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Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve' which was released on 
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Report to Congressional Adressees:

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

December 2007: 

Military Base Realignments And Closures: 

Cost Estimates Have Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve: 

GAO-08-159: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-159, a report to congressional addressees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round is the biggest, most 
complex, and costliest ever. DOD viewed this round as a unique 
opportunity to reshape its installations, realign forces to meet its 
needs for the next 20 years, and achieve savings. To realize savings, 
DOD must first invest billions of dollars in facility construction, 
renovation, and other up-front expenses to implement the BRAC 
recommendations. However, recent increases in estimated cost have 
become a concern to some members of Congress.

Under the Comptroller Generalís authority to conduct evaluations on his 
own initiative, GAO (1) compared the BRAC Commissionís cost and savings 
estimates to DODís current estimates, (2) assessed potential for change 
in DODís current estimates, and (3) identified broad implementation 
challenges. GAO compared the BRAC Commissionís estimates, which were 
the closest estimates available associated with final BRAC 
recommendations, to DODís current estimates. GAO also visited 25 
installations and major commands, and interviewed DOD officials. 

What GAO Found: 

Since the BRAC Commission issued its cost and savings estimates in 
2005, DOD plans to spend more and save less, and it will take longer 
than expected to recoup up-front costs. Compared to the BRAC 
Commissionís estimates, DODís cost estimates to implement BRAC 
recommendations increased from $21 billion to $31 billion (48 percent), 
and net annual recurring savings estimates decreased from $4.2 billion 
to $4 billion (5 percent). DODís one-time cost estimates to implement 
over 30 of the 182 recommendations have increased more than $50 million 
each over the BRAC Commissionís estimates, and DODís cost estimates to 
complete 6 of these recommendations have increased by more than $500 
million each. Moreover, GAOís analysis of DODís current estimates shows 
that it will take until 2017 for DOD to recoup up-front costs to 
implement BRAC 2005ó4 years longer than the BRAC Commissionís estimates 
show. Similarly, the BRAC Commission estimated that BRAC 2005 
implementation would save DOD about $36 billion over a 20-year period 
ending in 2025, whereas our analysis shows that BRAC implementation is 
now expected to save about 58 percent less, or about $15 billion.

DODís estimates to implement BRAC recommendations are likely to change 
further due to uncertainties surrounding implementation details and 
potential increases in military construction and environmental cleanup 
costs. Moreover, DOD may have overestimated annual recurring savings by 
about 46 percent or $1.85 billion. DODís estimated annual recurring 
savings of about $4 billion includes $2.17 billion in eliminated 
overhead expenses, which will free up funds that DOD can then use for 
other priorities, but it also includes $1.85 billion in military 
personnel entitlements, such as salaries, for personnel DOD plans to 
transfer to other locations. While DOD disagrees, GAO does not believe 
transferring personnel produces tangible dollar savings since these 
personnel will continue to receive salaries and benefits. Because DODís 
BRAC budget does not explain the difference between savings 
attributable to military personnel entitlements and savings that will 
make funds available for other uses, DOD is generating a false sense 
that all of its reported savings could be used to fund other defense 
priorities.

DOD has made progress in planning for BRAC 2005 implementation, but 
several complex challenges to the implementation of those plans 
increase the risk that DOD might not meet the statutory September 2011 
deadline. DOD faces a number of challenges to synchronize the 
realignment of over 123,000 personnel with the completion of over $21 
billion in new construction or renovation projects by 2011. For 
example, the time frames for completing many BRAC recommendations are 
so closely sequenced and scheduled to be completed in 2011 that any 
significant changes in personnel movement schedules or construction 
delays could jeopardize DODís ability to meet the statutory 2011 
deadline. Additionally, BRAC 2005, unlike prior BRAC rounds, included 
more joint recommendations involving more than one military component, 
thus creating challenges in achieving unity of effort among the 
services and defense agencies. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that DOD explain its estimated BRAC savings from 
personnel reductions as compared to other savings to provide more 
transparency to Congress. DOD concurred with our recommendation and 
agreed to explain savings estimates in its BRAC budget material to 
Congress. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-159]. For more information, contact Brian 
Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or Leporeb@gao.gov.

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DOD Plans to Spend More and Save Less Than Originally Estimated and 
Will Take Longer Than Expected to Recoup Up-Front Costs: 

DODís Estimates to Implement BRAC Recommendations Will Likely Continue 
to Evolve, and Savings Estimates May be Overstated: 

DOD Has Made Progress Implementing BRAC, but Several Challenges 
Increase Risk That All Recommendations Might Not be Completed by the 
Statutory Deadline: 

Conclusion: 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: BRAC Recommendations with the Largest Increases in 
Estimated Costs: 

Appendix III: BRAC Recommendations with the Largest Decreases in 
Estimated Net Annual Recurring Savings: 

Appendix IV: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Cost the Most: 

Appendix V: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Save the Most Annually: 

Appendix VI: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Save the Most Over a 
20-Year Period: 

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Comparison of BRAC Cost and Savings Estimates: 

Table 2: Army Installations Expecting Net Gains of at Least 5,000 
Personnel for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 Due to BRAC, Overseas 
Rebasing, Modularity, and Other Miscellaneous Restationing Actions (as 
of March 2007): 

Table 3: BRAC Recommendations That Increased by More Than $50 Million 
in Estimated One-Time Costs (Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011): 

Table 4: BRAC Recommendations That Have Decreased by More Than $25 
Million in Estimated Net Annual Recurring Savings (Projected for Fiscal 
Year 2012): 

Table 5: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Cost the Most to Implement 
(Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011): 

Table 6: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Save the Most Annually 
After Implementation (Projected for Fiscal Year 2012): 

Table 7: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Save the Most Over a 20-
Year Period (Fiscal Years 2006 through 2025): 

Figures: 

Figure 1: DODís Selection Criteria for the BRAC 2005 Round: 

Figure 2: DODís Review Process of the BRAC 2005 Business Plans: 

Figure 3: Comparison of Time to Recoup BRAC Costs Using BRAC Commission 
and DODís Data: 

Figure 4: Sequencing of Personnel Movement for Several Interdependent 
BRAC Recommendations: 

Abbreviations: 

BRAC: Base Realignment and Closure: 

COBRA: Cost of Base Realignment Actions: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense: 

USACE: United States Army Corps of Engineers: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

December 11, 2007: 

Congressional Addressees: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently implementing 
recommendations resulting from the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) round. BRAC 2005 is the fifth round undertaken by DOD since 1988 
and, by our assessment, is the biggest, most complex, and costliest 
BRAC round ever. With this BRAC round, DOD plans to execute over 
800 BRAC actions, relocate over 123,000 personnel, and spend over 
$31 billionóan unprecedented amount, given that DOD has spent about $24 
billion to date to implement the four previous BRAC rounds combined. 
DOD viewed the BRAC 2005 round as not only an opportunity to achieve 
savings but also as a unique opportunity to reshape its installations 
and realign its forces to meet its needs for the next 20 years. The 
Secretary of Defense made clear at the outset that his primary goal for 
the 2005 BRAC round was military transformation. As such, many of the 
BRAC 2005 recommendations involve complex realignments such as 
designating where forces returning to the United States from overseas 
bases would be located; establishing joint medical centers; creating 
joint bases; and reconfiguring the defense supply, storage, and 
distribution network. However, anticipated savings resulting from BRAC 
implementation remained an important consideration and was a factor in 
justifying the need for the 2005 BRAC round[Footnote 1]. 

Unlike prior BRAC rounds, which were implemented during times of 
declining defense budgets and where the focus was on eliminating excess 
capacity and realizing cost savings, the 2005 BRAC round is being 
implemented during a time of conflict when many military capabilities 
are surging and DOD is also implementing or planning to implement other 
extensive worldwide transformation initiatives. For example, at the 
same time DOD is to implement the most recent round of BRAC, it is 
relocating about 50,000 soldiers[Footnote 2] from primarily Europe and 
Korea to the United States, transforming the Armyís force structure 
from an organization based on divisions to more rapidly deployable, 
brigade-based units, and seeks to increase its active end strength by 
92,000,[Footnote 3] all of which will affect DODís facility 
infrastructure. Consequently, when evaluating DODís candidate BRAC 
recommendations, the BRAC Commission[Footnote 4] focused not only on 
costs and savings but also on DODís future force structure, the ongoing 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and military transformation. In 
addition, both DOD and the BRAC Commission reported that their primary 
consideration in making recommendations for the 2005 round was military 
value.[Footnote 5] To realize savings from BRAC, DOD must first invest 
billions of dollars in facility construction, renovation, and other up-
front expenses to implement the BRAC recommendations. However, some 
members of Congress have expressed concerns about DODís increased up-
front cost estimates to implement the BRAC 2005 recommendations. 

This report is one in a series of reports we have undertaken on BRAC 
2005 implementation. These reports have identified complex challenges 
to implementing recommendations from this BRAC round, including 
retraining personnel to new missions, completing many construction 
projects in a compressed time frame, and synchronizing personnel 
movements with planned infrastructure improvements. We also reported 
that Congress does not have full visibility over the total expected 
cost of DODís BRAC-related environmental cleanup efforts, several Air 
National Guard recommendations are expected to result in annual costs 
instead of annual savings, and DODís cost estimates for implementing 
recommendations related to the Armyís reserve components have increased 
while savings estimates have decreased. A listing of our related 
products is at the end of this report. 

As with most of our BRAC-related work, we initiated this review under 
the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations on his 
own initiative[Footnote 6] and are reporting the results of our 
evaluation to you because of your oversight role of DODís 
infrastructure and the BRAC program. We are also reporting the results 
of our work as a result of direction by the House Armed Services 
Committee to report annually on DODís implementation of BRAC 
2005.[Footnote 7] Our objectives are to (1) compare cost and savings 
estimates in the BRAC Commissionís report to DODís current cost and 
savings estimates, (2) assess the potential for further change in DODís 
estimated costs and savings related to implementing BRAC 2005 
recommendations, and (3) identify broad challenges that could affect 
the implementation of these recommendations and DODís ability to meet 
the statutory 6-year completion period.[Footnote 8] 

To address these objectives, we interviewed officials in the Office of 
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment 
and associated BRAC implementation offices in the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force. To analyze BRAC cost and savings estimates, we compared the 
change in these estimates using mostly information in two publicly 
available documentsóthe BRAC Commissionís report to the President dated 
September 2005 and DODís latest BRAC budget submission to Congress 
dated February 2007óbecause they provided the most authoritative 
financial information publicly available. Also, we compared the BRAC 
Commissionís estimates, which were the closest estimates available 
associated with final BRAC recommendations, to DODís current budgeted 
estimates. To analyze net annual recurring savings estimates, we used 
OSDís savings data for fiscal year 2012óthe fiscal year after DOD 
expects to complete all BRAC recommendationsóbecause it more fully 
captured the expected savings and allowed us to replicate the same 
methodology used by the BRAC Commission in its calculation of this 
estimate. We generally reported costs and savings in current dollars 
and not constant dollars except where noted. Given the unprecedented 
number of BRAC 2005 closures and realignments, we focused our analysis 
on broad issues affecting DODís cost and savings estimates and 
implementation challenges rather than on specific implementation issues 
of individual recommendations. In addition, we visited 17 installations 
and 8 major commands affected by some of the more costly BRAC 
realignments or closures to obtain the perspective of officials 
directly involved in BRAC implementation planning and execution. 
Overall, we determined that the data to support our objectives were 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of making broad comparisons 
between the BRAC Commission and DODís cost and savings estimates and 
identifying implementation challenges. 

We conducted our work from November 2005, when the BRAC recommendations 
became effective, through October 2007, so we could analyze data in 
DODís BRAC budget submission provided to Congress in February 2007. Our 
work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Further details on our scope and methodology are 
described in appendix I.

Results in Brief: 

Since the BRAC Commission issued its BRAC cost and savings projections 
in 2005, DOD plans to spend more and save less to implement the BRAC 
Commissionís recommendations, and it will take the department longer 
than expected to recoup up-front costs. DODís cost estimates to 
implement these recommendations have increased from $21 billion to $31 
billion (48 percent) compared to the BRAC Commissionís estimates, and 
net annual savings estimates have decreased from $4.2 billion to $4 
billion (5 percent) compared to the BRAC Commissionís estimates. 
[Footnote 9] Our analysis further shows that DODís estimated one-time 
costs to implement nearly 1/5 of the 2005 BRAC recommendations have 
increased by more than $50 million each compared to the BRAC 
Commissionís estimates. Of these, the estimated costs to implement six 
recommendations have increased by more than $500 million each. 
Moreover, our analysis of DODís current estimates shows that it will 
take until 2017 for DOD to recoup its up-front costs to implement BRAC 
recommendationsó4 years longer than the BRAC Commissionís estimate. 
Similarly, the BRAC Commission estimated that BRAC 2005 would save DOD 
about $36 billion over a 20-year period ending in 2025, whereas our 
analysis shows BRAC implementation is now expected to save about $15 
billion during this 20-year time period, a decrease of 58 percent, 
because BRAC cost estimates have increased and savings estimates have 
decreased. OSD BRAC officials told us that, although the 20-year 
savings estimate is less than the BRAC Commission expected, the 
department expects the implementation of this BRAC round to produce 
capabilities that will enhance defense operations and management, 
despite less than anticipated savings. In addition, both DOD and the 
BRAC Commission used an estimation model, known as the Cost of Base 
Realignment Actions (COBRA), to assess the costs and savings of 
proposed BRAC recommendations during the decision-making process. The 
COBRA model relied to a large extent on standard factors and averages 
and was not intended to represent budget-quality estimates. As a 
result, neither DODís nor the BRAC Commissionís cost and savings 
estimates can be assumed to represent the actual completion costs that 
Congress will need to fund through appropriations or fully reflect the 
savings to be achieved after implementation. 

DODís estimated costs and savings to implement the recommendations from 
the latest BRAC round are likely to change further due to uncertainties 
surrounding certain implementation details for some recommendations, 
potential increases in military construction costs, and likely 
increases in the cost of environmental cleanup for some BRAC 
properties. Moreover, we believe that DOD may have overstated its net 
annual savings estimates by about 46 percent or $1.85 billion. DODís 
estimated net annual recurring savings of about $4 billion includes 
$2.17 billion in eliminated overhead expenses, which will free up funds 
that DOD can then use for other priorities. However, DODís net annual 
recurring savings estimate also includes $1.85 billion in military 
personnel entitlementsósuch as salaries and housing allowancesófor 
personnel DOD plans to transfer to other locations rather than 
eliminate. While DOD disagrees with us, we do not believe that 
transferring military personnel produces tangible dollar savings 
outside the military personnel accounts since these personnel will 
continue to receive salaries and benefits. Because DODís BRAC budget 
submission to Congress does not explain the difference between net 
annual recurring savings attributable to military personnel 
entitlements and net annual recurring savings that will make funds 
available for other uses, DOD is generating a false sense that all of 
its reported savings could be used to fund other defense priorities.

DOD has made progress in planning for BRAC 2005 implementation, but 
several complex challenges to the implementation of those plans 
increase the risk that DOD might not meet the September 2011 statutory 
deadline. By statute, DOD must complete the recommendations for closing 
or realigning bases made in the BRAC 2005 round within 6 years from the 
date the President submitted to Congress his approval of the BRAC 
Commissionís recommendations. Although DOD has completed several BRAC 
actions already, the department faces a number of challenges related to 
the synchronization and coordination involved in implementing some key 
recommendations. For example, the realignment of over 123,000 military 
and civilian personnel must be carefully synchronized with the 
completion of over $21 billion in new construction or renovation 
projects to support them. In addition, some recommendations are 
dependent on the completion of other recommendations before facilities 
can be renovated for new uses, and some DOD installations are affected 
by more than six BRAC recommendations. Delays in completing some 
interrelated actions could cause a domino effect that might jeopardize 
DODís ability to meet the statutory 2011 BRAC deadline. [Footnote 10] 
In addition, our analysis shows that 43 percent of DODís 240 business 
plans for implementing BRAC recommendations involve formal coordination 
between at least two military services or defense agencies. Such joint 
recommendations involving more than one military component have created 
challenges in achieving unity of effort. 

This report contains a recommendation that DOD explain its annual 
recurring savings attributable to military personnel entitlements in 
its budget submission to Congress, thus providing more transparency 
over these savings. In commenting on a draft of this report, the 
department concurred with our recommendation and agreed to include an 
explanation of the annual recurring savings in its BRAC budget 
justification material that accompanies the annual Presidentís budget. 
Also, DOD noted that although net annual recurring savings have 
decreased from $4.2 billion to $4 billion, these estimated savings 
still represent a significant benefit that will result from the 
implementation of BRAC recommendations. DODís written comments are 
reprinted in appendix VII. DOD also provided technical comments, which 
we have incorporated into this report as appropriate. 

Background: 

DOD has undergone four BRAC rounds since 1988 and is currently 
implementing its fifth round. [Footnote 11] For the most recent BRAC 
roundóreferred to in this report as the BRAC 2005 roundóDOD applied 
legally mandated selection criteria that included four criteria related 
to military value as well as other criteria regarding costs and 
savings, economic impact to local communities, community support 
infrastructure, and environmental impact, as shown in figure 1. 

Figure 1: DODís Selection Criteria for the BRAC 2005 Round: 

[See PDF for image] 

Military value criteria: 

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on 
operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, 
including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness. 

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated 
airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, 
naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain 
areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland 
defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations. 

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and 
future total force requirements at both existing and potential 
receiving locations to support operations and training. 

4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications. 

Other criteria: 

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the 
number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure 
or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs. 

6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of 
military installations. 

7. The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential 
receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel. 

8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to 
potential environmental restoration, waste management, and 
environmental compliance activities. 

Source: Pub. L. No. 101-510, ß 2913. 

[End of figure] 

In applying these BRAC 2005 selection criteria, priority consideration 
was given to military value. In fact, as required by BRAC legislation, 
military value was the primary consideration for making BRAC 
recommendations, as reported by both DOD and the BRAC Commission. DOD 
also incorporated into its analytical process several key 
considerations required by BRAC legislation, including the use of 
certified data and basing its analysis on its 20-year force structure 
plan. [Footnote 12] In commenting on DODís BRAC process in July 2005, 
we reported that DOD established and generally followed a logical and 
reasoned process for formulating its list of BRAC recommendations. 
[Footnote 13] Using this analytical process, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) provided over 200 BRAC recommendations to 
the BRAC Commission for an independent assessment in May 2005. The BRAC 
Commission had the authority to change the Secretaryís recommendations 
if it determined that the Secretary deviated substantially from the 
legally mandated selection criteria and DODís force structure plan. 
After assessing OSDís recommendations, the BRAC Commission stated that 
it rejected 13 recommendations in their entirety and significantly 
modified another 13. Ultimately, the BRAC Commission forwarded a list 
of 182 recommendations for base closure or realignment to the President 
for approval. The BRAC Commissionís recommendations were accepted in 
their entirety by the President and Congress and became effective 
November 9, 2005. [Footnote 14] The BRAC legislation requires DOD to 
complete recommendations for closing or realigning bases made in the 
BRAC 2005 round within a 6-year time frame ending September 15, 2011, 6 
years from the date the President submitted to Congress his approval of 
the recommendations. 

To provide a framework for promoting consistency in estimating the 
costs and savings associated with various proposed BRAC 
recommendations, DOD used an estimation model, known as the Cost of 
Base Realignment Actions (COBRA). [Footnote 15] The COBRA model has 
been used in the base closure process since 1988. It provided important 
financial information to the selection process as decision makers 
weighed the financial implications for various BRAC actions along with 
military value and other selection criteria when arriving at final 
decisions regarding the suitability of BRAC recommendations. [Footnote 
16] In addition, the department designed the model to calculate 
estimated costs and savings associated with actions that are necessary 
to implement BRAC recommendations over the 6-year implementation period 
and to calculate recurring costs or savings thereafter. As such, the 
BRAC Commission continued to use DODís COBRA model for making its cost 
and savings estimates. 

The COBRA model relies to a large extent on standard factors and 
averages but is not intended toóand consequently does notórepresent 
budget-quality estimates. As a result, neither DODís or the BRAC 
Commissionís COBRA-generated estimates can be assumed to represent the 
actual completion costs that Congress will need to fund through 
appropriations or fully reflect the savings to be achieved after 
implementation. We have examined COBRA in the past and have found it to 
be a generally reasonable estimator for comparing potential costs and 
savings among candidate alternatives but have not considered it a tool 
for use in budgeting. [Footnote 17] In the intervening years, COBRA has 
been revised to address certain problems we and others have identified 
after each round. As with any model, the quality of the output is 
dependent on the quality of the input. For example, a DOD analyst could 
assume a building could be renovated to accommodate receiving 
personnel; however, when BRAC implementation began, site surveys showed 
that the building could not be renovated, thus requiring new 
construction that increased estimated costs. 

The model provides a standard quantitative approach to comparing 
estimated costs and savings across various proposed recommendations. In 
this and previous BRAC rounds, DOD subsequently developed budget-
quality estimates once BRAC recommendations became effective. Thus, the 
BRAC Commissionís estimated implementation costs and savings were 
useful for comparing candidate recommendations and DOD has subsequently 
refined these estimates based on better information after conducting 
site surveys. 

BRAC legislation requires DOD to submit an annual schedule containing 
revised BRAC cost and savings estimates for each closure and 
realignment recommendation to Congress. To meet this legislative 
requirement, DOD presents its schedule in its annual BRAC budget 
submission to Congress. For BRAC 2005 recommendations, DODís first 
presentation of its cost and savings schedule was in its fiscal year 
2007 budget submission to Congress in March 2006. However, the 
department stated in its submission that it did not have enough time to 
formulate a reasonable BRAC budget and that the fiscal year 2007 BRAC 
budget submission contained significant funding shortfalls. DODís 
second presentation of its cost and savings schedule was its fiscal 
year 2008 BRAC budget submission to Congress in February 2007. 

For the BRAC 2005 round, the OSD BRAC Officeóunder the oversight of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logisticsóhas monitored the servicesí and defense agenciesí 
implementation progress, analyzed budget justifications for significant 
differences in cost and savings estimates, and facilitated the 
resolution of any challenges that may impair the successful 
implementation of the recommendations within the 6-year completion 
period. To facilitate its oversight role, OSD required the military 
departments and certain defense agencies to submit a detailed business 
plan for each of their recommendations. These business plans include 
information such as a listing of all actions needed to implement each 
recommendation, schedules for personnel movements between 
installations, updated cost and savings estimates based on better and 
updated information, and implementation completion time frames. 
[Footnote 18] OSDís general process for reviewing business plans is 
shown in figure 2. 

Figure 2: DODís Review Process of the BRAC 2005 Business Plans: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of DODís Review Process of the BRAC 2005 
Business Plans. The review process is as follows: 

1) OSD directs military departments and defense agencies to develop 
about 240 business plans as the foundation in BRAC implementation 
planning. OSD reviews these plans twice per year to assess updated 
information. 

[Submit business plans and amended plans] 

2) OSD BRAC Office[a] reviews business plans and amended business plans 
for completeness and accuracy. Return business plan for revision, if 
necessary (step 1). 

[Submit business plans and amended plans] 

3) Infrastructure Steering Group[b] reviews and approves plans. Return 
business plan for revision, if necessary (step 1). 

4) Business plans provide DOD the budgetary basis for BRAC funding 
requests to Congress. 

Source: GAO. 

[a] OSD BRAC Office oversees the planning and execution of the BRAC 
2005 program. 

[b] The Secretary of Defense established the Infrastructure Steering 
Group to oversee the BRAC 2005 process. The group is chaired by the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), and 
composed of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service 
Vice Chiefs, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and 
Environment), and the Military Department Assistant Secretaries for 
Installations and Environment. 

[End of figure] 

OSD BRAC officials consider their business plans to be living documents 
that will evolve over the course of the 6-year implementation period. 
Additionally, OSDís General Counsel assesses whether the business plans 
meet the intent of the BRAC Commissionís recommendations. 

DOD Plans to Spend More and Save Less Than Originally Estimated and 
Will Take Longer Than Expected to Recoup Up-Front Costs: 

Compared to the BRAC Commissionís estimates, DOD plans to spend more 
and save less to implement BRAC recommendations than the BRAC 
Commission originally estimated, and it will take longer than expected 
for DOD to recoup its up-front costs. Since the BRAC Commission issued 
its cost and savings estimates in 2005, DODís reported estimates of the 
costs to implement about 180 BRAC recommendations have increased by $10 
billion to about $31.2 billion while annual savings estimates have 
decreased by about $200 millionó$4.2 billion to $4 billion. Moreover, 
our analysis of DODís current estimates shows that it will take until 
2017 for the department to recoup its up-front costs to implement BRAC 
recommendationsó4 years longer than the BRAC Commissionís estimates 
indicate this would happen. Similarly, whereas the BRAC Commission 
estimated that the implementation of the BRAC 2005 recommendations 
would save DOD about $36 billion over a 20-year period ending in 2025, 
BRAC implementation is now expected to save about $15 billion, a 
decrease of 58 percent. 

DOD Plans to Spend More and Save Less Than Originally Estimated: 

Since the BRAC Commission issued its cost and savings projections in 
2005, cost estimates to implement the BRAC 2005 recommendations have 
increased from $21 billion to $31 billion (48 percent) compared to the 
BRAC Commissionís reported estimates [Footnote 19] and net annual 
recurring savings estimates have decreased from $4.2 billion to $4 
billion (5 percent) compared to the BRAC Commissionís reported 
estimates as shown in table 1. 

Table 1: Comparison of BRAC Cost and Savings Estimates (Dollars in 
millions): 

Category: One-time costs during implementation (fiscal years 2006 
through 2011); 
BRAC Commissionís reported estimates[a]: $21,025; 
DODís estimates[b]: $31,160; 
Difference, Amount: $10,135; 
Difference, Percent: 48. 

Category: Net annual recurring savings after implementation (fiscal 
years 2012 through 2025); 
BRAC Commissionís reported estimates[a]: 4,225; 
DODís estimates[b]: 4,014; 
Difference, Amount: (212); 
Difference, Percent: (5). 

Source: GAO analysis of BRAC Commission and DOD data. 

Notes: Amounts may not total due to rounding. 

[a] The BRAC Commission reported its estimates in constant fiscal year 
2005 dollars (i.e., does not include projected inflation). Also, OSD 
officials told us they disagreed with the BRAC Commissionís reported 
estimates for 18 recommendations and would increase one-time costs 
during BRAC implementation by about $224 million and increase net 
annual recurring savings after implementation by about $144 million to 
the BRAC Commissionís estimates shown in this table. 

[b] DOD reported its BRAC estimates in the fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget 
submission to Congress in current dollars (i.e., includes projected 
inflation). 

[End of table] 

A comparison of the BRAC Commissionís reported projections with DODís 
data shows that estimated implementation costs have increased by $10.1 
billion or 48 percent and estimated net annual recurring savings have 
decreased by $212 million or 5 percent. However, another way to compare 
expected BRAC costs and saving is by omitting the effects of inflation. 
We found that using the same constant dollar basis as used by the BRAC 
Commissionómeaning inflation is not consideredóDODís estimated one-time 
costs to implement BRAC increased to about $28.6 billion or 36 percent 
in constant dollars and estimated net annual recurring savings 
decreased to about $3.4 billion or 20 percent in constant dollars 
compared to the BRAC Commissionís reported estimates. 

We found that estimated military construction costs accounted for about 
64 percent of the increase in expected BRAC one-time costs. 
Specifically, the BRAC Commission estimated that to implement the BRAC 
recommendations, military construction costs would be about $13 
billion, whereas DODís current estimates for military construction, 
without inflation, were about $20 billion. We estimated that inflation 
accounted for about 25 percent, or about $2.6 billion of the increase 
in expected one-time costs. This mostly occurred because the BRAC 
Commission presented its estimates using constant fiscal year 2005 
dollars, which does not include the effects of projected inflation, 
whereas DODís budgeted estimates were presented in current (inflated) 
dollars because budget requests take into consideration projected 
inflation. Further, the BRAC Commission estimates did not include 
projected environmental cleanup costs for BRAC-affected bases, which is 
a consistent practice with past BRAC rounds because DOD is required to 
perform needed environmental cleanup on its property whether a base is 
closed, realigned, or remains open. Environmental cleanup added about 6 
percent, or about $590 million in expected costs. Finally, other 
projected expenses such as operation and maintenance accounted for 
about 5 percent or about $500 million of the increase in expected 
costs. Because the BRAC Commissionís data do not include some specific 
budget categories that are used in the DOD BRAC budget, we could not 
make direct comparisons and precisely identify all estimated cost and 
savings changes. 

Estimated One-time Costs Have Increased: 

Our analysis shows that estimated one-time costs to implement 33 BRAC 
recommendations, representing nearly 1/5 of all the BRAC 
recommendations for this round, increased by more than $50 million each 
compared to the BRAC Commissionís estimates. (See app. II for a listing 
of these recommendations.) DODís expected costs to implement 6 of these 
recommendations increased by a total of about $4 billion. Specifically, 
we found about: 

* $970 million increase in the estimated costs of consolidating various 
leased locations and closing other locations of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency to Fort Belvoir, Virginia, largely because the 
agency identified the need for additional supporting facilities, such 
as a technology center and additional warehouse space, as well as 
increased costs for information technology and furnishings to outfit 
the new buildings. According to OSDís business plan, the COBRA analysis 
of specific costs and the number of personnel to realign were 
classified; 

* $700 million increase in the estimated costs of realigning Walter 
Reed Army Medical Center, D.C., and relocating medical care functions 
to the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland, and Fort 
Belvoir, Virginia, largely because planning officials identified the 
need for additional space and supporting facilities at the receiving 
installations that increased estimated military construction costs by 
almost $440 million. Most of these estimated cost increases are 
expected to occur at the National Naval Medical Center, Maryland, 
because of increased requirements to renovate existing facilities, such 
as the medical center. Additionally, several other facilities, such as 
a parking structure and a larger than-initially-expected addition to 
the medical center, increased the construction cost estimates as well; 

* $680 million increase in the estimated costs of relocating the Armyís 
armor center and school from Fort Knox, Kentucky, to Fort Benning, 
Georgia, to support the creation of a new maneuver school, largely 
because the Army identified the need for about $400 million in 
construction of several facility projects, such as training ranges, 
instructional facilities, barracks, medical facilities, and a child 
development center that were not in the initial estimates. Also, the 
Army identified the need for about $280 million more in infrastructure 
support, such as water, sewer, and gas lines, as well as roads to 
support the new maneuver school at Fort Benning; 

* $680 million increase in the estimated costs of closing Fort 
Monmouth, New Jersey, largely because of increases in expected military 
construction costs, such as $375 million at Aberdeen Proving Ground, 
which is to receive many of the missions from the planned closure of 
Fort Monmouth and for additional facilities, such as a communications 
equipment building and an instructional auditorium. Also, the Army 
identified the need for additional infrastructure improvements at 
Aberdeen such as utilities, roads, and information technology upgrades. 
The Army determined that its military construction estimates would 
increase because the existing facilities at Aberdeen could not 
accommodate an increase in size of Fort Monmouthís Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance mission as originally estimated. Moreover, military 
construction costs to relocate the U.S. Army Military Academy 
Preparatory School from Fort Monmouth to West Point, New York, 
increased about $175 million largely because the scope of the facility 
construction increased from approximately 80,000 square feet to more 
than 250,000 square feet and planning officials identified the need to 
spend about $40 million to prepare the site for construction, 
particularly for rock removal, given the terrain at West Point. Also, 
DODís cost estimates for environmental cleanup at Fort Monmouth have 
increased by more than $60 million; 

* $600 million increase in the estimated costs of co-locating 
miscellaneous OSD, defense agency, and field activity-leased locations 
to Fort Belvoir and Fort Lee, Virginia, largely due to increases in 
military construction cost due to the identification of various 
required facilities at the receiving installations not included in the 
original estimate. For example, construction costs increased because it 
was determined a structured parking garage costing about $160 million 
would be needed to accommodate the increase in personnel with parking 
needs compared to the original nearly $3 million estimate for a flat 
surface parking lot. An additional estimated cost increase of nearly 
$50 million is needed to cover the costs for a heating and cooling 
plant and various safety and antiterrorism protection features. 
Estimated costs also increased by more than $160 million to implement 
this recommendation for increased information technology needs; and: 

* $550 million increase in the estimated costs of establishing the San 
Antonio Regional Medical Center and realigning enlisted medical 
training to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, largely because planning officials 
identified additional requirements to move medical inpatient care 
functions from Wilford Hall Medical Center at Lackland Air Force Base, 
Texas to Fort Sam Houston, including operating rooms and laboratory 
facilities not included in the original estimate. Additionally, 
requirements for more instructional and laboratory space increased to 
accommodate an increase in the number of students expected to receive 
medical training at Fort Sam Houston. Based on the services conducting 
additional analysis and using other planning assumptions, the number of 
students now expected to arrive at Fort Sam Houston for medical 
enlisted training increased by more than 2,700 (44 percent)ófrom about 
6,270 students to approximately 9,000 students. 

BRAC implementing officials told us that information gained from site 
visits, such as better information on the actual condition and 
availability of certain facilities, was a key factor as to why the 
departmentís estimates changed from the BRAC Commissionís estimates. 
For example, DODís estimated cost increased over earlier projections as 
a result of better data becoming available on the realignment of the 
Army Forces Command headquarters due to the closure of Fort McPherson, 
Georgia. These data showed the Command realigned to Fort Bragg and Pope 
Air Force Base, North Carolina would be located in over 20 different 
buildings. The Army decided, therefore, to preserve existing 
operational efficiencies by keeping the entire Command intact in one 
location, as it is now at Fort McPherson, by building a new facility at 
Fort Bragg although this plan led to the increase in expected costs to 
implement the recommendation. 

Moreover, data for some recommendations changed as certain requirements 
became better defined over time. For example, personnel requirements 
related to the recommendation to activate a brigade combat team and its 
associated headquarters unit at Fort Hood, Texas, and then relocate it 
to Fort Carson, Colorado, became better defined after the BRAC 
Commission made its estimates. During the BRAC decision-making process 
in 2005, the Army planned its facility requirement on about 3,200 
soldiers per brigade combat team but subsequently increased the 
personnel requirement to 3,900 soldiers per brigade combat team as it 
budgeted for needed facilities in formulating the fiscal year 2008 BRAC 
budget submission. Likewise, the personnel requirement in providing 
facilities for an associated headquarters unit increased from 300 
soldiers in the initial analysis to 900, thus increasing the expected 
costs. Thus, the number of personnel to be accommodated at Fort Carson 
in order to implement this BRAC recommendation increased by 37 percent 
from what was initially expected, which in turn increased the size of 
the facilities necessary to house the additional soldiers expected to 
arrive at Fort Carson, leading to an increase in expected cost to 
implement this recommendation. 

As in all previous BRAC rounds, the BRAC Commission used DODís COBRA 
model to generate its estimates. Both we and the BRAC Commission 
acknowledged in our respective BRAC 2005 reports that the COBRA model, 
while valuable as a comparative tool, does not provide estimates that 
DOD is expected to use in formulating the BRAC budget and against which 
Congress will appropriate funds. We have stated that COBRA does not 
necessarily reflect with a high degree of precision the actual costs or 
savings that are ultimately associated with BRAC implementation. We 
have also stated that the services are expected to refine COBRA 
estimates following the BRAC decision-making process to better reflect 
expected costs and savings using site-specific information. While COBRA 
estimates do not reflect the actual costs and savings ultimately 
attributable to BRAC, we have recognized in the past and continue to 
believe that COBRA is a reasonably effective tool for the purpose for 
which it was designedóto aid in BRAC decision makingóand that the BRAC 
Commissionís COBRA-generated estimates are the only reasonable baseline 
to use to identify BRAC cost and savings changes since the 
recommendations became effective. [Footnote 20] 

Savings Estimates Have Decreased: 

Our analysis shows that estimated net annual recurring savings to 
implement 13 BRAC recommendations decreased by more than $25 million 
each compared to the BRAC Commissionís estimates. (See app. III for a 
listing of these recommendations.) The BRAC Commission estimated that 
BRAC 2005 would result in net annual recurring savings of $4.2 billion 
beginning in fiscal year 2012; however, we calculated that the net 
annual recurring savings have decreased to $4 billion (5 percent).21 
DOD attributed the decrease in its savings estimate primarily to 
changes in initial assumptions or plans. We identified several BRAC 
recommendations for which savings estimates decreased compared to the 
BRAC Commissionís estimates. Specifically, we found about: 

* $90 million decrease in the estimated savings of closing various 
leased locations of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and 
realigning other locations to Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Initially, 
officials at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the OSD 
BRAC Office explained that fewer personnel eliminations caused some of 
the decrease in savings. Additionally, the day before we released this 
draft for comment, an OSD BRAC Office official explained to us that 
they under reported the estimated savings from expected lease 
terminations in the fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget submission. However, 
time did not permit us to analyze this information. 

* $80 million decrease in the estimated savings of closing three 
chemical demilitarization depots (Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah; Newport 
Chemical Depot, Indiana; and Umatilla Chemical Depot, Oregon), largely 
because the Army expects not to close these facilities within the BRAC 
statutory implementation time frame because DOD must complete the 
chemical demilitarization mission to comply with treaty obligations 
before these facilities can close, which resulted in less expected 
savings; 

* $70 million decrease in the estimated savings of establishing joint 
bases at multiple locations, largely because the Army did not include 
its share of the expected savings due to unresolved issues concerning 
joint base operations, whereas the other services included the COBRA-
generated savings in DODís BRAC budget submission to Congress. OSD had 
not approved the business plan for this recommendation; thus additional 
information on expected savings was not available for us to review; 
and: 

* $50 million savings decrease in realigning the Defense Logistics 
Agencyís supply, storage, and distribution network, largely because of 
the need to retain higher inventory levels than anticipated and less 
personnel elimination. 

DOD Will Take Longer to Recoup Up-Front Costs Than the BRAC Commission 
Expected: 

DODís current estimates to implement the BRAC recommendations show that 
it will take until 2017 for the department to recoup its up-front 
costsó4 years longer than the BRAC Commissionís estimates indicated it 
would take for DODís up-front investments to begin to pay back. 
[Footnote 22] Historically, it has taken DOD about 6Ĺ years to recoup 
up-front costs for actions such as constructing new facilities, 
providing civilian severance pay, or moving personnel and equipment as 
a result of implementing BRAC recommendations. Our analysis of the BRAC 
Commissionís estimates shows that the time required to recoup such 
costs would be 8 years, or in 2013. However, using DODís current 
estimates, our analysis shows that the time required to recoup costs 
would be 12 years, or in 2017, as shown in figure 3. 

Figure 3: Comparison of Time to Recoup BRAC Costs Using BRAC Commission 
and DODís Data (constant fiscal year 2005 dollars in billions): 

[See PDF for image] 

Six-year statutory implementation period is from 2006 through 2001. 

Fiscal Year: 2006; 
Cumulative net savings based on DOD current estimates: 0.1; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on DOD current estimates: 1.5; 
Cumulative net savings based on BRAC Commission estimates: 0.2; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on BRAC Commission estimates: 3.5. 

Fiscal Year: 2007; 
Cumulative net savings based on DOD current estimates: 0.6; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on DOD current estimates: 6.9; 
Cumulative net savings based on BRAC Commission estimates: 1.1; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on BRAC Commission estimates: 11.5. 

Fiscal Year: 2008; 
Cumulative net savings based on DOD current estimates: 1.6; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on DOD current estimates: 14.5; 
Cumulative net savings based on BRAC Commission estimates: 3.3; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on BRAC Commission estimates: 16.8. 

Fiscal Year: 2009; 
Cumulative net savings based on DOD current estimates: 3.4; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on DOD current estimates: 21.7; 
Cumulative net savings based on BRAC Commission estimates: 7.0; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on BRAC Commission estimates: 19.4. 

Fiscal Year: 2010: 
Cumulative net savings based on DOD current estimates: 6.0; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on DOD current estimates: 26.7; 
Cumulative net savings based on BRAC Commission estimates: 11.4; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on BRAC Commission estimates: 20.8. 

Fiscal Year: 2011; 
Cumulative net savings based on DOD current estimates: 9.2; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on DOD current estimates: 28.6; 
Cumulative net savings based on BRAC Commission estimates: 15.5; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on BRAC Commission estimates: 21.0. 

Fiscal Year: 2012; 
Cumulative net savings based on DOD current estimates: 12.6; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on DOD current estimates: 28.6; 
Cumulative net savings based on BRAC Commission estimates: 19.8; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on BRAC Commission estimates: 21.0. 

Fiscal Year: 2013: 
Cumulative net savings based on DOD current estimates: 16.0; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on DOD current estimates: 28.6; 
Cumulative net savings based on BRAC Commission estimates: 24.0; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on BRAC Commission estimates: 21.0. 

Fiscal Year: 2014; 
Cumulative net savings based on DOD current estimates: 19.3; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on DOD current estimates: 28.6; 
Cumulative net savings based on BRAC Commission estimates: 28.2; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on BRAC Commission estimates: 21.0. 

Fiscal Year: 2015; 
Cumulative net savings based on DOD current estimates: 22.7; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on DOD current estimates: 28.6; 
Cumulative net savings based on BRAC Commission estimates: 32.4; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on BRAC Commission estimates: 21.0. 

Fiscal Year: 2016; 
Cumulative net savings based on DOD current estimates: 26.1; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on DOD current estimates: 28.6; 
Cumulative net savings based on BRAC Commission estimates: 36.7; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on BRAC Commission estimates: 21.0. 

Fiscal Year: 2017; 
Cumulative net savings based on DOD current estimates: 29.5; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on DOD current estimates: 28.6; 
Cumulative net savings based on BRAC Commission estimates: 40.9; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on BRAC Commission estimates: 21.0. 

Fiscal Year: 2018;
Cumulative net savings based on DOD current estimates: 32.8; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on DOD current estimates: 28.6; 
Cumulative net savings based on BRAC Commission estimates: 45.1; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on BRAC Commission estimates: 21.0. 

Fiscal Year: 2019; 
Cumulative net savings based on DOD current estimates: 36.2; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on DOD current estimates: 28.6; 
Cumulative net savings based on BRAC Commission estimates: 49.4; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on BRAC Commission estimates: 21.0. 

Fiscal Year: 2020; 
Cumulative net savings based on DOD current estimates: 39.6; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on DOD current estimates: 28.6; 
Cumulative net savings based on BRAC Commission estimates: 53.6; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on BRAC Commission estimates: 21.0. 

Fiscal Year: 2021; 
Cumulative net savings based on DOD current estimates: 42.9; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on DOD current estimates: 28.6; 
Cumulative net savings based on BRAC Commission estimates: 57.8; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on BRAC Commission estimates: 21.0. 

Fiscal Year: 2022; 
Cumulative net savings based on DOD current estimates: 46.3; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on DOD current estimates: 28.6; 
Cumulative net savings based on BRAC Commission estimates: 62.0; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on BRAC Commission estimates: 21.0. 

Fiscal Year: 2023; 
Cumulative net savings based on DOD current estimates: 49.7; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on DOD current estimates: 28.6; 
Cumulative net savings based on BRAC Commission estimates: 66.3; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on BRAC Commission estimates: 21.0. 

Fiscal Year: 2024; 
Cumulative net savings based on DOD current estimates: 53.0; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on DOD current estimates: 28.6; 
Cumulative net savings based on BRAC Commission estimates: 70.5; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on BRAC Commission estimates: 21.0. 

Fiscal Year: 2025; 
Cumulative net savings based on DOD current estimates: 56.4; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on DOD current estimates: 28.6; 
Cumulative net savings based on BRAC Commission estimates: 74.7; 
Cumulative one-time costs based on BRAC Commission estimates: 21.0. 

DOD current estimates indicate cumulative savings will exceed 
cumulative costs in fiscal year 2013. 

BRAC Commission estimates indicate cumulative savings will exceed 
cumulative costs in fiscal year 2017. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and BRAC data. 

[End of table] 

Similarly, because DOD expects to spend more and save less compared to 
the BRAC Commissionís estimates, projected 20-year savings have 
decreased by more than half. [Footnote 23] The BRAC Commission 
estimated that the implementation of this BRAC round would save about 
$36 billion over a 20-year period ending in 2025. However, based on our 
analysis of DODís current estimates, implementation of this BRAC round 
will save about $15 billion, a decrease of $21 billion (58 percent), in 
fiscal year 2005 constant dollars. OSD BRAC officials told us that, 
although the 20-year savings estimate is less than the BRAC Commission 
expected, the department expects the implementation of this BRAC round 
to produce capabilities that will enhance defense operations and 
management, despite less than anticipated savings. 

Moreover, DOD expects a majority of the expected costs and savings to 
be related to the implementation of a small percentage of the BRAC 
recommendations. For example, we determined that DOD expects the 
implementation of about 13 percent of the recommendations to incur 65 
percent of the expected one-time costs (see app. IV); 15 percent of the 
recommendations to generate 85 percent of the expected annual recurring 
savings (see app. V); and 16 percent of the recommendations to generate 
85 percent of the expected 20-year savings (see app. VI).

DODís Estimates to Implement BRAC Recommendations Will Likely Continue 
to Evolve, and Savings Estimates May be Overstated: 

Based on our analysis, we believe DODís cost and savings estimates to 
implement the BRAC 2005 recommendations are likely to continue to 
evolve in future BRAC budget submissions. First, DODís estimates for 
some key recommendations are uncertain because they are based on 
implementation details that are still evolving, especially for some 
complex recommendations such as establishing 12 new joint bases. 
Second, military construction costs could increase due to various 
economic factors and a possible readjustment of Army construction 
costs. Third, environmental cleanup costs for BRAC implementation are 
preliminary and are likely to increase. Furthermore, we believe that 
DODís annual recurring savings estimates may be overstated, largely 
because 46 percent of this savings is due to questionable military 
personnel savings.

Details for Several Key Recommendations Are Uncertain and Estimates Are 
Likely to Change: 

Many details involved in the implementation of several key BRAC 
recommendations were uncertain when the department submitted its fiscal 
year 2008 BRAC budget submission to Congress in February 2007; thus, 
these estimates are likely to continue to change in succeeding BRAC 
budget submissions. OSD officials told us that some estimates could 
change as implementation planning progresses and that initial planning 
for many recommendations was very difficult but they wanted to provide 
Congress with the best budget data available at the time of the budget 
submission. However, until DOD resolves implementation details 
surrounding its BRAC recommendations, it will continue to have 
difficulty in more precisely estimating costs and savings and the 
resolution of these details could cause the departmentís cost and 
savings estimates to change. For example: 

* Realigning Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C. Multiple 
groups reviewed current and future medical care for wounded soldiers, 
and DOD officials told us that cost estimates in DODís next BRAC budget 
submission to Congress could change pending the outcomes of these 
various review groups. OSD officials told us implementation costs will 
likely increase from the reported $1.7 billion estimate if the time 
frame to complete the recommendation is accelerated, as recommended by 
OSDís independent panel to review current rehabilitative care at Walter 
Reed. [Footnote 24] 

* Co-locating miscellaneous OSD, defense agency, and field activity 
leased locations to Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The Army had planned to 
relocate these agencies and activities to Fort Belvoirís Engineering 
Proving Ground, but in August 2007 the Army announced it is considering 
a nearby location currently belonging to the U.S. General Services 
Administration in Springfield, Virginia. Then, in October 2007, the 
Army announced it is also considering another site in Northern Virginia 
for relocating about 6,000 personnel. The reported cost estimate of 
$1.2 billion to implement this recommendation is likely to change 
depending on the Armyís site location for relocating these OSD offices, 
defense agencies, and defense field activities. 

* Establishing Army Centers of Excellence at several locations. The 
Army was not certain about the number of personnel it expected to 
eliminate as a result of combining several Army schools and centers at 
the time of the fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget submission to Congress. 
[Footnote 25] Based on our analysis, once the Army resolves the 
implementation details for these recommendations, the combined net 
annual savings estimate of $332 million is likely to change in the next 
BRAC budget submission. 

* Realigning Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The decision as to where to 
relocate on Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, the Armyís 7th Special 
Forces Group currently located at Fort Bragg remained uncertain as of 
August 2007. According to officials at Eglin, the planned location of 
the Special Forces Group could change because of various space and 
noise issues associated with the installationís implementation of 
another BRAC recommendation to establish a joint training site for the 
Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, also at Eglin Air Force Base. DODís 
estimated $343 million in cost in its fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget 
submission to Congress would change depending on the final site 
location for the 7th Special Forces Group at Eglin. 

* Establishing joint basing at multiple locations. The services have 
yet to agree on many of the details involved with this recommendation 
to create 12 joint bases. According to BRAC implementing officials and 
recent testimony before Congress, it is still uncertain what the 
organizational and personnel requirements will be for these joint 
bases, thus making it difficult to provide a realistic estimate on the 
costs or savings from implementing this recommendation. DOD is 
currently estimating net savings of $116 million annually. 

* Realigning medical enlisted training at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Part 
of this recommendation required the services to co-locate their medical 
training to one location with the potential of transitioning to a joint 
training effort. Fort Sam Houston officials told us that the expected 
savings from this recommendation were anticipated based on a joint 
training effort. However, BRAC implementing officials told us the 
services had not yet agreed on the final joint curriculum when the 
fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget submission was provided to Congress; thus 
the number of instructors needed and several other details remained 
uncertain. These officials told us that once these details become 
final, the amount of expected net savings, which DOD estimated to be 
about $91 million annually, could change for this recommendation. 

* Creating a Naval Integrated Weapons and Armaments Research, 
Development and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation Center mostly at Naval 
Air Weapons Station China Lake, California. Navy officials told us they 
were uncertain how many personnel associated with a testing range 
mission will realign as they plan for the implementation of this 
recommendation. Moreover, the DOD Inspector General recently reported 
that the Navy did not adequately document the number of personnel 
expected to realign in this recommendationís proposed business plan, 
citing that the number of personnel to move has ranged from about 1,660 
to nearly 650. [Footnote 26] Until OSD resolves implementation details 
surrounding this recommendation, it will continue to have difficulty in 
more precisely estimating the associated costs and savings. DOD 
estimated it will cost about $427 million to implement this 
recommendation as presented in the fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget 
submission and OSD estimated it will accrue a net recurring savings of 
$68 million annually after 2011. 

* Co-locating medical command headquarters. Various BRAC implementing 
officials associated with planning the implementation for this 
recommendation told us that depending on the still undecided final site 
location and the number of personnel to relocate, the $50 million in 
estimated costs to implement this recommendation could likely change. 
These recommendations illustrate the evolving nature of implementation 
planning and the likelihood that the associated cost and savings 
estimates could likely change. They are not the only recommendations 
which may experience changes in costs or savings; however, they are 
some of the recommendations from which DOD expects to incur the most 
costs and savings relative to other BRAC 2005 recommendations. Thus, 
changes to cost and savings estimates related to these recommendations 
will have a larger effect on the overall BRAC implementation estimates. 

Military Construction Costs Could Increase: 

Military construction costs could increase due to various economic 
pressures and if the Armyís new initiatives designed to reduce 
construction costs do not achieve the planned results. DODís current 
cost estimates of $31 billion to implement the BRAC recommendations 
involve about $21 billion in estimated costs for military construction 
that could likely increase because of greater than expected inflation 
and the market demand for new construction. Since the majority of 
expected BRAC costs are for military construction, systemic increases 
in the cost of construction could have a considerable effect on the 
total cost to implement BRAC 2005. This change is important because 
DODís estimate of $21 billion in military construction is the single 
largest cost item associated with implementing BRAC 2005 
recommendations and is unprecedented given that DOD spent less than $7 
billion for military construction in the four previous BRAC rounds 
combined. In addition, we recognize that determining costs in 
construction programs that span years of effort is difficult. As such, 
DOD told us they will continue to monitor reasons for potential cost 
growth for BRAC construction contracts. 

Additionally, BRAC implementing officials expressed concern that 
construction costs have the potential to increase in areas already 
experiencing high commercial construction demands such as the National 
Capital Region, Washington, D.C. and San Antonio, Texas. For example, 
DOD estimated it could cost about $3.4 billion in construction to 
implement several recommendations in the National Capital Region, 
Washington, D.C. (the realignment of Walter Reed Medical Center, the 
relocation of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the 
realignment to Fort Belvoir due to numerous terminations of DOD-leased 
space in the Washington, D.C. area). Moreover, DOD estimated it could 
cost about $1.3 billion in construction to implement the recommendation 
to establish a new joint medical enlisted training center and relocate 
Lackland Air Force Baseís medical inpatient care to Fort Sam Houston, 
San Antonio, Texas. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) officials told 
us they are concerned about what effect construction demand might have 
on bid proposals given the sizable amount of construction to take place 
in a limited amount of time to meet the BRAC statutory completion time 
frame. Additionally, service officials at various installations 
expressed concern about the potential for increases in construction 
costs because of ongoing reconstruction due to damage caused by 
Hurricane Katrina, coupled with the large volume of anticipated BRAC 
construction that could also affect bid proposals. 

Similar to the current commercial construction market in general, 
military construction has been affected by rising costs for 
construction labor and materials for the last several years. USACE 
officials told us the actual rate of construction inflation for the 
last several years has exceeded the federal governmentís inflation rate 
used for budgetary purposes, which is required to be used in budgeting 
for construction projects. While this difference was as high as 6.1 
percentage points in 2004, the difference between the actual rate of 
construction inflation and the governmentís budgetary inflation rate 
has diminished recently. USACE officials told us that if the extent to 
which the actual rate of inflation continues to exceed the budgeted 
rate as implementation proceeds, and if construction material costs are 
higher than anticipated, they would either have to redirect funding 
from other sources to provide for construction projects or resort to a 
reduction in the scope of some construction projects. However, this 
trend may not necessarily continue into the future depending on the 
economics surrounding the construction industry. 

USACE is currently transforming and streamlining its process for 
managing and contracting for military construction. USACE officials 
told us that these transformation efforts could help in meeting Armyís 
expected large volume of military construction as well as costs 
associated with BRAC and other force structure initiatives such as 
overseas rebasing and Army modularity. USACE has developed a strategy 
intended to reduce construction costs by 15 percent and reduce 
construction time by 30 percent. Through its transformation strategy, 
USACE intends to change how it executes construction projects by: 

* standardizing facility designs and processes; 
* expanding the use of premanufactured building where sections or 
modules of a building are constructed and transported to a construction 
site to be assembled; 
* executing military construction as a continuous building program 
rather than a collection of individual construction projects, and; 
* emphasizing commercial rather that government building standards, 
which would allow contractors greater flexibility to use a wider 
variety of construction materials to meet construction requirements. 

The Army has already incorporated a 15 percent reduction into its BRAC 
construction estimates and has budgeted accordingly. Although USACE 
officials expressed optimism that these cost savings will be realized, 
and preliminary results are encouraging, these results are based on 
recent, limited experience using this new process. Specifically, USACE 
initiated five construction pilots in 2006, all of which were awarded 
under its price limit. However, if the cost of construction materials 
escalates or if there is a shortage of construction labor, especially 
in locations of high construction volume such as Washington, D.C, and 
San Antonio, Texas, USACE told us that some of the expected military 
construction transformation savings could decrease. Given that the Army 
is expected to incur almost 60 percent of the estimated BRAC 
construction costs ($12 billion), the impact on overall BRAC costs if 
the Army is unable to achieve its projected 15 percent savings could be 
considerable, especially since USACE officials told us the majority of 
the Armyís BRAC-related construction projects incorporated the 15 
percent reduction into their estimates. 

Environmental Cleanup Costs Are Preliminary and Likely to Increase: 

We reported in January 2007 that DODís available data showed that at 
least $950 million will be needed to complete environmental cleanups 
underway for known hazards on the military bases scheduled for closure 
as a result of the BRAC 2005 round. [Footnote 27] Our prior work has 
shown that some closures result in more intensive environmental 
investigations and the uncovering of additional hazardous 
contaminations, thus resulting in higher cleanup costs than DOD 
predicted and budgeted. For example, additional hazardous 
contaminations were found at the former McClellan Air Force Base, 
California, which was recommended for closure in 1995. The discovery of 
traces of plutonium during a routine cleanup in 2000 caused cleanup 
costs to increase by $21 million. However, as certain bases undergo 
more complete and in-depth environmental assessments, a clearer picture 
of environmental cleanup costs will likely emerge. 

Annual Recurring Savings Estimates May be Overstated: 

DODís estimated annual recurring savings resulting from base closures 
and realignments may be overstated by about 46 percent. Currently, DOD 
calculates total estimated annual recurring savings of about $4 
billion. This amount includes $2.17 billion in eliminated overhead 
expenses such as the costs no longer needed to operate and maintain 
closed or realigned bases and reductions in civilian salaries, which 
will free up funds that DOD can then use for other defense priorities. 
However, DODís annual recurring savings estimate also includes $1.85 
billion in military personnel entitlementsósuch as salaries and housing 
allowancesófor military personnel DOD plans to shift to other positions 
but does not plan to eliminate. While DOD disagrees with us, we do not 
believe that transferring personnel to other locations produces 
tangible dollar savings outside the military personnel accounts that 
DOD can use to fund other defense priorities since these personnel will 
continue to receive salaries and benefits. 

We recognize that DOD is trying to transform its infrastructure and the 
Secretary of Defenseís primary goal for the BRAC 2005 process was 
military transformation. We also recognize DODís position that military
personnel reductions allow the department to reapply these personnel to 
support new capabilities and improve operational efficiencies. 
Nonetheless, DODís inclusion of military personnel entitlements in its 
estimates of annual recurring savings could generate a false sense that 
all of its reported savings would generate funds that DOD could apply 
elsewhere. Because DODís BRAC budget submission to Congress does not 
explain the difference between recurring savings attributable to 
military personnel entitlements and recurring savings that will make 
funds available for other defense priorities, DODís overall estimated 
annual recurring savings appear almost twice as large as those which 
will actually be realized. In addition, our analysis shows that the 
current percentage of estimated annual recurring savings from military 
personnel entitlements (46 percent) is considerably higher compared to 
the last round of BRAC that took place in 1995, in which DOD derived 
about 5 percent of BRAC annual recurring savings from military 
personnel entitlements. During the previous four rounds of BRAC that 
took place between 1988 and 1995, the military was downsizing in 
personnel strength, yet the average percentage of annual recurring 
savings DOD derived from military personnel entitlements was 26 
percent. 

We reported in July 2005 that military personnel position eliminations 
are not a true source of savings since DOD intends to reassign or shift 
personnel to other positions without reducing military end strength 
associated with the corresponding BRAC recommendation. Moreover, the 
BRAC Commission stated in its September 2005 report that DODís 
inclusion of savings from eliminating military personnel positions 
distorts the actual savings attributable to BRAC recommendations. The 
service officials we interviewed could not link actual military 
personnel eliminations directly to implementing a BRAC recommendation, 
as illustrated in the following: 

* Army officials said its military end strength will not be reduced due 
to any BRAC recommendations. In fact, the Army plans to increase its 
active-duty end strength by 65,000 over the next several years. 

* Navy officials said they anticipate reducing the Navyís end strength 
by 26,000 active duty military personnel between fiscal years 2006 and 
2011. However, they told us they have not linked any of these 
anticipated reductions to BRAC recommendations. 

* Air Force officials said they are in the process of reducing the 
serviceís active-duty end strength by about 40,000. However, Air Force 
officials said that they cannot link any reductions in military end 
strength to implementing their BRAC recommendations and the personnel 
drawdown is independent of BRAC. 

DOD policy and Office of Management and Budgetís guidance [Footnote 28] 
require that an economic analysis be explicit about the underlying 
assumptions used to estimate future costs and benefits, which we 
believe includes estimating BRAC savings. If the savings we question 
were omitted from DODís savings estimates, net annual recurring savings 
would decrease by about 46 percent. As a result, DODís BRAC budget 
submission does not provide enough information to allow Congress full 
oversight of the savings that can be applied to other programs outside 
of the military personnel account. Greater transparency over the 
assumptions behind DODís BRAC savings estimates would help to promote 
independent analysis and review and facilitate congressional decision 
making related to the multibillion-dollar BRAC implementation program. 

In addition to taking issue with how DOD characterizes military 
personnel savings, we also disagree with DOD claiming savings for 
closing a base that is actually going to stay open. At the time of 
DODís fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget submission to Congress, DOD claimed 
about $260 million in annual recurring savings for closing Cannon Air 
Force Base, New Mexico, which is now going to remain open. Although DOD 
recommended closing Cannon in May 2005 as a proposed recommendation, 
the BRAC Commission modified the proposed closure, and stated in its 
September 2005 report to the President that Cannon could remain open if 
the Secretary of Defense identified a new mission for the base and 
relocated the baseís fighter wing elsewhere. [Footnote 29] 
Subsequently, the Air Force announced in June 2006 that Cannon would 
remain open and the 16th Special Operations Wing, currently located at 
Hurlburt Field, Florida, would relocate to Cannon. Nevertheless, DOD 
still claimed about $200 million in annual savings for military 
personnel entitlements and about $60 million in annual savings for 
categories such as base operation and maintenance in its fiscal year 
2008 BRAC budget. Officials at the Air Force BRAC office told us that 
they claimed these annual savings because they disestablished the 
fighter wing at Cannon, although they said most of the military 
personnel and aircraft associated with the disestablished fighter wing 
were reassigned or relocated and will continue to operate. [Footnote 
30] 

Furthermore, we have taken issue with estimated savings for several Air 
National Guard BRAC recommendations. As we reported in May 2007, the 
implementation of several Air National Guard recommendations is 
expected to result in annual recurring costs of $53 million rather than 
the annual recurring savings of $26 million estimated by the BRAC 
Commissionóa $79 million per year difference that occurred primarily 
due to language in the BRAC Commissionís report that prevents the Air 
National Guard from reducing its current end strength in some states. 
[Footnote 31]

DOD Has Made Progress Implementing BRAC, but Several Challenges 
Increase Risk That All Recommendations Might Not be Completed by the 
Statutory Deadline: 

DOD has made progress implementing BRAC 2005, but faces a number of 
synchronization and coordination challenges related to implementing 
many BRAC recommendations. These challenges increase DODís risk of not 
meeting the September 2011 statutory deadline. For example, personnel 
movements involving tens of thousands of personnel must be synchronized 
with the expenditure of billions of dollars to construct or renovate 
facilities needed to support them by 2011. The time frames for 
completing many BRAC recommendations are so closely sequenced and 
scheduled to be completed in 2011 that any significant changes in 
personnel movement schedules or construction delays could jeopardize 
timely completion. Also, some recommendations are dependent on the 
completion of others, and delays in completing some interrelated 
actions might cause a domino effect that could jeopardize DODís ability 
to meet the statutory 2011 BRAC deadline. BRAC 2005, unlike prior BRAC 
rounds, included more joint recommendations involving more than one 
military component, thus creating challenges in achieving unity of 
effort among the services and defense agencies. 

DOD Has Made Progress Implementing BRAC: 

DODís implementation of BRAC 2005 has progressed since the 
recommendations became effective in November 2005. For example, Navy 
officials reported that they completed implementing 14 BRAC actions 
[Footnote 32] involving the closure of Navy reserve centers and 
recruiting districts. To dedicate resources and facilitate 
communications to plan for the implementation of hundreds of BRAC 
actions, the military services and affected defense agencies have their 
own BRAC program management offices. Over the past 2 years, these 
offices have begun the planning and design for the $21 billion military 
construction program necessitated by the most recent BRAC round, 
including initiating site surveys and environmental assessments needed 
before military construction projects can begin. 

OSD realized that the complexity of the BRAC 2005 round required it to 
strategically manage and oversee the entire BRAC 2005 program. During 
prior BRAC rounds, OSDís oversight of BRAC implementation was typically 
limited to adjudicating disagreements among the services over 
implementation issues, according to OSD BRAC officials. However, for 
this BRAC round, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics stated in 2005 that the large 
number of transformational recommendations, particularly 
recommendations to promote joint facility operations, would present OSD 
with significant implementation challenges. To meet these challenges, 
the department initiated a process to develop business plans that laid 
out the requisite actions, timing of those actions, and the costs and 
savings associated with implementing each recommendation. Additionally, 
OSD recognized that the development of business plans would serve as 
the foundation for the complex program management necessary to 
implement the BRAC 2005 recommendations. As such, the primary 
implementation activity of the military services, and defense agencies 
has been to develop about 240 business plans for OSD review and 
approval. According to OSD, these business plans have been used as the 
primary vehicle to delineate resource requirements and generate 
military construction requirements. 

As of October 2007, OSD has approved about 220 business plans. Some 
business plans remain in draft and have not been approved for various 
reasons. According to OSD, these business plans involve complex issues 
associated with the servicesí lines of authority and sizable personnel
realignments that OSD BRAC officials told us they intend to resolve 
soon. However, OSD has deferred the approval of about 15 business plans 
pending the development of broader policies to facilitate the 
implementation of the recommendations associated with joint basing and 
chemical demilitarization. Finally, officials in OSDís BRAC Office told 
us they plan to continue reviewing business plans as part of their 
comprehensive, centrally managed oversight of the BRAC program. 
Recognizing that business plans provide important implementation 
details, in June 2007 OSD directed the services and defense agencies to 
update these business plans twice a year in conjunction with OSD 
program reviews. 

Challenges in Synchronizing Many BRAC Actions Could Hinder DODís 
Ability to Complete Recommendations within the Statutory Time Frame: 

The department faces a number of challenges related to synchronizing 
the completion of many BRAC recommendations in order to meet the 
statutory 2011 time frame. For example, personnel movements involving 
tens of thousands of military and civilian personnel must be 
synchronized with billions of dollars worth of construction or 
renovation activities needed to ensure they have the necessary 
facilities to support them. Also, the implementation of some 
recommendations is dependent on the completion of other recommendations 
before facilities can be renovated for new uses, and some DOD 
installations are affected by more than six separate recommendations. 
Delays in synchronizing and completing these interrelated actions could 
cause a domino effect that might jeopardize DODís ability to meet the 
statutory 2011 BRAC deadline. Also, synchronizing the implementation of 
several force structure initiatives could further complicate DODís BRAC 
implementation efforts. 

DOD Must Synchronize Personnel Movements with Construction Time Frames: 

Implementation challenges primarily stem from the complexity of 
synchronizing the realignment of over 123,000 personnel with the 
completion of over $21 billion in new construction or renovation 
projects. According to DOD officials, construction schedules are often 
the primary driver in setting BRAC implementation timelines due to the 
amount of time needed to design and build new facilities or renovate 
existing facilities. The time frames for completing many BRAC 
recommendations are closely sequenced and scheduled to be completed in 
2011 but any significant changes in personnel movement schedules or 
construction delays could jeopardize DODís ability to meet the 
statutory 2011 BRAC deadline. 

According to OSDís approved business plans and DOD officials, the 
following are some BRAC recommendations that could experience 
synchronization challenges: 

* Realigning Army reserve components, constructing 125 new Armed Forces 
Reserve Centers, and closing 387 existing reserve component facilities: 
Army reserve component officials told us they are managing the 
construction of new Armed Forces Reserve Centers in a compressed time 
frame. The data in our recently issued report show that 26 percent of 
the BRAC actions implementing these recommendations will begin in 
fiscal year 2010, according to the approved business plans. [Footnote 
33] This approach compresses the amount of time available to construct 
the facilities and respond to any construction delays that might arise, 
which increases the risk that the projects might not be completed in 
time to meet the BRAC statutory completion deadline. On the other hand, 
Army officials told us that they would assume less risk because many of 
these projects are small and can be completed within shorter time 
frames compared to larger projects. For example, the Army considered 
starting construction on the Armed Forces Reserve Centers toward the 
beginning of the implementation period and closing older reserve 
facilities. Instead, more complex and costly recommendations became a 
higher priority and reserve center actions were delayed. 

* Co-locating miscellaneous OSD, defense agency, and field activity 
leased locations at Fort Belvoir, Virginia: OSD officials told us that 
these activities have scheduled the arrival of over 6,000 personnel by 
September 1, 2011ó2 weeks before the BRAC statutory deadlineóto 
implement over 30 discrete actions associated with this recommendation. 
In addition, recent developments could affect the timing of this 
realignment to Fort Belvoir because, at the time of our review, the 
Army was revising its implementation planning to accommodate the 
possibility of using nearby land owned by the U.S. General Services 
Administration or another location in Northern Virginia, which will 
require additional studies to determine environmental impacts and 
transportation requirements at the new location, according to Fort 
Belvoir officials. If the process of identifying alternative site 
locations results in delaying the movement of miscellaneous OSD 
offices, defense agencies, and field offices, this could jeopardize 
meeting the statutory deadline. 

* Realigning the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to Fort 
Belvoir, Virginia: The fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget submission shows 
that construction is expected to be completed by June 2011, which 
allows 3 months before the statutory deadline to move its missions. To 
mitigate mission impact and the risk of not completing these moves if 
construction is delayed, the agency plans to begin moving its personnel 
in phases starting in April 2010. 

* Realigning Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C., to the 
National Naval Medical Center, Maryland, and Fort Belvoir, Virginia: 
Completion is scheduled by September 2011 according to the business 
plan. The medical joint cross-service group that developed this 
recommendation in 2005 stated that delays in constructing and occupying 
the buildings could risk the timely completion of this recommendation 
and concluded that aggressive actions would be needed to meet the 6-
year deadline. Army and OSD officials testified before Congress in 
January 2007 that the time frame was ďvery tightĒ for completing this 
recommendation. [Footnote 34] Also, in response to various concerns 
about the quality of care for warfighters at Walter Reed, an official 
with the Armyís Surgeonís General Office told us in September 2007 that 
certain parts of the recommendation supporting the construction of 
intensive medical care facilities are expected to be completed sooner 
than originally planned, while the move to the National Naval Medical 
Center, Maryland, and Fort Belvoir, Virginia is still scheduled to be 
completed by September 2011. DODís standard construction schedules for 
medical facilities indicate new hospitals, or additions and renovations 
to an existing hospital, generally take longer to complete compared to 
other facilities. 

Some Recommendations Are Dependent on the Completion of Others: 

In some cases, DODís synchronization challenges are exacerbated when 
the completion of one recommendation is dependent on the completion of 
another. For example, the BRAC recommendation to close Fort Monmouth, 
New Jersey, involves relocating personnel from the Armyís 
Communications-Electronics Life Cycle Management Command currently 
located at Monmouth to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. The new 
facilities at Aberdeen are expected to be renovated by February 2011. 
However, DOD cannot begin those renovations until the training activity 
currently occupying the Aberdeen facilities relocates to Fort Lee, 
Virginia, an action associated with the implementation of another BRAC 
recommendation. Consequently, the training activity cannot vacate the 
Aberdeen space until a new facility is built for them at Fort Lee 
sometime in 2009. This interdependence is shown in figure 4. 

Figure 4: Sequencing of Personnel Movement for Several Interdependent 
BRAC Recommendations: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a time line depicting the sequencing of personnel 
movement for several interdependent BRAC recommendations. The following 
data is depicted: 

Fort Lee Construction: Fiscal years 2007-2009; 
Fort Lee cannot realign 800 personnel from Aberdeen Proving Ground 
until Fort Lee constructs new facilities for them. Construction is 
expected to be completed in 2009. 
Possible delay: 2009-?

Aberdeen Proving Ground Renovation: Fiscal years 2009-2011; 
Aberdeen cannot begin renovation until 800 personnel move to Fort Lee. 
Renovation is expected to be completed and facilities to be ready by 
February 2011. 
Possible delay: 2011-? 

Fort Monmouth Relocation: Fiscal year 2011; 
The relocation cannot be completed until the renovation at Aberdeen is 
done. Forth Monmouth is expected to close by September 2011. 
Possible delay: 2011-?

Possible delay: 
Possible delay means completion dates could slip. For Fort Monmouth 
possible delays in construction or renovation at Fort Lee or Aberdeen 
could cause slippage of completion dates, thus increasing the risk of 
not closing Forth Monmouth within the statutory timeline. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Likewise, such interdependence could undermine the Navyís ability to 
complete within the statutory deadline the recommendation to 
consolidate various Navy-leased locations onto government-owned 
property. The business plan that describes the actions and time frames 
for moving various Navy-leased locations onto government-owned property 
stated that it will begin renovating space for the move to Arlington, 
Virginia, in September 2008. However, the current occupant of the 
spaceóa component of the Defense Information Systems Agencyóis not 
scheduled to vacate the space the Navy is to move into until June 2011 
because the Defense Information Systems Agency component needs to wait 
until it can move into newly constructed space at Fort Meade, 
Marylandóan action associated with another BRAC recommendation. 
Although both DOD components are working on a solution, the business 
plans for these two recommendations stated several options in order to 
meet the 2011 BRAC deadline, such as having the Navy occupy ďportable 
facilities,Ē build a new facility, or explore other workarounds to meet 
the statutory time frame. 

Some Installations Affected by Multiple Recommendations: 

Another factor that could threaten the timely completion of some of the 
BRAC recommendations is the number of DOD installations that are 
affected by more than one recommendation. Based on BRAC Commission 
data, 27 installations are affected by six or more BRAC recommendations 
that include installations such as Fort Belvoir, Virginia; Fort Sam 
Houston, Texas; Lackland Air Force Base, Texas; Wright-Patterson Air 
Force Base, Ohio; Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia; Aberdeen Proving 
Ground, Maryland; and Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. In addition to their 
routine duties for facility management, installation officials are 
responsible for synchronizing and coordinating the movements of 
personnel with the availability of facilities. The following are 
examples of installations affected by multiple recommendations: Some 
Installations Affected by Multiple Recommendations: 

* Fort Belvoir, Virginia: Officials responsible for implementing the 
BRAC actions associated with 14 separate recommendations told us that 
they need to synchronize the availability of various facilities to 
accommodate the increase of nearly 24,000 personnel expected to arrive, 
primarily as a result of BRAC recommendations resulting in the closure 
or realignment of numerous DOD agencies and activities. These officials 
said that they have concerns about meeting the overall time frame 
because their plans do not allow for any delays in construction 
projects or funding. Fort Belvoir officials told us they are 
encountering challenges when planning the synchronization of the large 
volume of construction and personnel movement throughout the 
implementation period. For example, the Army initially planned to site 
the implementation of 2 recommendations (realigning the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and co-locating miscellaneous OSD, 
defense agency, and field activity leased locations) at Fort Belvoir 
that would have an unfavorable impact on the surrounding community due 
to increased traffic congestion. Though Fort Belvoir in October 2007 
announced new plans to obtain property near Fort Belvoir that might 
lessen traffic congestion for the move of miscellaneous OSD, defense 
agency, and field activity leased locations, Fort Belvoir officials 
told us that these plans could raise new implementation challenges to 
meet the statutory deadline because of additional time needed for 
environmental impact studies, planning and design of new construction, 
and demolition of existing structures at the new proposed site. 

* Fort Sam Houston, Texas: Installation officials at Fort Sam Houston 
told us that they have to synchronize numerous actions involving eight 
separate BRAC recommendations and have concerns about coordinating the 
availability of facilitiesóeither to be constructed or renovatedówith 
the planned net increase of over 10,000 personnel. Furthermore, 
officials told us the lack of guidance on how installation officials 
will establish a joint base with nearby Lackland and Randolph Air Force 
Bases, Texas, in accordance with the BRAC recommendation on joint 
basing exacerbates the uncertainty in planning for the implementation 
of these recommendations. 

Force Structure Initiatives Further Complicate DODís BRAC 
Implementation Efforts: 

Two Army force restructuring initiativesómodularity and overseas 
rebasing strategyócould exacerbate the Armyís BRAC synchronization 
challenges. The Army considers modularity to be the most extensive 
reorganization of its force since World War II, in which it 
restructures itself from a division-based force to a more agile and 
responsive modular brigade-based force. According to Army estimates, 
this initiative will require a significant investment through fiscal 
year 2011. DODís Global Defense Posture Realignment Plan, also known as 
overseas rebasing, will result in a global realignment of U.S. forces 
and installations, including the planned transfer to American territory 
of up to 70,000 defense personnel and about 100,000 family members and 
civilian employees currently living overseas. As a result of mostly 
these force structure initiatives and BRAC, the Army plans to relocate 
over 150,000 soldiers and civilian personnel by fiscal year 2012, 
representing over 20 percent of the Armyís total projected active-duty 
and civilian personnel end strength. To illustrate, Army installations 
that expect personnel increases of greater than 5,000 over the next 5 
years, as of March 2007, are shown in table 2. 

Table 2: Army Installations Expecting Net Gains of at Least 5,000 
Personnel for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 Due to BRAC, Overseas 
Rebasing, Modularity, and Other Miscellaneous Restationing Actions (as 
of March 2007): 

Installation: Fort Belvoir, VA; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 21,437; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 45,332; 
Estimated net gain in population: 23,895; 
Percentage of population increase: 111; 
Estimated Army military construction (dollars in thousands): $277,700. 

Installation: Fort Bliss, TX; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 20,130; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 38,063; 
Estimated net gain in population: 17,933; 
Percentage of population increase: 89; 
Estimated Army military construction (dollars in thousands): 2,076,280. 

Installation: Fort Bragg, NC; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 57,352; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 69,136; 
Estimated net gain in population: 11,784; 
Percentage of population increase: 21; 
Estimated Army military construction (dollars in thousands): 1,421,011. 

Installation: Fort Lewis, WA; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 36,147; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 47,110; 
Estimated net gain in population: 10,963; 
Percentage of population increase: 30; 
Estimated Army military construction (dollars in thousands): 1,191,249. 

Installation: Fort Sam Houston, TX; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 24,819; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 34,980; 
Estimated net gain in population: 10,161
Percentage of population increase: 41; 
Estimated Army military construction (dollars in thousands): 179,540. 

Installation: Fort Benning, GA; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 40,592; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 50,487; 
Estimated net gain in population: 9,895; 
Percentage of population increase: 24; 
Estimated Army military construction (dollars in thousands): 1,423,461. 

Installation: Fort Riley, KS; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 15,188; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 24,608; 
Estimated net gain in population: 9,420; 
Percentage of population increase: 62; 
Estimated Army military construction (dollars in thousands): 905,570. 

Installation: Fort Lee, VA; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 13,495; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 20,645; 
Estimated net gain in population: 7,150; 
Percentage of population increase: 53; 
Estimated Army military construction (dollars in thousands): 965,500. 

Installation: Fort Meade, MD; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 35,504; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 41,915; 
Estimated net gain in population: 6,411; 
Percentage of population increase: 18; 
Estimated Army military construction (dollars in thousands): 104,900. 

Installation: Fort Carson, CO; 
FY 2006 beginning population: 24,066; 
Estimated FY 2011 population: 29,756; 
Estimated net gain in population: 5,690; 
Percentage of population increase: 24; 
Estimated Army military construction (dollars in thousands): 958,129. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army headquarters-level data. 

Notes: Personnel growth consists of Army military (active and reserve), 
military students and trainees, civilians, non-Army military and 
civilians, and mission contractors. Figures do not include family 
members and nonmission-related contractors and expected increases that 
may occur as a result of plans to increase the Armyís active end 
strength by 65,000 personnel. 

[End of table] 

As shown in table 2, some installations are expecting substantial 
growth; Forts Belvoir, Bliss, Riley, and Lee each anticipate net 
personnel gains of more than 50 percent. For example, the Army plans to 
relocate at Fort Bliss, Texas, about 18,000 personnel as part of BRAC, 
the transformation of Army modular brigade units, and DODís overseas 
rebasing efforts. The Army is planning 54 new construction projects 
over the 6-year BRAC implementation period to accommodate the increase 
in base population at Fort Bliss. Also, some of the installations 
listed in table 2 may experience more growth in the next several years 
depending on whether the Armyís active end strength is increased by 
65,000 soldiers. 

Coordination Among Multiple Services and Agencies Presents Additional 
Challenges: 

BRAC 2005, unlike prior BRAC rounds, included more joint 
recommendations involving more than one military component, thus 
creating challenges in achieving unity of effort among the services and 
defense agencies. According to our analysis, 43 percent of the 240 OSD-
required business plans involved formal coordination between at least 
two services or agencies. Service officials said that gaining consensus 
among military services and defense agencies has been challenging in 
the areas of personnel and facility requirements, implementation 
schedules, and funding responsibilities. For example, officials told us 
it was a challenge due to the joint nature in planning for the 
implementation of the recommendation to realign Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina, by relocating Armyís 7th Special Forces Group to Eglin Air 
Force Base, Florida. Service officials told us it took time for the 
Army and Air Force to coordinate how to share base operations costs 
given these two services have different standards for calculating these 
costs. Similarly, regarding the recommendation to establish the Joint 
Strike Fighter initial joint training site at Eglin Air Force Base, 
Florida, it took time for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force to 
agree on cost-sharing arrangements and a joint training curriculum 
designed to achieve savings from consolidated training on the aircraft. 
Likewise, other complex joint cross-service recommendations could be 
slowed by a similar need to coordinate and negotiate agreements. The 
following are some BRAC recommendations with unresolved coordination 
challenges. 

* Create joint bases involving multiple defense installations: The 26 
defense installations involved with creating 12 new joint bases 
required DOD to define the governance structure over how these joint 
bases should be organized, the associated chain of command authority, 
and the operational concepts for managing these joint bases. [Footnote 
35] According to service officials, some of their most challenging 
issues to resolve include 1) transferring real property and budget 
authority to the lead service, 2) determining standard levels of base 
operating support and which base functions to transfer to the lead 
service, 3) deciding whether civilian personnel on a joint base will 
become employees of the lead service, 4) agreeing on common terminology 
and standards, and 5) funding contributions from each service. These 
challenges to establishing joint bases have been problematic since each 
service has its own concept of how installations should be managed and 
organized. In particular, during recent congressional testimony, the 
Air Force expressed views on joint basing concepts contrary to those of 
OSD and the other services. [Footnote 36] To overcome these challenges, 
OSD formed a special working group to resolve these issues and OSD 
officials told us they would approve the joint basing business plan 
when more of the planning details have been resolved.

* Realign supply, storage, and distribution management at multiple 
locations: There are several potential issues between the Defense 
Logistics Agency and the military services that may affect the planned 
implementation of the recommendation. While baseline agreements have 
been reached between the Defense Logistics Agency and the services on 
the transfer of supply-related personnel positions and related 
inventories to the Defense Logistics Agency, some important aspects of 
the implementation plans are incomplete and still need to be resolved. 
For example, performance-based agreements that will establish 
responsibilities, metrics to measure performance, costs, and business 
rules between the Defense Logistics Agency and the services have yet to 
be negotiated and agreed upon. Additionally, the funding and decision-
making process for future maintenance, upgrades, usage, and integration 
of information technology systems transferring to Defense Logistics 
Agency has not been agreed to. Lastly, due to the way the Defense 
Logistics Agency plans to implement the recommendation by staging the 
personnel transfers over time by each military service, it plans to 
apply lessons learned to resolve issues as implementation proceeds. We 
also reviewed a separate BRAC action, which is part of this 
recommendation, in more detail and issued our report in October 2007. 
[Footnote 37] 

* Co-locate medical command headquarters: The affected agencies have 
had challenges in reaching agreement on where to co-locate these 
medical commands. Specifically, the Air Force and OSD Health Affairs 
have disagreed with the business manager on associated cost and 
implementation time frames. As such, OSD has not yet approved the 
business plan for this recommendation. As a result of these 
coordination challenges, the planning process has lengthened beyond 
that which DOD officials initially expected, which could result in 
delayed implementation of certain recommendations. The need for gaining 
consensus about planning and implementation details among the services 
and defense agencies could continue throughout the BRAC implementation 
period. At the same time, DOD believes the review process helps to 
ensure that BRAC actions meet the intent of the law, are accurate, and 
effectively coordinated. However, if gaining consensus among these 
entities continues to be a challenge or if new organizations 
established under BRAC continue to lack fully developed operational 
concepts and organizational structures, it may become increasingly 
difficult to implement these recommendations before the statutory 2011 
deadline. 

Conclusion: 

DOD recognizes that its BRAC recommendations and its implementation are 
of high public interest. As such, it is paramount that DOD communicates 
openly about the expected savings that could result from the 
implementation of BRAC actions. As long as DOD continues to assert that 
nearly half of its estimated $4 billion in annual recurring BRAC 
savings come from military personnel reassignments, which will not free 
up funds for other defense priorities, DOD could create a false sense 
that BRAC 2005 will result in a much higher dollar savings than will 
actually be realized to readily fund other priorities. Without 
explaining the difference between annual recurring savings attributable 
to military personnel reassignments and annual recurring savings that 
will make funds available for other defense priorities, DOD could 
lessen the credibility of the BRAC program and decrease the publicís 
trust in the BRAC process. Greater transparency over the source of 
expected BRAC savings could help to preserve public confidence in the 
integrity of the BRAC program. 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

To provide more transparency over DODís estimated annual recurring 
savings from BRAC implementation, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics, in consultation with the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), to explain, in DODís BRAC budget 
submission to Congress, the difference between annual recurring savings 
attributable to military personnel entitlements and annual recurring 
savings that will readily result in funds available for other defense 
priorities. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our 
recommendation and agreed to include an explanation of the annual 
recurring savings in its BRAC budget justification material that 
accompanies the annual Presidentís budget. DOD also noted in its 
comments to us that military personnel reductions attributable to a 
BRAC recommendation as savings are as real as savings generated through 
end strength reductions. DOD also stated that while it may not reduce 
overall end strength, its reductions in military personnel for each 
recommendation at a specific location are real and these personnel 
reductions allow the department to reapply these military personnel to 
support new capabilities and improve operational efficiencies. While we 
recognize these benefits from reapplying freed up military personnel to 
other locations due to implementing BRAC recommendations, we do 
question that nearly half of DODís annual recurring savings estimate of 
$4 billion includes military personnel entitlementsósuch as salaries 
and housing allowancesófor military personnel DOD plans to shift to 
other positions but does not plan to eliminate thus requiring DOD to 
continue paying the salaries and benefits. While DOD disagrees with us, 
we do not believe that shifting or transferring personnel to other 
locations produces tangible dollar savings outside the military 
personnel accounts that DOD can use to fund other defense priorities 
since these personnel will continue to receive salaries and benefits. 
DOD did acknowledge however, that these savings may not be available to 
fund other defense priorities because they have already been spent to 
fund military personnel priorities. It is also worth noting that DOD 
commented that although its net annual recurring savings estimates have 
decreased from $4.2 billion to $4 billion, these savings still 
represent a significant benefit that will result from the 
implementation of BRAC recommendations. DODís written comments are 
reprinted in appendix VII. DOD also provided technical comments, which 
we have incorporated into this report as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees; the Secretaries of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force; Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director, 
Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to 
others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no 
charge on GAOís Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff has any questions concerning this report, please 
contact me on (202) 512-4523 or by e-mail at leporeb@gao.gov. Contact 
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs 
are on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix VIII. 

Signed by: 

Brian J. Lepore: 
Director Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Congressional Addressees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Tim Johnson: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related 
Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Susan Collins: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John P. Murtha, Jr.: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Chet Edwards: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Roger F. Wicker: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related 
Agencies: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Tom Davis: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

We reviewed the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commissionís 182 
recommendations to realign and close military bases, but mostly focused 
our work on the recommendations that changed the most in expected costs 
and savings compared to the Commissionís estimates. Recognizing that 
the Department of Defense (DOD) was in the process of initial planning 
for base realignment and closure (BRAC) implementation, and the 
associated financial data were changed frequently during our review, we 
compared BRAC cost and savings estimates primarily using two key 
publicly available documentsóthe 2005 BRAC Commission report to the 
President released in September 2005 and DODís latest BRAC budget 
submission provided to Congress in February 2007. We used data from the 
BRAC Commission report to the President because the estimates contained 
in this report were the closest estimates available associated with the 
final and approved BRAC recommendations. We used DODís most recent BRAC 
budget submission because it was the most authoritative information 
publicly available for making broad comparisons of BRAC cost and 
savings estimates. Specifically, we compared the change in cost 
estimates as well as the estimates for net annual recurring savings 
that DOD expects to incur after BRAC implementation and noted those 
recommendations that have increased the most in expected costs and 
decreased the most in expected savings. In addition, we used the BRAC 
Commissionís data generated from DODís estimation model, known as the 
Cost of Base Realignment Actions, to determine changes in expected one-
time costs, to include military construction cost estimates and 
inflation. We generally reported costs and savings in current dollars 
and not constant dollars except where noted. 

To calculate DODís estimate of net annual recurring savings, we used 
OSDís data provided to us for estimated savings in fiscal year 2012óthe 
year after OSD expects all recommendations to be completedóbecause 
these data more fully captured these savings and allowed us to 
replicate the same methodology used by the BRAC Commission in its 
calculation of this estimate. We used OSDís fiscal year 2012 data and 
subtracted the estimates for annual recurring costs from the estimates 
for annual recurring savings, which is the same method both DOD and we 
have used for prior BRAC rounds. To determine expected 20-year 
savingsóalso known as the 20-year net present valueówe used the same 
formulas and assumptions as DOD and the BRAC Commission used to 
calculate these savings. [Footnote 38] Specifically, we used DODís BRAC 
fiscal year 2008 budget data for expected costs and savings to 
implement each recommendation for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. We 
also used data that the BRAC Office in the Office of the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment provided us for 
expected net annual recurring savings after the completion of each 
recommendation for fiscal years 2012 to 2025. We then converted these 
data to fiscal year constant 2005 dollars using DOD price indexes to 
distinguish real changes from changes due to inflation. We used fiscal 
year 2005 dollars to calculate 20-year savings because the BRAC 
Commission also used fiscal year 2005 dollars for this calculation. 
[Footnote 39] Finally, we calculated how many years it would take for 
expected BRAC savings to recoup the expected initial investment costs 
to implement the recommendations, comparing the fiscal years, or break-
even points, when cumulative net savings would exceed cumulative one-
time costs. We did this to be consistent with the way DOD had reported 
their break-even points for past BRAC rounds, which is a methodology we 
also replicated in our prior reports on BRAC implementation. 

To assess the reliability of DODís BRAC cost and savings data, we 
tested computer-generated data for errors, reviewed relevant 
documentation, and discussed data quality control procedures with 
officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) BRAC Office. 
We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes 
of making broad comparisons between DODís reported cost and savings 
estimates and the BRAC Commissionís reported estimates. 

To determine why DODís estimates changed compared to the BRAC 
Commissionís estimates, we reviewed over 200 OSD-approved business 
plans that outlined actions, time frames, and financial estimates for 
implementing each BRAC recommendation. We also obtained and analyzed 
information from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers about its recent 
initiative to transform how it manages military construction projects 
and how these new initiatives are expected to reduce military 
construction costs during BRAC implementation. We did not validate the 
servicesí or defense agenciesí BRAC military construction requirements 
because DODís Office of the Inspector General, the Army Audit Agency, 
the Naval Audit Service, and the Air Force Audit Agency were reviewing 
BRAC military construction projects at the time of this report. Their 
work in this area is expected to continue over the next several years. 
However, we met with staff of these audit services periodically over 
the course of our review. 

Further, we met periodically with officials at the OSD BRAC office and 
corresponding BRAC implementation offices in the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force to determine why DODís estimates changed compared to the BRAC 
Commissionís estimates. We also met with these officials to discuss 
their roles and responsibilities as they began BRAC implementation 
planning and to obtain their perspectives on any implementation 
challenges that they encountered. Given the unprecedented number of 
BRAC 2005 closures and realignments, we focused our analysis on broad 
issues affecting DODís cost and savings estimates and implementation 
challenges rather than on specific implementation issues of individual 
recommendations. 

To obtain the perspective of installation and command officials 
directly involved in BRAC implementation planning and execution, we 
visited 17 bases and 8 major commands affected by BRAC. We selected 
these bases and commands because they were among the closures or 
realignments that DOD projected to have significant costs or savings, 
or because we wanted to obtain more information about particular 
implementation issues. Installations we visited include: 

* Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; 
* Brooks City-Base, Texas; 
* Eglin Air Force Base, Florida; 
* Fort Belvoir, Virginia; 
* Fort Benning, Georgia; 
* Fort Bliss, Texas; 
* Fort Dix, New Jersey; 
* Fort McPherson, Georgia; 
* Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; 
* Fort Monroe, Virginia; 
* Fort Sam Houston, Texas; 
* Lackland Air Force Base, Texas; 
* McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey; 
* National Naval Medical Center, Maryland; 
* Randolph Air Force Base, Texas; 
* Rock Island Army Arsenal, Illinois; and: 
* Walter Reed Army Medical Center, District of Columbia. 

In addition, we met with officials from eight commands to obtain a 
command-level perspective about BRAC implementation and because these 
commands were involved in coordinating the business plans or were 
responsible for key decisions in implementation planning. Commands 
visited include the Air Forceís Air Education and Training Command; 
Army CommunicationsĖElectronics Life Cycle Management Command; Army 
Forces Command; Army Information Systems Engineering Command; Army 
Medical Command; Army Training and Doctrine Command; Naval 
Installations Command; and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. As we 
obtained information concerning implementation challenges during 
interviews, we assessed the reliability of that information by asking 
similar questions from officials at different military services at the 
installation and headquarters levels. 

We conducted our work from November 2005, when the BRAC recommendations 
became effective, through October 2007 so we could analyze data in 
DODís BRAC budget submission provided to Congress in February 2007. Our 
work was done in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: BRAC Recommendations with the Largest Increases in 
Estimated Costs: 

Appendix II lists specific base realignment and closure (BRAC) 
recommendations that have increased the most in estimated one-time 
costs compared to the BRAC Commission estimates reported in September 
2005. Table 3 shows that the Department of Defenseís (DOD) one-time 
implementation cost estimates have increased by more than $50 million 
each for 33 recommendations compared to BRAC Commission estimates. 

Table 3: BRAC Recommendations That Increased by More Than $50 Million 
in Estimated One-Time Costs, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 (Dollars in 
millions): 

Recommendation: Close National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency leased 
locations and realign others to Fort Belvoir, VA; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: $1,117.30; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: $2,090.97; 
Difference, Amount: $973.67; 
Difference, Percent: 87. 

Recommendation: Realign Walter Reed Army Medical Center to Bethesda 
National Naval Medical Center, MD and to Fort Belvoir, VA; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 988.76; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 1,688.38; 
Difference, Amount: 699.62; 
Difference, Percent: 71. 

Recommendation: Realign Maneuver Training to Fort Benning, GA; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 773.10; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 1,454.65; 
Difference, Amount: 681.55; 
Difference, Percent: 88. 

Recommendation: Close Fort Monmouth, NJ; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 780.43; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 1,458.11; 
Difference, Amount: 677.68; 
Difference, Percent: 87. 

Recommendation: Co-locate miscellaneous OSD, defense agency, and field 
activity leased locations; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 601.75; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 1,200.00; 
Difference, Amount: 598.25; 
Difference, Percent: 99. 

Recommendation: Establish San Antonio Regional Medical Center and 
realign enlisted medical training to Fort Sam Houston, TX; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 1,040.90. 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 1,591.02; 
Difference, Amount: 550.12; 
Difference, Percent: 53. 

Recommendation: Realign to establish Combat Service Support Center at 
Fort Lee, VA; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 754.00; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 1,145.40; 
Difference, Amount: 391.40; 
Difference, Percent: 52. 

Recommendation: Realign supply, storage, and distribution management; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 192.70; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 577.32; 
Difference, Amount: 384.62; 
Difference, Percent: 200. 

Recommendation: Consolidate Defense Information Systems Agency at Fort 
Meade, MD; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 219.98; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 572.83; 
Difference, Amount: 352.85; 
Difference, Percent: 160. 

Recommendation: Close Fort McPherson, GA; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 214.54; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 550.07; 
Difference, Amount: 335.53; 
Difference, Percent: 156. 

Recommendation: Close Brooks City-Base, TX; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 325.30; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 592.30; 
Difference, Amount: 267.00; 
Difference, Percent: 82. 

Recommendation: Consolidate/co-locate active and reserve personnel and 
recruiting centers for Army and Air Force; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 128.73; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 370.02; 
Difference, Amount: 241.29; 
Difference, Percent: 187. 

Recommendation: Co-locate military department investigation agencies 
with DOD Counterintelligence and Security Agency to Marine Corps Base 
Quantico, VA; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 171.99; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 388.14; 
Difference, Amount: 216.15; 
Difference, Percent: 126. 

Recommendation: Close Fort Monroe, VA; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 72.40; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 288.06; 
Difference, Amount: 215.66. 
Difference, Percent: 298. 

Recommendation: Co-locate missile and space defense agencies to 
Redstone Arsenal, AL; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 178.20; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 373.53; 
Difference, Amount: 195.33; 
Difference, Percent: 110. 

Recommendation: Close Naval Support Activity New Orleans, LA; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 46.15; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 232.73; 
Difference, Amount: 186.58; 
Difference, Percent: 404. 

Recommendation: Realign Fort Hood, TX; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 435.80; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 621.75; 
Difference, Amount: 185.95; 
Difference, Percent: 43. 

Recommendation: Realign to create joint centers for chemical, 
biological, and medical research, development, and acquisition; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 55.23; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 233.92; 
Difference, Amount: 178.69; 
Difference, Percent: 324. 

Recommendation: Close Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant, TX; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 29.00; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 173.43; 
Difference, Amount: 144.43; 
Difference, Percent: 498. 

Recommendation: Consolidate depot level reparable procurement 
management consolidation; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 124.90; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 263.89; 
Difference, Amount: 138.99; 
Difference, Percent: 111. 

Recommendation: Reserve Component Transformation, TX; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 375.60; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 500.79; 
Difference, Amount: 125.19; 
Difference, Percent: 33. 

Recommendation: Co-locate miscellaneous Air Force leased locations and 
National Guard Headquarters leased locations; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 90.50; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 212.47; 
Difference, Amount: 121.97; 
Difference, Percent: 135. 

Recommendation: Realign to relocate undergraduate pilot and navigator 
training; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 71.70; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 193.19; 
Difference, Amount: 121.49; 
Difference, Percent: 169. 

Recommendation: Relocate Army headquarters and field operating 
activities: 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 199.90; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 320.85; 
Difference, Amount: 120.95; 
Difference, Percent: 61. 

Recommendation: Close Fort Gillem, GA; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 56.80; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 150.43; 
Difference, Amount: 93.63; 
Difference, Percent: 165. 

Recommendation: Relocate miscellaneous Department of the Navy leased 
locations; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 61.75; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 155.07; 
Difference, Amount: 93.32; 
Difference, Percent: 151. 

Recommendation: Realign to create a Naval Integrated Weapons and 
Armaments Research, Development, and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation 
Center mostly at Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 343.33; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 426.95; 
Difference, Amount: 83.62; 
Difference, Percent: 24. 

Recommendation: Realign to relocate Air Defense Artillery Center and 
School to Fort Sill, OK; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 247.00; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 326.16; 
Difference, Amount: 79.16; 
Difference, Percent: 32. 

Recommendation: Reserve Component Transformation, OK; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 168.70; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 238.89; 
Difference, Amount: 70.19; 
Difference, Percent: 42. 

Recommendation: Consolidate Transportation Command components at Scott 
Air Force Base, IL; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 101.88; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 171.60; 
Difference, Amount: 69.72; 
Difference, Percent: 68. 

Recommendation: Realign defense research service-led laboratories at 
multiple locations; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 136.05; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 203.39; 
Difference, Amount: 67.34; 
Difference, Percent: 49. 

Recommendation: Reserve Component Transformation, NY; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 103.80; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 162.65; 
Difference, Amount: 58.85; 
Difference, Percent: 57. 

Recommendation: Close Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 193.12; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 245.97; 
Difference, Amount: 52.85; 
Difference, Percent: 27. 

Source: GAO analysis of BRAC Commission and DOD data. 

[a] In constant fiscal year 2005 dollars. 

[b] In current dollars. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: BRAC Recommendations with the Largest Decreases in 
Estimated Net Annual Recurring Savings: 

Appendix III lists specific base realignment and closure (BRAC) 
recommendations that have decreased the most in estimated net annual 
recurring savings compared to the BRAC Commission estimates. Table 4 
shows that the Department of Defenseís (DOD) net annual recurring 
savings estimates have decreased by more than $25 million each for 13 
recommendations compared to BRAC Commission estimates. 

Table 4: BRAC Recommendations That Have Decreased by More Than $25 
Million in Estimated Net Annual Recurring Savings, Projected for Fiscal 
Year 2012 (Dollars in millions): 

Recommendation: Close National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency leased 
locations and realign others at Fort Belvoir, VA; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: $127.70; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: $35.48; 
Difference, Amount: ($92.23); 
Difference, Percent: 72. 

Recommendation: Establish joint bases at multiple locations; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 183.76; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 116.39; 
Difference, Amount: (67.37); 
Difference, Percent: 37. 

Recommendation: Realign Fort Hood, TX[c]; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: (45.27); 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: (105.78); 
Difference, Amount: (60.51); 
Difference, Percent: 134. 

Recommendation: Realign supply, storage, and distribution management; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 203.21; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 157.58; 
Difference, Amount: (45.63); 
Difference, Percent: 22. 

Recommendation: Realign Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 66.69; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 25.06; 
Difference, Amount: (41.63); 
Difference, Percent: 62. 

Recommendation: Close Deseret Chemical Depot, UT; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 37.95; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 0; 
Difference, Amount: (37.95); 
Difference, Percent: 100. 

Recommendation: Establish San Antonio Regional Medical Center and 
realign enlisted medical training to Fort Sam Houston, TX; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 129.04; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 91.22; 
Difference, Amount: (37.82); 
Difference, Percent: 29. 

Recommendation: Close Naval Air Station Willow Grove, PA and realign 
Cambria Regional Airport, Johnstown, PA; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 73.90; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 36.32; 
Difference, Amount: (37.58); 
Difference, Percent: 51. 

Recommendation: Realign to establish Joint Strike Fighter initial joint 
training site at Eglin Air Force Base, FL[c]; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: (3.33); 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: (40.69); 
Difference, Amount: (37.36); 
Difference, Percent: 1122. 

Recommendation: Close Umatilla Chemical Depot, OR; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 34.69; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 0; 
Difference, Amount: (34.69); 
Difference, Percent: 100. 

Recommendation: Realign Otis Air National Guard Base, MA, and Lambert-
St. Louis International Airport Air Guard Station, MO[c]; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 27.88; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: (6.21); 
Difference, Amount: (34.09); 
Difference, Percent: 122. 

Recommendation: Realign Operational Army (Integrated Global Presence 
and Basing Strategy)[c]; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: (294.68); 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: (324.78); 
Difference, Amount: (30.10); 
Difference, Percent: 10. 

Recommendation: Co-locate miscellaneous Air Force leased locations and 
National Guard Headquarters leased locations; 
BRAC 2005 Commission reported estimates[a]: 30.84; 
DODís fiscal year 2008 budget estimates[b]: 1.08; 
Difference, Amount: (29.76); 
Difference, Percent: 97. 

Source: GAO analysis of BRAC Commission and DOD data. 

[a] In constant fiscal year 2005 dollars. 

[b] Data provided by DOD for fiscal year 2012 expected savings. 

[c] Both the BRAC Commission and subsequently DOD estimated that this 
recommendation would incur a net annual recurring cost (denoted by the 
parenthesis) after the BRAC implementation period rather than a net 
annual recurring savings. We used the parenthesis to denote an increase 
in net annual recurring cost. We included this recommendation because 
DODís current estimate shows net annual recurring cost has increased by 
more than $25 million. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Cost the Most: 

Appendix IV lists individual base realignment and closure (BRAC) 
recommendations that the Department of Defense (DOD) expects to cost 
the most to implement. DOD expects 24 recommendations (13 percent) to 
generate 65 percent of the one-time costs to implement BRAC 
recommendations during fiscal years 2006 through September 15, 2011, as 
shown in table 5. 

Table 5: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Cost the Most to 
Implement, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2011 (Dollars in millions): 

Recommendation: Realign Operational Army (Integrated Global Presence 
and Basing Strategy); 
One-time costs: $2,918. 

Recommendation: Close National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency leased 
locations and realign others to Fort Belvoir, VA; 
One-time costs: 2,091. 

Recommendation: Realign Walter Reed Army Medical Center to Bethesda 
National Naval Medical Center, MD and to Fort Belvoir, VA; 
One-time costs: 1,688. 

Recommendation: Establish San Antonio Regional Medical Center and 
realign medical enlisted training to Fort Sam Houston, TX; 
One-time costs: 1,591. 

Recommendation: Close Fort Monmouth, NJ 1,458Realign Maneuver Training 
to Fort Benning, GA; 
One-time costs: 1,455. 

Recommendation: Co-locate miscellaneous OSD, defense agency, and field 
activity leased locations; 
One-time costs: 1,200. 

Recommendation: Realign to establish Combat Service Support Center at 
Fort Lee, VA; 
One-time costs: 1,145. 

Recommendation: Realign Fort Hood, TX; 
One-time costs: 622. 

Recommendation: Close Brooks City-Base, TX; 
One-time costs: 592. 

Recommendation: Realign supply, storage, and distribution management; 
One-time costs: 577. 

Recommendation: Consolidate Defense Information Systems Agency to Fort 
Meade, MD; 
One-time costs: 573. 

Recommendation: Close Fort McPherson, GA; 
One-time costs: 550. 

Recommendation: 
Army reserve component transformation, TX; 
One-time costs: 501. 

Recommendation: Realign to create a Naval Integrated Weapons and 
Armaments Research, Development, and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation 
Center mostly at Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA; 
One-time costs: 427. 

Recommendation: Co-locate military department investigation agencies 
with DOD Counterintelligence and Security Agency to Marine Corps Base 
Quantico, VA; 
One-time costs: 388. 

Recommendation: Co-locate missile and space defense agencies to 
Redstone Arsenal, AL; 
One-time costs: 374. 

Recommendation: Consolidate/co-locate active and reserve personnel and 
recruiting centers for Army and Air Force; 
One-time costs: 370. 

Recommendation: Realign Fort Bragg, NC; 
One-time costs: 343. 

Recommendation: Realign to relocate Air Defense Artillery Center and 
School to Fort Sill, OK; 
One-time costs: 326. 

Recommendation: Relocate Army headquarters and field operating 
activities; 
One-time costs: 321. 

Recommendation: Close Fort Monroe, VA; 
One-time costs: 288. 

Recommendation: Consolidate Defense Finance and Accounting Service; 
One-time costs: 280. 

Recommendation: Close Naval Air Station Willow Grove, PA and realign 
Cambria Regional Airport, Johnstown, PA; 
One-time costs: 266. 

Total one-time estimated costs from the recommendations listed above: 
$20,344. 

Total one-time estimated costs from all recommendations: $31,160. 

Percentage of one-time costs from recommendations listed above of all 
recommendations: 65%. 

Source: GAO analysis based on DOD data. 

Note: Totals may not add because of rounding. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Save the Most Annually: 

Appendix V lists individual base realignment and closure (BRAC) 
recommendations that the Department of Defense (DOD) expects to save 
the most annually after it has implemented the recommendations. DOD 
expects 28 recommendations (15 percent) to generate 85 percent of the 
net annual recurring savings as shown in table 6. 

Table 6: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Save the Most Annually 
After Implementation, Projected for Fiscal Year 2012 (Fiscal year 2012 
dollars in millions): 

Recommendation: Realign to establish fleet readiness centers; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: $304. 

Recommendation: Consolidate Defense Finance and Accounting Service; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 284. 

Recommendation: Realign Cannon Air Force Base, NM[b]; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 260. 

Recommendation: Realign Pope Air Force Base, NC; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 212. 

Recommendation: Realign Walter Reed Army Medical Center to Bethesda 
National Naval Medical Center, MD and to Fort Belvoir, VA; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 172. 

Recommendation: Consolidate/co-locate active and reserve personnel and 
recruiting centers for Army and Air Force; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 170. 

Recommendation: Realign supply, storage, and distribution management; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 158. 

Recommendation: Close Fort Monmouth, NJ; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 154. 

Recommendation: Consolidate depot level reparable procurement 
management consolidation; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 150. 

Recommendation: Realign to establish Combat Service Support Center at 
Fort Lee, VA; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 148. 

Recommendation: Realign Maneuver Training to Fort Benning, GA; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 133. 

Recommendation: Establish joint bases at multiple locations; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 116. 

Recommendation: Close Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 115. 

Recommendation: Realign by converting medical inpatient services to 
clinics at various installations; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 106. 

Recommendation: Consolidate Transportation Command components at Scott 
Air Force Base, IL; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 97. 

Recommendation: Close Fort McPherson, GA; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 94. 

Recommendation: Close Brooks City-Base, TX; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 92. 

Recommendation: Establish San Antonio Regional Medical Center and 
realign enlisted medical training to Fort Sam Houston, TX; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 91. 

Recommendation: Co-locate miscellaneous OSD, defense agencies, and 
field activity leases at Fort Belvoir, VA; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 72. 

Recommendation: Close Naval Station Ingleside, TX and realign Naval Air 
Station Corpus Christi, TX; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 69. 

Recommendation: Realign to create a Naval Integrated Weapons and 
Armaments Research, Development, and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation 
Center mostly at Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 68. 

Recommendation: Close Fort Monroe, VA; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 65. 

Recommendation: Consolidate Defense Information Systems Agency at Fort 
Meade, MD; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 52. 

Recommendation: Relocate medical command headquarters; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 51. 

Recommendation: Realign to relocate Air Defense Artillery Center and 
School to Fort Sill, OK; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 50. 

Recommendation: Co-locate missile and space defense agencies to 
Redstone Arsenal, AL; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 45. 

Recommendation: Realign defense research service-led laboratories at 
multiple locations; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 43. 

Recommendation: Close Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA; 
Net annual recurring savings[a]: 42. 

Total net annual recurring savings from the recommendations listed 
above: $3,413. 

Total net annual recurring savings from all recommendations: $4,014. 

Percentage of net annual recurring savings from recommendations listed 
above of all recommendations: 85%. 

Source: GAO analysis based on DOD data. 

Note: Totals may not add because of rounding. 

[a] Data provided by DOD for fiscal year 2012 expected savings. 

[b] In May 2005, DOD proposed closing Cannon Air Force Base, New 
Mexico. In September 2005, the BRAC Commission stated that Cannon could 
remain open if DOD identified a new mission for the base. Subsequently, 
the Air Force announced in June 2006 that Cannon will remain open 
because they plan to activate a new mission at the installation. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Save the Most Over a 
20-Year Period: 

Appendix VI lists individual base realignment and closure (BRAC) 
recommendations that the Department of Defense (DOD) expects to save 
the most over a 20-year period. DOD expects the implementation of 29 
recommendations (16 percent) to generate 85 percent of the 20-year 
savings as shown in table 7. 

Table 7: BRAC Recommendations DOD Expects to Save the Most Over a 20-
Year Period, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2025 (Constant fiscal year 2005 
dollars in millions): 

Recommendation: Realign to establish fleet readiness centers; 
20-year net present value[a]: $3,361. 

Recommendation: Realign Cannon Air Force Base, NM[b]; 
20-year net present value[a]: 2,837. 

Recommendation: Consolidate Defense Finance and Accounting Service; 
20-year net present value[a]: 2,800. 

Recommendation: Realign Pope Air Force Base, NC; 
20-year net present value[a]: 2,382. 

Recommendation: Consolidate/co-locate active and reserve personnel and 
recruiting centers for Army and Air Force; 
20-year net present value[a]: 1,436. 

Recommendation: Consolidate depot level reparable procurement 
management; 
20-year net present value[a]: 1,367. 

Recommendation: Realign supply, storage, and distribution management; 
20-year net present value[a]: 1,251. 

Recommendation: Establish joint bases at multiple locations; 
20-year net present value[a]: 1,032. 

Recommendation: Realign by converting medical inpatient services to 
clinics at various installations; 
20-year net present value[a]: 1,015. 

Recommendation: Consolidate Transportation Command components at Scott 
Air Force Base, IL; 
20-year net present value[a]: 930. 

Recommendation: Close Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME; 
20-year net present value[a]: 950. 

Recommendation: Close Naval Station Ingleside, TX and realign Naval Air 
Station Corpus Christi, TX; 
20-year net present value[a]: 488. 

Recommendation: Relocate medical command headquarters; 
20-year net present value[a]: 482. 

Recommendation: Realign to establish Combat Service Support Center at 
Fort Lee, VA; 
20-year net present value[a]: 457. 

Recommendation: Realign commodity management privatization; 
20-year net present value[a]: 454. 

Recommendation: Close Fort McPherson, GA; 
20-year net present value[a]: 452. 

Recommendation: Close Naval Station Pascagoula, MS; 
20-year net present value[a]: 446. 

Recommendation: Close Brooks City-Base, TX; 
20-year net present value[a]: 417. 

Recommendation: Close Fort Monmouth, NJ; 
20-year net present value[a]: 381. 

Recommendation: Close Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA; 
20-year net present value[a]: 372. 

Recommendation: Close Fort Monroe, VA; 
20-year net present value[a]: 330. 

Recommendation: Co-locate miscellaneous Army leased locations; 
20-year net present value[a]: 319. 

Recommendation: Realign to create a Naval Integrated Weapons and 
Armaments Research, Development, and Acquisition, Test and Evaluation 
Center mostly at Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, CA; 
20-year net present value[a]: 285. 

Recommendation: Realign to consolidate maritime command, control, 
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance, research, development, and acquisition, test and 
evaluation functions at multiple locations; 
20-year net present value[a]: 272. 

Recommendation: Realign defense research service-led laboratories at 
multiple locations; 
20-year net present value[a]: 268. 

Recommendation: Realign Army Reserve Command and Control - Northeast; 
20-year net present value[a]: 260. 

Recommendation: Realign Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID; 
20-year net present value[a]: 254. 

Recommendation: Realign Walter Reed Army Medical Center to Bethesda 
National Naval Medical Center, MD and to Fort Belvoir, VA; 
20-year net present value[a]: 2251. 

Recommendation: Close Fort Gillem, GA; 
20-year net present value[a]: 249. 

Total savings from the recommendations listed above: $25,756. 

Total savings from only recommendations that accrue a net savings after 
20 years: $30,358. 

Percentage of savings from recommendations listed above of all 
recommendations that accrue a net savings after 20 years: 85%. 

Source: GAO analysis based on DOD data. 

Notes: Totals may not add because of rounding. 

[a] Net present value: A financial calculation that takes the time 
value of money into account by determining the present value of the up-
front initial investment minus future net savings over a specified 
period of time. In the context of BRAC, net present value is the total 
one-time costs minus the total net savings that DOD expects to incur 
from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2025 to project 20-year 
savings at 2.8 percent discount rate. 

[b] In May 2005, DOD proposed closing Cannon Air Force Base, New 
Mexico. In September 2005, the BRAC Commission stated that Cannon could 
remain open if DOD identified a new mission for the base. Subsequently, 
the Air Force announced in June 2006 that Cannon will remain open 
because they plan to activate a new mission at the installation. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, Dc 20301-3000: 

December 3, 2007: 

Mr. Brian J. Lepore: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548-0001: 

Dear Mr. Lepore: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report, "Military Base Realignments And Closures: Cost Estimates Have 
Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve," dated November 5, 2007 
(GAO Code 350840/GAO-08-159). 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on this draft 
report and concurs with the GAO's one recommendation concerning 
insertion of an explanation of the annual recurring savings in the 
Department's Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 budget 
justification material executive summary, as indicated in the enclosed. 

The report accurately characterizes the Department's viewpoint that, 
even though the BRAC 2005 round is costing more and saving less than 
originally estimated in 2005, implementation of these recommendations 
are expected to enhance defense capabilities as the Department reshapes 
and realigns forces to meet future national security needs. 

Regarding the increase in one-time costs between the original Cost of 
Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) FY05 constant dollar estimates and the 
estimates reflected in the FY 2008 President's Budget, the Department 
agrees that the majority of that increase is associated with funding 
Military Construction (MilCon) projects. With approximately 70 percent 
of the BRAC 2005 FY08 President's Budget allocated to facilitize new 
capabilities, it is understandable that most of the increase would be 
associated with MilCon. 

The reasons for such increases, beyond inflation, include management 
decisions to pursue new construction versus use of renovated space, use 
of site specific survey assessments, and to accommodate changes in unit 
sizes, functions or responsibilities by increasing facilities, changing 
configurations or building additional facilities. In other cases, 
business decisions were made to enhance quality of life and training 
infrastructure at installations receiving missions beyond those 
initially estimated by COBRA. 

Specifically, the Army added approximately $2 billion to improve 
training ranges, consolidate reserve centers, for child care and other 
quality of life facilities and in support of medical facilities. 

The Department concurs with the GAO assessment that the original COBRA 
model estimates, while valuable as a comparative tool, do not provide 
estimates that the Department is expected to use in formulating the 
BRAC budget against which Congress will appropriate funds. 
Specifically, the Department's experience is such that the combination 
of actual on-site surveys and better definition of requirements 
contributed to MilCon cost increases as the more detailed 
implementation planning process progressed. 

Regarding the treatment of annual recurring savings, the Department 
considers military personnel reductions attributable to a BRAC 
recommendation as savings that are as real as savings generated through 
end-strength reductions. While the Department may not reduce overall 
end-strength, the reductions in military personnel for each 
recommendation at a specific location are real. As is the case of 
monetary savings, personnel reductions allow the Department to re-apply 
these military personnel to support new capabilities and to improve 
operational efficiencies. In this context, savings from military 
personnel reductions are real savings. However, the Department 
acknowledges that these savings may not be available to fund other 
Defense priorities because they have already been spent to fund 
military personnel priorities. 

Finally, in spite of the fact that net annual recurring savings (ARS) 
have decreased from $4.2 billion to $4.0 billion, as indicated in the 
report, the Department emphasizes that the ARS still represents a 
significant benefit that will result from successful implementation of 
these recommendations. 

The Department's comments regarding the specific recommendation in the 
report are outlined in the enclosure. We appreciate the work performed 
by the GAO. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Phillip W. Grone: 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense: 
(Installations and Environment): 

Enclosure: As stated: 

GAO Draft Report Ė Dated November 5, 2007: 
GAO Code 350840/GAO-08-159: 

"Military Base Realignments And Closures: Cost Estimates Have Increased
and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendation: 

Recommendation: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, in consultation with the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller), to explain, in DoD's budget submission to 
Congress, the difference between annual recurring savings attributable 
to military personnel entitlements and annual recurring savings that 
will readily result in funds available for other defense priorities. 

DOD Response: DoD concurs with this recommendation. The Department will 
include an explanation of the annual recurring savings in its BRAC 2005 
budget justification material executive summary that accompanies the 
annual President's Budget. As explained in the Department's main 
response to this draft report, personnel reductions allow the 
Department to re-apply these military personnel to support new 
capabilities and to improve operational efficiencies. In this context, 
savings from military personnel reductions are real savings. However, 
the Department acknowledges that these savings may not be available to 
fund other Defense priorities because they have already been spent to 
fund military personnel priorities. 

[End of section] 

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Barry Holman, Director 
(retired); Laura Talbott, Assistant Director; Leigh Caraher; Grace 
Coleman; Susan Ditto; Thomas Mahalek; Julia Matta; Charles Perdue; 
Benjamin Thompson; and Tristan T. To made key contributions to this 
report. 

Related GAO Products: 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating, 
Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute 
of Pathology. GAO-08-20. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage, 
and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics 
Agency. GAO-08-121R. Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007. 

Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely 
Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial 
Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor 
Challenges for Completing More than 100 Armed Forces Reserve Centers. 
GAO-07-1040. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007. 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the 
2005 Round. GAO-07-1203R. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007. 

Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers 
Are Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and 
Overcome Certain Challenges. GAO-07-304. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 
2007. 

Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate 
Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely 
Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641. 
Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007. 

Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental 
Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property. 
GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007. 

Military Bases: Observations on DODís 2005 Base Realignment and Closure 
Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905. Washington, D.C.: 
July 18, 2005. 

Military Bases: Analysis of DODís 2005 Selection Process and 
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785. 
Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005. 

Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC Rounds. 
GAO-05-614. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005. 

Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and 
Closures. GAO-05-138. Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2005. 

Military Base Closures: Assessment of DODís 2004 Report on the Need for 
a Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-760. Washington, D.C.: May 
17, 2004. 

Military Base Closures: Observations on Preparations for the Upcoming 
Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-558T. Washington, D.C.: 
March 25, 2004. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] In a 2001 testimony before Congress, the Secretary of Defense 
stated that another BRAC round would generate recurring savings the 
department could use for other higher-priority defense programs. 

[2] About 15,000 of these soldiers are included in the 123,000 
personnel mentioned above. Army plans to relocate the remaining 
soldiers in realignment actions not related to BRAC. 

[3] The Army plans to seek an increase in its active-duty end strength 
by 65,000, and the Marine Corps plan to seek an increase in its active-
duty end strength by 27,000 over the next several years. 

[4] BRAC legislation (Pub. L. No. 101-510, Title XXIX, as amended by 
Pub. L. No. 107-107, Title XXX) provided for an independent commission 
to review the Secretary of Defenseís realignment and closure 
recommendations and the commission had the authority to change these 
recommendations if it determined that the Secretary deviated 
substantially from the legally mandated selection criteria. The Defense 
Base Closure and Realignment Commission (referred to in this report as 
the BRAC Commission) presented its list of final recommendations to the 
President of the United States, who approved them in their entirety. 
The President subsequently forwarded these BRAC recommendations to 
Congress, and they became effective on November 9, 2005. 

[5] Military value refers to one or more of the first four BRAC 
selection criteria (see fig. 1), which includes such considerations as 
an installationís current and future mission capabilities, condition, 
ability to accommodate future needs, and cost of operations. Whereas in 
prior rounds, military value was a priority consideration, along with 
costs and savings, economic impact to local communities, and other 
concerns, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 
directed DOD to consider military value above all other criteria in the 
BRAC 2005 round. Pub. L. No. 107-107, ß 3002 (2001). 

[6] 31 U.S.C. ß 717. 

[7] H.R. Rep. No. 110-146, at 514 (2007). 

[8] Pub. L. No. 101-510, ß 2904(a)(5), as amended, provides that the 
Secretary shall complete all such closures and realignments no later 
than the end of the 6-year period beginning on the date on which the 
President transmits the report pursuant to section 2903(e) containing 
the recommendations for such closures or realignments. 

[9] The BRAC Commission reported its estimates in constant fiscal year 
2005 dollars (i.e., excludes projected inflation), while DOD reported 
BRAC estimates in the fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget submission to 
Congress in current dollars (i.e., includes projected inflation). 

[10] Pub. L. No. 101-510, ß 2904, as amended (1990). 

[11] The first round in 1988 was completed under the Defense 
Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Pub. L. 
No. 100-526, Title II, as amended (1988)). Subsequently, additional 
BRAC rounds were completed in 1991, 1993, and 1995 as authorized in the 
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Pub .L. No.101-510, 
Title XXIX, as amended (1990)). The latest roundóBRAC 2005ówas 
authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-107, Title XXX, (2001)). 

[12] Specified DOD personnel are required to certify to the best of 
their knowledge and belief that information provided to the Secretary 
of Defense or the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission 
concerning the realignment or closure of a military installation is 
accurate and complete. Pub. L. No. 101-510, ß 2903(c)(5). The force 
structure plan is the numbers, size, and composition of the units that 
comprise U.S. forces, for example, divisions, air wings, aircraft, 
tanks, and so forth. Pub. L. No. 101-510, ß 2912(a)(1)(A). 

[13] GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DODís 2005 Selection Process and 
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments, GAO-05-785 
(Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005). 

[14] The President was required to approve or disapprove the BRAC 
Commissionís recommendations in their entirety by September 23, 2005. 
After they were approved, the recommendations were forwarded to 
Congress, which had 45 days or until adjournment of Congress to 
disapprove the recommendations on an all-or-none basis; otherwise, the 
recommendations became effective. 

[15] The COBRA model provided for several key outputs such as (1) 
estimated one-time costs for such factors as military construction, 
personnel severance, or moving costs over the implementation period; 
(2) estimated savings for such factors as personnel reductions or 
eliminations, or reduced operations and maintenance costs; (3) savings 
that are expected to occur annually after the implementation period; 
(4) the payback period for estimating when total savings will exceed 
total costs; and (5) the 20-year savings, also known as net present 
value, of implementing BRAC actions. 

[16] Pub. L. No. 101-510, ß 2913(c)(1) requires DOD to consider the 
extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number 
of years until savings exceed costs, in its BRAC selection process. 

[17] GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DODís 2005 Selection Process and 
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments, GAO-05-785 
(Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005) and Military Bases: Analysis of DODís 
1995 Process and Recommendations for Closure and Realignment, GAO/NSIAD-
95-133 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 1995). 

[18] OSD assigned one of the military services or a defense agency to 
take the lead in developing business plans for each recommendation or a 
distinct part of a recommendation. For recommendations affecting 
multiple services or defense agencies, the military service or defense 
agency with facility management authority at the gaining site usually 
prepared the business plan. 

[19] The BRAC Commission forwarded 182 BRAC recommendations to the 
President who approved them in their entirety. Our analysis shows DOD 
requested funds to implement 175 recommendations because 7 
recommendations do not involve implementation costs for various 
reasons. 

[20] In DODís initial BRAC fiscal year 2007 budget submission to 
Congress in March 2006, the department stated that it did not have 
enough time to formulate a reasonable BRAC budget and that the budget 
submission contained significant funding shortfalls. Based on our 
analysis of DODís initial BRAC budget submission, we agreed and 
believed it would have been inappropriate for us to use the data in our 
analysis. 

[21] Estimates for net annual recurring savings are based on DODís 
annual recurring costs and savings expected in 2012, the year after DOD 
expects to complete BRAC implementation. OSD BRAC officials told us 
they expect 2012 to be the first year to accrue the full amount of net 
annual recurring savings because some recommendations are not expected 
to be completed until late 2011. Based on data OSD provided us, DOD 
expects to generate about $400 million more in annual recurring savings 
using its 2012 data, which we have included in our analysis, compared 
to the data provided in the departmentís fiscal year 2008 BRAC budget 
submission to Congress. 

[22] Payback period is a metric used by DOD and the BRAC Commission in 
evaluating individual BRAC recommendations and represents the time 
required to recoup up-front investment costs to implement BRAC 
recommendations. Thus, payback or the break-even point is when 
cumulative savings exceed cumulative costs. 

[23] Twenty-year savings, also known as 20-year net present value in 
the BRAC Commissionís report, is a financial calculation that accounted 
for the time value of money by determining the present value of future 
savings minus up-front investment costs over a specified period of 
time. Determining net present value is important because it illustrates 
both the up-front investment costs and long-term savings in a single 
amount. In the context of BRAC implementation, net present value is 
calculated for a 20-year period from 2006 through 2025. 

[24] Report by the Independent Review Group on Rehabilitative Care and 
Administrative Processes at Walter Reed Army Medical Center and the 
National Naval Medical Center, April 2007. 

[25] Combining several existing schools and centers is associated with 
three BRAC recommendations. These Army recommendations are (1) realign 
the Armor School at Fort Knox, Kentucky, with the Infantry School at 
Fort Benning, Georgia, to create the new Maneuver Training Center; (2) 
realign various combat service support functions from various 
installations to Fort Lee, Virginia, to establish a combined Combat 
Service Support Center; and (3) realign the Air Defense Artillery 
School from Fort Bliss, Texas, to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to form the new 
Net Fires Center. 

[26] DOD Inspector General, Navyís Proposed Business Plan for Base 
Realignment and Closure 2005 Recommendation 184, D-2007-127 (Arlington, 
Va.: Sept. 25, 2007). 

[27] GAO, Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve 
Environmental Cleanup Cost Reporting and Expedite Transfer of Unneeded 
Property, GAO-07-166 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2007). 

[28] DOD Instruction 7041.3, Economic Analysis for Decisionmaking (Nov. 
7, 1995) and Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-94, 
Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal 
Programs (Oct. 29, 1992). 

[29] Although the BRAC Commission language refers to Cannon Air Force 
Base as a realignment, this is in reference to establishing an enclave 
at Cannon that could remain open until December 31, 2009, during which 
time the Secretary of Defense could seek other newly identified 
missions for possible assignment to Cannon. 

[30] In commenting on a draft of this report, the Air Force BRAC Office 
said they claimed these savings because the decision to reallocate Air 
Force resources and mission to Cannon was made after the BRAC 
recommendation was approved and was therefore, a non-BRAC programmatic 
decision. 

[31] GAO, Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to 
Mitigate Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely 
Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations, GAO-07-641 
(Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007). 

[32] In the context of BRAC, actions are activities necessary to 
implement final and approved recommendations of the BRAC Commission to 
close or realign military installations. 

[33] GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to 
Monitor Challenges for Completing More than 100 Armed Forces Reserve 
Centers, GAO-07-1040 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2007). 

[34] House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense hearing on Military 
Medical Readiness and Related Issues, January 19, 2007. 

[35] To establish joint bases, DOD plans to transfer various 
installation management functions from bases that are contiguous or in 
close proximity to each other to a designated lead military service. 
For example, OSD plans to transform three basesóMcGuire Air Force Base, 
Fort Dix, and Naval Air Engineering Station LakehurstĖNew Jerseyóinto 
one joint base with the Air Force providing installation services. 

[36] Testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military 
Construction and Veterans Affairs in March 2007. 

[37] GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, 
Storage, and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense 
Logistics Agency, GAO-08-121R (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 26, 2007). 

[38] DOD reported 20-year savings estimates for each base closure and 
realignment recommendation in its report to the BRAC Commission. 
Subsequently, the BRAC Commission also reported 20-year savings 
estimates for each BRAC recommendation in its report to the President. 
OSD BRAC officials told us that DOD does not include 20-year savings 
estimates in its BRAC budgets to Congress because this information is 
not required. Consequently, we calculated 20-year savings for 
comparison purposes in a manner consistent with the BRAC Commissionís 
calculation of these savings. 

[39] Applying the same formulas and assumptions as used by the BRAC 
Commission, we used a 2.8 percent discount rate to calculate the 
accumulated net present value of expected 20-year savings. 

[End of section] 

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