarian 
deployment to Latin America and the Caribbean, providing medical 
treatment to a dozen countries] 

Select SOUTHCOM and USAID Projects: 

[Interactive graphic: refer to Appendix IX for content] 

Funding[A]: 

Obligations for humanitarian assistance efforts under SOUTHCOM’s 
OHDACA program have fluctuated from about $3.5 million in fiscal year 
2005 to a height of about $21.4 million in fiscal year 2009. In fiscal 
year 2010, the most recent year for which data are available, SOUTHCOM 
obligated about $17.5 million for its OHDACA humanitarian assistance 
efforts. In addition, SOUTHCOM spent almost $32.5 million on HCA 
projects during the same time period. 

[A] All figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars. OHDACA 
figures represent obligations for the OHDACA humanitarian assistance 
program, as distinguished from the broader OHDACA program. 

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD and USAID data; DOD (photo). 

[End of section] 

Appendix IX: Noninteractive Graphics and Text for Appendixes III-VIII: 

Figure 11: Select AFRICOM and USAID Projects (see appendix III): 

Senegal: 
Infrastructure: Department of Defense; 
Construction of closed wells with solar-powered pumping systems and on-
site water storage capability.  

Chad: 
Education: Department of Defense; 
Construction of school classrooms, administrative offices, and storage. 

Ethiopia 
Education: USAID; 
Programs to improve teacher skills, train primary school principals 
and school board members in education planning and management, and 
increase school enrollment.  

Democratic Republic of Congo: 
Global health: USAID; 
Services to improve maternal and infant health care and prevent the 
spread of malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS.  

Uganda: 
Health: Department of Defense; 
Construction of a maternal and pediatric care ward at a hospital.  

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD and USAID data. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 12: Select CENTCOM and USAID Projects (see appendix IV): 

Egypt: 
Education: USAID; 
Activities to support professional development for teachers, 
decentralization of the education system, policy reform, and reading 
instruction. 

Tajikistan: 
Education: Department of Defense; 
Renovation and structural improvements to school buildings. 
    
Lebanon: 
Health: Department of Defense; 
Construction of an operating room to perform surgeries at a local 
hospital. 

Yemen: 
Global health: USAID; 
Programs to renovate health clinics, provide medical equipment, train 
health care providers, and improve health care education and 
counseling services.  

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD and USAID data. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 13: Select EUCOM and USAID Projects (see appendix V): 

Belarus: 
Global health: USAID; 
Programs to train health care professionals and combat tuberculosis.  

Albania: 
Economic growth: USAID; 
Programs to provide access to credit and foster economic policies to 
support business development, trade, and private investment.       

Moldova: 
Disaster preparation: Department of Defense; 
Renovation of a fire and rescue station to support regional emergency 
operations. 

Macedonia   
Education: Department of Defense; 
Renovation of windows, electrical system, and floors in a primary 
school. 

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD and USAID data. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 14: Select NORTHCOM and USAID Projects (see appendix VI): 

Mexico: 
Global health: USAID; 
Programs to detect, improve treatment of, and prevent the spread of 
HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. 
      
Mexico: 
Disaster preparation: Department of Defense; 
Training and equipment to support Mexican Hazardous Materials Disaster 
Response and Consequence Management.  

Bahamas: 
Disaster preparation: Department of Defense; 
Disaster response training on the geographic information system to map 
flood-prone areas in response to tropical storms.       
    
Mexico: 
Education: USAID; 
Provide scholarships to promote teacher and technical training 
programs. 

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD and USAID data. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 15: Select PACOM and USAID Projects (see appendix VII): 

Bangladesh: 
Disaster preparation: USAID; 
Construction of embankments and earthen levees to protect crops and 
prevent erosion in low-lying areas subject to flooding. 
     
The Philippines: 
Infrastructure: Department of Defense; 
Construction and expansion of roads to improve law enforcement and 
armed forces emergency response capabilities.  

Cambodia
Education: Department of Defense; 
Renovation and structural repair of a high school.  

Indonesia : 
Global health: USAID; 
Programs to improve maternal and neonatal health care and prevent the 
spread of HIV/AIDS, drug resistant tuberculosis, and avian and 
pandemic influenza.  

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD and USAID data. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 16: Select SOUTHCOM and USAID Projects (see appendix VIII): 

Jamaica: 
Infrastructure: Department of Defense; 
Construction of a warehouse to safeguard critical supplies and 
equipment in preparation for a disaster. 

Guatemala: 
Global health: USAID; 
Programs to improve maternal and child health care, HIV/AIDS treatment 
and prevention, and reproductive health and family planning 
services.    

El Salvador: 
Education: USAID; 
Programs to improve teacher training and improve the quality of 
education in underserved areas. 
   
Peru: 
Health:  Department of Defense; 
Construction of a medical clinic to support an area with a growing 
immigrant t population. 

Sources: GAO analysis of DOD and USAID data. 

[End of figure] 

Appendix X: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

We received DOD's comments on January 23, 2012. 

Office of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense: 
Special Operations/low-Intensity Conflict: 
2500 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-2500: 

Ms. Marie Mak: 
Assistant Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Mak: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft 
Report, GA0-12-XXX, "Humanitarian And Development Assistance: Project 
Evaluations and Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage Military's 
Efforts," dated February 12 (GAO Code 351534). DoD generally concurs 
with the seven recommendations with additional comments. Our response 
to the recommendations is enclosed. 

As discussed in the report, DoD conducts humanitarian assistance 
activities through the Humanitarian Assistance (HA) program funded by 
the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) 
appropriation and through the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) 
program funded by the Service Departments. These activities enable DoD 
to address and mitigate the destabilizing effects of human suffering 
and privation through the provision of humanitarian support in the 
sectors of education, health care, basic infrastructure and disaster 
preparedness. Collaboration with interagency partners — particularly 
with the U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International 
Development, as well as with host country officials and non-
governmental organizations operating in these countries — enables DoD 
to apply meaningful and targeted assistance complementary to that 
provided by other US government agencies and in support of U.S. 
national security objectives. 

As GAO acknowledges in this report, any overlap in the types of 
projects implemented by DoD and State or USAID is not necessarily 
undesirable — rather than wasting resources, such overlap may 
exemplify complementarity. In fact, as the funding made available for 
the HA and HCA programs has grown in recent years, the Department has 
taken steps to ensure that projects are consistent with State 
Department and USAID strategies and objectives for individual 
countries. DoD policy requires these projects to be coordinated with 
interagency representatives before being vetted at the geographic 
combatant commands to ensure conformity with both policy and program 
management guidance. The current policy guidance, furthermore, places 
stringent requirements on projects to promote sustainability, capacity-
building, and coordination with local stakeholders. 

GAO identifies several areas of potential improvement in DoD's HA and 
HCA programs, and the Department has already begun to address these 
issues through both policy and process modifications. To the extent 
that the report describes possible improvements to interagency
coordination and visibility issues, however, the Department's ability 
to address key external constraints is limited. The report notes that 
"USAID officials said that their agency has staffing shortages, and it 
can be a burden on USAID personnel to have to coordinate...on DoD's 
humanitarian assistance projects." As the lead federal agency for 
foreign development activities with oversight responsibility for 
related activities conducted by other US government agencies,
USAID must be properly resourced to conduct its mission to maximize 
effectiveness and minimize the very overlap and duplication that this 
report seeks to identify. 

Our point of contact for this action is Ms. Anne Knight, Office of the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and 
Stability Operations, commercial phone (703) 692-0103 or email 
address: anne.knight@osd.mil. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

James A. Schear: 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and 
Stability Operations: 

Enclosure: As stated. 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report Dated January 2012: 
GAO-12-XXX (GAO Code 351534): 

"Humanitarian And Development Assistance: Project Evaluations And 
Better Information Sharing Needed To Manage Military's Efforts" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership 
Strategy and Stability Operations to help improve consistency in 
program implementation by issuing a departmental instruction and 
updating accompanying guidance on DoD's Overseas Humanitarian, 
Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) humanitarian assistance program. In 
issuing the updated guidance, the department may wish to consider 
further clarifying the use of OHDACA funds for specific project 
evaluation purposes. 

DoD Response: DoD partially concurs with the recommendation. DoD is in 
the process of developing updated policy guidance for the Humanitarian
Assistance program, with the intent to use the updated guidance — once 
finalized and disseminated — as the foundation for a DoD Instruction 
on Humanitarian Assistance. The updated policy guidance will clarify 
existing guidance requiring combatant commands to assess their HA 
projects in terms of both performance and effectiveness in meeting 
project objectives. 

DoD does not concur that the Secretary of Defense should direct the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and 
Stability Operations to help issue a departmental instruction. DoD 
Instructions are issued by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
and not by Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency to require 
that the combatant commands and other DOD users of the Overseas 
Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System database provide 
complete and timely updates to OHDACA humanitarian assistance project 
information within the system. 

DoD RESPONSE: DoD partially concurs with the recommendation. The
Department concurs that the combatant commands and other DoD users of 
the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared. Information System 
(OHASIS) database be required to provide complete and timely updates 
to OHDACA
humanitarian assistance project information within the system. Having 
previously recognized this as a concern, DSCA initiated in 2010 a 
multi-year commitment to develop an entirely reconstructed OHASIS 
system (OHASIS 2) to fix deficiencies in the first iteration of OHASIS 
(OHASIS 1), to include exploring and implementing methods to ensure 
complete and timely updates. 

However, DoD nonconcurs with the notion that Secretary of Defense must 
direct the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to 
implement this requirement. As stated above, efforts are well underway 
to address the concern of ensuring complete and timely updates to the 
OHASIS database. This requirement is one of the drivers behind the 
development of OHASIS 2, which began in January 2010 and became 
operational in February 2011. OHASIS 2 will capture data for FY12 data 
and beyond. The OHASIS database as a system was first established in 
2007 as a project approval and tracking system and has evolved to meet 
ever increasing demands. OHASIS 2 is a more complete management and 
reporting system that continues to evolve to provide more analytical 
capability. We intend to utilize advancements in the capabilities of 
OHASIS 2 to tie HA program funding back to combatant commands' and 
other DoD users' ability to provide complete and timely information 
into the system. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency to employ a 
risk-based approach to review and modify project evaluation 
requirements for the OHDACA humanitarian assistance program to measure 
the long-term effects of humanitarian assistance projects, and take 
steps to ensure compliance with the requirements. 

DoD Response: DoD partially concurs with the recommendation. The
Department concurs with the recommendation to modify project evaluation
requirements to measure the long-term effects of humanitarian 
assistance projects and take steps to ensure compliance with project 
evaluation requirements. DoD is working continuously to refine the 
project evaluation requirements to ensure they provide useful 
qualitative and quantitative data that will facilitate the measuring 
of long-term effects of the HA projects. Efforts currently underway 
seek to refine project evaluations so that the data collected is more 
useful, while simultaneously making the collection process less 
burdensome so as to encourage the capture of relevant data. A 
complementary effort under development is creating an appropriate 
method to encourage compliance with the new project evaluation 
requirements. The Department believes that the process of developing 
and refining evaluation requirements should be ongoing, as these 
processes are never truly "complete", but aims to have refined and 
implemented updated project evaluation requirements in the near 
future. The initial 30-day After Action Reporting capability will be 
implemented by the third quarter of FY12. Initial analytical and 
reporting tools leveraging this data will be developed during the 
third and fourth quarters of FY12. Also to be completed by the third 
quarter of FY12 will be a scorecard for combatant commands to evaluate 
the progress of projects. This scorecard will highlight when projects 
are past their completion timeframe and when After Action Reports (30 
day or 1 year) are due and overdue. 

While the Department concurs with the recommendation to employ a risk-
based approach to review project evaluation requirements, such 
implementation will require the accumulation of data over time in 
order to define the risk criteria and apply them effectively. Given 
the paucity of project evaluation data currently available (as alluded 
to by the GAO), the Department believes it will take some time to 
formulate a significant and reliable risk-based approach to project 
evaluations requirements. In order to implement a significant and 
reliable risk-based approach to project evaluations, more data must 
first be collected and analyzed. OHASIS 2 is designed to provide the 
platform for this type of activity, and we anticipate that at least 
one year's worth of data will be required for developing a risk-based 
approach that will reduce the number of AARs required yet yield 
sufficient information to determine project/program success. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to require that the 
combatant commands and other DOD users of the Overseas Humanitarian 
Assistance Shared Information System database provide complete and 
timely updates to Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA) project 
information within the system. 

DoD Response: DoD concurs with the recommendation. Since assuming 
responsibility of the HCA program on Jan 1, 2011, the Joint Staff has 
made numerous improvements to the management of the program and has 
already taken steps to address management issues identified over the 
course of GAO's review of the HCA program. Enhancing the functionality 
of OHASIS has been the first step to ensuring that combatant commands 
provide regular and complete updates on HCA projects. In December 2011 
the Joint Staff, in coordination with the office of the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability
Operations, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and the combatant
commands, released an upgraded version of the Overseas Humanitarian 
Assistance Shared Information System database for HCA project 
nominations. The new system standardizes input for project review and 
provides improved features that enhance coordination and communication 
both within DoD and with the interagency. 

Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to employ a risk-based 
approach to review and modify project evaluation requirements for the 
HCA program to measure the long-term effects of projects and take 
steps to ensure compliance with the requirements. 

DoD Response: DoD concurs with the recommendation. Since assuming 
responsibility of the HCA program on 1 Jan 2011, the Joint Staff has 
made significant improvements to the management of the HCA program and 
already undertaken initiatives to address program data gaps in advance 
of the release of this report. Additionally, the Joint Staff, in 
coordination with the combatant commands, is in the process of 
supporting the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations in the revision of the 
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) guidance. 

The Joint Staff has established monthly HCA teleconferences with the 
office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership 
Strategy and Stability Operations, the Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency (DSCA), and the combatant commands to clarify policy guidance, 
discuss business rules and best practices, and identify avenues for 
improvement. In late January 2012, the Joint Staff will begin 
developing amplified guidance for the assessment of these HCA projects 
and will begin coordination on an upgraded version of OHASIS HCA for 
after action reporting. This expanded guidance on project assessments 
will be informed by DSCA's concurrent risk-based approach to 
evaluations of project effectiveness. 

The Global Theatre Security Cooperation Management Information System 
(G-TSCMIS), which is currently under development and is mentioned in 
this report as an ongoing information-sharing project, will also link 
into OHASIS and may present a solution to help resolve many of the 
reporting, tracking and follow-up issues highlighted in the report. G-
TSCMIS will be DoD's authoritative reporting and tracking database for 
the Department's security cooperation activities — including 
humanitarian assistance — and will be a comprehensive, single-point 
database with tools to link to, arrange, manage and view the 
Department's collective engagement activities. 

Recommendation 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretaries of
Defense and State, and the Administrator of USAID, develop a framework 
to formalize interagency information sharing on humanitarian/ 
development assistance efforts, such as a common database. Such a 
framework could involve selecting an existing initiative, such as the 
Foreign Assistance Dashboard, to be used by all agencies for their 
assistance efforts, or taking steps to facilitate interoperability 
among the agencies' existing independent mechanisms. 

DoD Response: DoD concurs with the recommendation. As State and USAID 
have larger foreign assistance programs, DoD will engage these 
agencies to determine what formats and/or mechanisms could be 
implemented at reasonable cost to enhance information sharing. DoD has 
already taken steps to share information about its humanitarian 
assistance program with State and USAID by providing these agencies 
access to the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information 
System (OHASIS) database. DoD has also sought to ensure the 
compatibility of OHASIS and the nascent Global Theater Security 
Cooperation Management Information System to promote the integration 
of HA program data with those of other security cooperation programs. 
As currently constructed, OHASIS has a framework in place for sharing 
data with systems such as the Foreign Assistance Dashboard, which uses 
a category/sector taxonomy that could potentially be adopted by OHASIS 
to facilitate information-sharing. 

Recommendation 7: The GAO recommends that the Secretaries of
Defense and State, and the Administrator of USAID, collaborate to 
develop guidance that provides a common understanding of the 
terminology used by DoD, State, and USAID related to their 
humanitarian and development assistance efforts. 

DoD Response: DoD concurs with the recommendation. Although State, 
USAID, and DoD use different terms in part because of the 
organizations' different authorities, mission sets, and expertise, a 
better understanding across the agencies of the terms used would 
likely facilitate coordination on common types of projects.
DoD will engage State and USAID to determine the scope, specific 
objectives, and timetable for issuing guidance establishing this 
common understanding of humanitarian terminology. 

[End of section] 

Appendix XI: Comments from the Department of State: 

United States Department of State: 
Chief Financial Officer: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

January 20, 2012: 

Mr. Loren Yager: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Mr. Yager: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, 
"Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and 
Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage Military's
Efforts," GAO Job Code 351534. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Anita Menghetti, Senior Coordinator, Office of the Director of U.S. 
Foreign Assistance at (202) 647-2707. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

James L. Millette: 

cc: GAO — John Pendleton: 
F— Robert H. Goldberg: 
State/OIG — Evelyn Klemstine: 

[End of letter] 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report: 

Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and 
Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage Military's Efforts." 
(GAO-12-XXX, GAO Code 351534) 

The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to comment on this 
GAO report entitled "Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project
Evaluations and Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage Military's 
Efforts," and notes the timeliness of the report and importance of the 
issues under review. 

The Department of State recognizes DOD's role and interest in engaging 
with civilian and military counterparts around the world in order to 
achieve objectives such as gaining access and influence, fostering 
partnerships, maintaining capabilities and training our forces. We 
also recognize that confusion arises within the inter-agency and 
international development and humanitarian assistance communities when 
in the pursuit of their objectives DOD activities secondarily produce 
development or humanitarian assistance-like outcomes. 

Recommendation: To improve transparency and oversight and to maximize 
the benefits derived from U.S. government resources devoted to 
humanitarian and development assistance activities, we recommend that 
the Secretaries of Defense and State, and the Administrator of USAID 
take the following two actions: 

* Develop a framework to formalize interagency information sharing on 
humanitarian/development assistance efforts, such as a common database.
Such a framework could involve selecting an existing initiative such 
as the Foreign Assistance Dashboard, to be used by all agencies for 
their assistance efforts, or taking steps to facilitate 
interoperability among the agencies' existing independent mechanisms. 

* Collaborate to develop guidance that provides a common understanding 
of the terminology used by DOD, State, and USAID related to their 
humanitarian and development efforts. 

Response: The Department agrees with the over-arching objective of 
improving transparency and oversight of humanitarian development 
assistance activities. With respect to the first recommended action, 
State, USAID and DOD are already in discussion with respect to 
broadening the Foreign Assistance Dashboard to include DOD's foreign 
assistance. However, it should be noted that the Dashboard is most 
useful for ex-post facto accountability and transparency. State is also
working on rolling out the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) process, 
which in its first year will go out to Missions in the Western 
Hemisphere and Europe. This process will require Missions to develop 
strategic plans in coordination with all USG entities at post, and may 
assist over-all coordination and planning. 

State is also of the opinion that the most important locus of 
coordination to ensure integration and minimize overlap is at the 
Mission level. We would therefore underscore points raised in other 
portions of the report with respect to Mission level coordination and 
the obstacles thereto. 

With respect to the second recommended action, State, USAID and DOD 
already work together on planning and could utilize this group to 
identify appropriate representatives from each agency to focus on 
taking action with respect to the second part of the recommendation. 
State would caveat, however, that the confusion with respect to 
terminology is not based on a lack of trying to understand one 
another, but rather the inconsistent terminology and objectives of
DOD's OHDACA authorization, when compared to legislative mandates
governing the work of the Bureau for Population Refugees and Migration 
at State and the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance at USAID. 

[End of section] 

Appendix XII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

USAID: 
From The American People: 

January 19, 2012: 

John H. Pendleton: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Pendleton: 

I am pleased to provide the formal response to the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report entitled "Humanitarian and 
Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and Better Information 
Sharing Needed to Manage Military's Efforts" (Engagement Code 351534) 
:or the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). 

The enclosed USAID comments are provided for incorporation with this 
letter as an appendix to the final report. 

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and 
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this audit 
review. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Angelique M. Crumbley: 
Acting Assistant to the Administrator: 
Bureau for Management: 
U.S. Agency for International Development: 

Enclosure: a/s. 

[End of letter] 

USAID Comments on Gao Draft Report - "Humanitarian and Development 
Assistance: Project Evaluations and Better Information Sharing
Needed to Manage Military's Efforts." (Engagement Code 351534): 

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) values the 
opportunity to comment on this GAO report and commends GAO on the 
timeliness and importance of these issues. 

While the Department of Defense (DOD) has a long history of 
intervention in humanitarian emergencies and conducting development-
like activities under the rubric of "humanitarian assistance," this 
role has been evolving and expanding in recent years with the advent 
of DOD Directive 3000.05 and changes in policy, authorities, and 
strategies. USAID recognizes DOD's role and interest in engaging with 
civilian and military counterparts around the world. Gaining access 
and influence, building partnerships, maintaining capabilities and 
training our forces are among the important objectives our nation 
achieves through DoD's engagement. In some cases, there is a 
humanitarian assistance-like outcome as a means to achieving 
legitimate DoD access, influence, and training objectives, but these 
are generally only a means to a different objective. 

In this vein, USAID notes GAO's recommendation regarding clarifying 
DOD's role in humanitarian assistance as the central issue at stake. 
Given various international norms and guidelines such as the Oslo 
Guidelines, development and humanitarian assistance is the domain of 
civilian authorities, with a limited role for DOD where their unique 
capabilities are needed. Clarification of distinct objectives, 
conditions, and terms of engagement of civilians and military in what 
is called "humanitarian assistance" by both agencies would be helpful. 
New terminology would also help distinguish the distinct goals and 
roles and responsibilities. DOD and USAID would also benefit from a 
clearer understanding of DOD's expected role where humanitarian 
assistance is the ultimate objective, vis-a-vis civilian agencies, as 
noted in this thorough report. We will continue to better clarify our 
roles in providing U.S. humanitarian assistance overseas. 

Recommendations: 

USAID appreciates the recommendations offered by the GAO. GAO has 
clearly and effectively identified key issues such as limited program 
guidance, poor data management, and limited program evaluation as 
significant weaknesses for DOD's implementation of their humanitarian 
assistance programs. We concur that these are challenges shared by the 
defense, diplomacy and development agencies (3Ds) as we try to develop 
closer coordination and collaboration mechanisms. The challenges 
identified by the report were already the focus of discussion and 
engagement by State, DOD and USAID, which recognize the need for 
improved communication and information sharing frameworks. The 3Ds 
also recognize the need for joint guidance to foment understanding of 
each other's terminology and planning processes. In that regard, the 3D
Planning Group, discussed in the report has produced a 3D planning 
guide and is working on developing a reference library for 3D 
planners. These are clear examples of USAID, State, and
DOD's joint efforts to address some of the challenges and weaknesses 
identified by this report. 

Recommendation 1: To improve transparency and oversight and to 
maximize the benefits derived from U.S. resources devoted to 
humanitarian/development assistance activities, we recommend that the 
Secretaries of Defense and State, and the Administrator of USAID 
develop a framework to formalize interagency information sharing on 
humanitarian/development assistance efforts, such as a common 
database. Such a framework could involve selecting an existing 
initiative, such as the Foreign Assistance Dashboard, to be used by 
all agencies for their assistance efforts, or taking steps to 
facilitate interoperability among the agencies' existing independent 
mechanisms. 

USAID Comments: USAID concurs with the recommendation. USAID welcomes 
GAO's recommendation and plans to explore the idea further with DOD 
and State. The difficulties in doing so, however, should not be 
underestimated. Previous attempts to develop a common assistance 
framework and databases have proven to run counter to existing 
authorities and practices. Among the efforts currently underway are 
the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System 
(TSCMIS), a DOD-funded program; the Foreign Assistance Dashboard, 
which is limited to budget information; and the UNITY Joint Capability 
Technology Demonstration, in which USAID has participated for the past 
several years. A common problem with these databases is that they are 
not integrated with USAID enterprise databases, and require separate 
data entry. The goal of a common view of U.S. activities overseas 
remains elusive. 

Recommendation 2: To improve transparency and oversight and to 
maximize the benefits derived from U.S. government resources devoted 
to humanitarian/development assistance activities, we recommend that 
the Secretaries of Defense and State, and the Administrator of
USAID collaborate to develop guidance that provides a common 
understanding of the terminology used by Department of Defense (DOD), 
State Department, and USAID related to their humanitarian and 
development assistance efforts. 

USAID Comments: USAID concurs with the recommendation. USAID, DOD and 
State Department are already taking concrete steps in improving 
planning collaboration and coordination among the 3D agencies. The 3D 
agencies are actively working together developing guides, tools and 
other products to improve 3D planning collaboration and coordination 
to achieve the coherence and unity of effort needed to preserve and 
advance U.S. national interests. 

[End of section] 

Appendix XIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Assistant Directors Alissa 
Czyz, Marie Mak, and James Michels; and Renee Brown, Justin Fisher, 
Lonnie McAllister, Meghan Perez, Steven Putansu, Amie Steele, Cheryl 
Weissman, Michael Willems, and Richard Winsor made major contributions 
to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] This policy was initially established in DOD Directive 3000.05, 
Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and 
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (Nov. 28, 2005). The directive was 
subsequently reissued in modified form as DOD Instruction 3000.05, 
Stability Operations (Sept. 16, 2009). 

[2] While DOD conducts a variety of humanitarian assistance programs, 
DOD's two key humanitarian assistance programs are (1) the Overseas 
Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid humanitarian assistance program 
and (2) the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance program. In this report, 
we refer to both programs together as DOD's humanitarian assistance 
efforts. 

[3] Figure is in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars. 

[4] Our prior work has identified critical management steps and 
practices that can help agencies to achieve success, including 
aligning efforts to strategic goals, coordinating with stakeholders, 
collecting complete and accurate data, measuring performance, and 
developing policies to help achieve results. 

[5] The OHDACA humanitarian assistance program is one component 
program funded by the OHDACA appropriation. This report reviews only 
the OHDACA humanitarian assistance program, which will subsequently be 
referred to in this report as the OHDACA program. We did not evaluate 
DOD's other programs under OHDACA, such as the humanitarian mine 
action program and the foreign disaster relief initiative. 

[6] DOD's fiscal year 2010 report to Congress was in draft form and 
had not been submitted to Congress at the time of our review. 

[7] The OHDACA humanitarian assistance program is one component 
program funded by the OHDACA appropriation. This report reviews only 
the OHDACA humanitarian assistance program, which will be referred to 
in this report as the OHDACA program. We did not evaluate DOD's other 
programs under OHDACA, such as the humanitarian mine action program 
and the foreign disaster relief initiative. 

[8] DOD defines HCA as assistance to the local populace provided by 
predominantly U.S. forces in conjunction with military operations and 
exercises limited to certain specific purposes. Additionally, the 
assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally 
create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. Joint Publication 3-
57, Civil Military Operations (July 8, 2008). 

[9] Special Operations Command stated that it does not receive 
humanitarian assistance funding but that its forces may execute 
projects with funding provided to the combatant commands. 

[10] The Defense Security Cooperation Agency fosters security 
cooperation programs vital to U.S. national security to build trust 
and influence in peacetime, to have access to regions of the world 
during times of crisis, and to ensure interoperability with coalition 
partners during times of conflict. Security cooperation programs 
provide financial and technical assistance, ensure transfer of defense 
materiel, provide training and services to friendly countries and 
allies, and promote military-to-military contacts. 

[11] Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-
Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities, Policy Guidance 
for DOD Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP) (November 2009). 

[12] Figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars. 

[13] DOD Instruction 2205.3, Implementing Procedures for the 
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Program (Jan. 27, 1995); DOD 
Instruction 2205.02, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Activities 
(Dec. 2, 2008); and Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 
Policy/Programming Guidance for FY 2008 Humanitarian and Civic 
Assistance (HCA) Projects and Activities (May 1, 2007). 

[14] Figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars. These figures 
do not include some costs associated with HCA activities, such as 
costs for transportation and military personnel. 

[15] Figures are in constant fiscal year 2011 dollars and do not 
include all of the administrative costs associated with these programs. 

[16] According to the Guidance for Employment of the Force and the 
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY 2008, CJCSI 3110.01G (Mar. 1, 
2008), each of the geographic combatant commanders is required to 
produce a theater campaign plan. Furthermore, each geographic 
combatant commander, except the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, is 
also required to develop theater posture plans as annexes to the 
theater campaign plan. 

[17] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[18] Officials from Northern Command explained that their projects are 
developed at the combatant command level rather than the country level 
because DOD staff at the embassies in Mexico and the Bahamas generally 
did not have enough time to plan humanitarian assistance efforts. The 
officials acknowledged that it would be better for the projects to be 
developed at the country level because there would be greater 
familiarity with the country's needs. 

[19] Northern Command officials said that they do not conduct HCA 
activities, and no HCA projects for the command were reported to 
Congress from fiscal years 2005 through 2009; therefore, this 
discussion applies to the remaining five geographic combatant commands. 

[20] USAID said that representatives from its Office of Foreign 
Disaster Assistance are authorized to make decisions and speak on 
behalf of the office. 

[21] In the initiative name, "3Ds" stands for defense, diplomacy, and 
development. The initiative aims to identify and coordinate Pacific 
Command, State, and USAID efforts in the region. For example, in 
Vietnam, Pacific Command recommended coordinating with State and USAID 
on the command's school-building programs, including consulting with 
USAID to determine appropriate school construction sites. 

[22] These personnel figures are intended to provide a general 
understanding of the differing sizes of the agencies and do not 
represent the number of officials dedicated to humanitarian assistance 
efforts. 

[23] GAO, Assessing the Reliability of Computer-Processed Data, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-680G] (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2009), and Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the 
Government Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June 
1996). 

[24] This list of projects was provided to us by the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency, which manages the OHDACA humanitarian assistance 
program. 

[25] Across all of the combatant commands, we found that DOD's 
database had not been updated with actual cost information for 25 
percent of projects marked as completed in the database for fiscal 
year 2007, or 49 out of 196 projects; 32 percent of projects for 
fiscal year 2008, or 119 out of 373 projects; 38 percent of fiscal 
year 2009 projects, or 130 out of 341 projects; and 24 percent of 
fiscal year 2010 projects, or 104 out of 429 projects. Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency officials told us that the data for fiscal 
years 2005 and 2006 might not be reliable because they had been 
imported into the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information 
System from a legacy system, so we excluded those 2 fiscal years from 
this analysis. 

[26] DOD uses another database, the Program Budget Automated System, 
for financial management purposes. However, cost information in this 
database is itemized only to the combatant command level, and thus 
does not provide visibility over the costs of individual projects. 

[27] The annual report is required to include a list of the countries 
in which HCA activities were carried out during the prior fiscal year, 
the type and a description of the activities performed in each 
country, and the amount expended in carrying out each activity. 

[28] Northern Command officials said that they do not conduct HCA 
activities, and no HCA projects were reported to Congress for the 
command from fiscal years 2005 through 2009; therefore, this 
discussion applies to the remaining five geographic combatant commands. 

[29] Defense Security Cooperation Agency officials told us that the 
data for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 might not be reliable because they 
had been imported into the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared 
Information System from a legacy system, so we excluded those 2 fiscal 
years from this analysis. 

[30] Africa Command was designated fully operational on September 30, 
2008, and consolidated responsibilities for DOD activities in Africa 
that had previously been shared by Central, European, and Pacific 
Commands. 

[31] Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-
Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities, Policy Guidance 
for DOD Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP). 

[32] To determine this estimate, we analyzed the presence of completed 
project evaluations in the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared 
Information System in a generalizable random sample of 97 OHDACA 
projects, out of a total of 579 projects, from the list of projects 
funded by the combatant commands from fiscal years 2005 through 2009 
that DOD identified as likely to have been completed and that had 
costs greater than $10,000. All estimates based on our sample are 
subject to sampling error. The margin of error for these estimates is 
no more than plus or minus 10 percentage points at the 95 percent 
level of confidence. In addition, we estimate that 10 percent of the 
projects identified as likely to have been completed had not in fact 
been completed, meaning that no assessments were due at the time that 
we reviewed the project files. 

[33] This confusion concerning the amount of funding available to 
perform project evaluations is caused by the misperception that OHDACA 
funds cannot be used to conduct project evaluations, as discussed 
later in this report. 

[34] GAO, Department of Defense: Changes Needed to the Humanitarian 
and Civic Assistance Program, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-94-57] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 
2, 1993). 

[35] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118]. 

[36] DOD's fiscal year 2008 report to Congress on its HCA efforts 
describes a project that involved assisting the Ugandan government in 
providing healthy livestock to civilians relocating from internally 
displaced persons camps to their former villages, but does not mention 
how the project relates to efforts to combat terrorism in Somalia. 

[37] GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its 
Horn of Africa Task Force, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-504] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 
2010). 

[38] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-207] (Washington, D.C.: January 
2005), and Defense Management: Additional Actions Needed to Enhance 
DOD's Risk-Based Approach for Making Resource Decisions, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-13] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 
2005). 

[39] We did not independently evaluate these resources to assess how 
they might be applied to DOD's efforts. 

[40] The Sphere Project was initiated by a group of nongovernmental 
organizations and the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement. Its goal in 
developing the standards was to improve the quality of humanitarian 
response and enhance the accountability of the system. The Sphere 
Project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian 
Response, 3d ed. (2011). 

[41] We have previously reported on challenges in monitoring and 
evaluating some of USAID's projects. See GAO, Afghanistan Development: 
Enhancements to Performance Management and Evaluation Efforts Could 
Improve USAID's Agricultural Programs, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-368] (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 
2010). 

[42] DOD, Security Assistance Management Manual, DOD 5105.38-M, ch.12 
(Oct. 3, 2003). 

[43] Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-
Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities, Policy Guidance 
for DOD Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP), and DOD 
Instruction 2205.3, Implementing Procedures for the Humanitarian and 
Civic Assistance (HCA) Program. 

[44] GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional 
Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, 
and Information Sharing, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 
2009). 

[45] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance 
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 
2005). 

[46] In the initiative title, "3D" stands for defense, diplomacy, and 
development. 

[47] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. 

[48] For the purposes of our review, we are combining the activities 
performed by State and USAID because while USAID performs a 
significant amount of foreign assistance activities, it performs them 
in close coordination with State and some projects are funded by State. 

[49] USAID officials identified the following development assistance 
accounts as comparable to DOD's humanitarian assistance efforts: the 
Economic Support Fund account; the Development Assistance account; 
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia; the Global Health 
and Child Survival account; and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 
funds for preparedness and disaster risk reduction. 

[50] It is important to note the distinction between overlap and 
duplication. While we found that the potential for overlap exists--
that is, the agencies are performing similar types of efforts, 
sometimes in the same geographic areas--we did not find examples of 
actual duplication of specific projects conducted by DOD and 
State/USAID. However, State and USAID officials cited past instances 
of apparent duplication, such as DOD drilling water wells or building 
schools and clinics near the same areas in which USAID was performing 
similar services. 

[51] We have previously reported that DOD personnel lack expertise in 
performing development assistance-type work in foreign nations. See 
GAO, Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency 
Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-794] (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 
2010), and [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-504]. 

[52] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-368]. 

[53] Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (February 2010). 

[54] The White House, Fact Sheet on U.S. Global Development Policy 
(Washington D.C.: Sept. 22, 2010). 

[55] Department of State and U.S. Agency for International 
Development, Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial 
Diplomacy and Development Review (2010). 

[56] DOD's fiscal year 2010 report to Congress was in draft form and 
had not been submitted to Congress at the time of our review. 

[57] Each of USAID's country profiles, which are posted on [hyperlink, 
http://www.usaid.gov], provides an overview of the agency's programs 
in a particular country. 

[58] The reports provided by DOD included all projects that had a 
status of "completed" in the "team status" database field. 

[59] Defense Security Cooperation Agency officials told us that the 
data for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 might not be reliable because they 
had been imported into the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared 
Information System from a legacy system, so we excluded those 2 fiscal 
years from this analysis. 

[60] We reviewed the "actual cost" database field in DOD's Overseas 
Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System database for all 
OHDACA projects that had been marked with a status of "completed" in 
the "team status" database field. 

[61] At the time of our review, DOD had not yet submitted an HCA 
report to Congress for fiscal year 2010, so that fiscal year was 
excluded from this analysis. 

[End of section] 

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