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the Need for a Base Realignment and Closure Round' which was released 
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Report to Congressional Committees:

United States General Accounting Office:

GAO:

May 2004:

Military Base Closures:

Assessment of DOD's 2004 Report on the Need for a Base Realignment and 
Closure Round:

GAO-04-760:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-04-760, a report to congressional committees 

Why GAO Did This Study:

The Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990, as amended, 
required the Department of Defense (DOD) to address several base 
realignment and closure (BRAC) issues in 2004 for the 2005 BRAC round 
to proceed. The requirements included reporting on a 20-year force 
structure plan, an inventory of military installations, and separately 
adopting selection criteria for the upcoming round. The legislation 
also required DOD to certify whether an additional BRAC round was 
needed, and, if so, that annual net savings would be realized not later 
than fiscal year 2011. If the certifications were provided, GAO was 
required to evaluate DODís submissions and report to Congress. DOD 
reported on March 23, 2004, and provided the certifications.

In this report GAO evaluates (1) DODís responsiveness to legislative 
requirements; (2) the force structure plan, infrastructure inventory, 
and selection criteria; (3) other key issues included in DOD's report; 
and (4) DODís certification regarding the need for an additional BRAC 
round.


What GAO Found:

DODís report to Congress generally addressed all legislative reporting 
requirements in section 2912 of the Defense Base Realignment and 
Closure Act of 1990, as amended, and separately complied with 
requirements under Section 2913 in adopting selection criteria to guide 
BRAC decision making. The degree of coverage on some reporting 
requirements was limited to avoid prejudging the ongoing analytical 
process for the 2005 round.

As directed, GAO analyzed DODís worldwide installation inventory, force 
structure plan, and selection criteria. While all three are important 
in setting a framework for the BRAC process, the latter two figure 
prominently in guiding DODís analyses for the 2005 round. The 
unclassified portion of the 20-year force structure plan, extending 
through 2009, provides a macro level focus (e.g., number of Army 
divisions), and reflects limited changes across the military services, 
even though the services have initiatives under way that could affect 
future force structure and infrastructure requirements. Todayís 
security environment is evolving, as are force structure requirements 
along with technology advancements, and defense transformation efforts. 
The department must consider these factors in its BRAC analyses with 
appropriate allowances for future uncertainties. DODís selection 
criteria closely parallel criteria used in previous rounds, while 
incorporating the provisions required by legislation authorizing the 
2005 round. The analytical sufficiency of the criteria will best be 
assessed through their application in the ongoing BRAC process.

GAO addressed other BRAC-related issues such as excess defense 
infrastructure capacity and BRAC savings because of their importance to 
DODís certification of need for the 2005 BRAC round. DODís excess 
capacity analysis, completed for the 2004 report, has some limitations 
that could result in either overstating or understating excess capacity 
across various functional areas, and make it difficult to project a 
total amount of excess capacity across DOD. While the analysis gives 
some indications of excess capacity within the department, the issue 
warrants a more complete assessment in the BRAC process. That process 
will also consider joint base use with the potential for better 
identifying excess capacity. DODís historical financial data suggest 
that, assuming conditions similar to those in the 1993 and 1995 rounds, 
each of the military departments could achieve annual net savings by 
2011, as stipulated by the mandate. While the potential exists for 
substantial savings from the upcoming round, it is difficult to 
conclusively project the expected magnitude of the savings because 
there are too many unknowns at this time. Additionally, improvements 
are needed in DODís accounting for savings after BRAC decisions are 
made. 

GAO found no basis to question DODís certification of the need for an 
additional BRAC round. While clear limitations exist in DODís 
assessment of excess capacity, it does point to some areas that warrant 
additional analysis-and the current BRAC process is an appropriate 
forum for doing so.

What GAO Recommends:

This report includes a recommendation for executive action by DOD and a 
matter for congressional consideration to strengthen the BRAC process.

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with the report 
contents.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-760.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Barry W. Holman at (202)
512-8412 or holmanb@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

DOD's Report Generally Addressed All of the Legislatively Required 
Information:

Worldwide Installation Inventory, Force Structure Plan, and Selection 
Criteria:

Observations on Other Key BRAC-Related Issues Included in 
DOD's Report:

Certification of the Need for an Additional BRAC Round:

Conclusion:

Recommendation for Executive Action:

Matter for Congressional Consideration:

Agency Comments:

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

Appendix II: BRAC 2005 Timeline:

Appendix III: GAO's Letter on Draft Selection Criteria for the 2005 Base 
Closure Round:

Appendix IV: DOD's Methodology for Estimating Excess Capacity:

Appendix V: Key Points from Prior GAO Products Regarding the Need for an 
Additional BRAC Round:

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense:

Appendix VII: Key Prior GAO Reports on DOD's Base Realignments 
and Closures:

Appendix VIII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

Tables:

Table 1: GAO Assessment of DOD's Responsiveness to Legislative 
Requirements in its Section 2912 Report to Congress:

Table 2: DOD's 20-year Force Structure Plan (unclassified portion 
through fiscal year 2009):

Table 3: Comparison of BRAC Criteria for the 1995 Round and Those 
Adopted for the 2005 Round:

Table 4: Net Annual Savings In the Sixth Year of Implementation for 
BRAC 1993 and 1995 Rounds by Military Department:

Table 5: Army Analysis of Proportional Capacity:

Table 6: Estimated Percentage of Excess Capacity:

Abbreviations:

BRAC: base realignment and closure:

CBO: Congressional Budget Office:

DLA: Defense Logistics Agency:

DOD: Department of Defense:

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:

United States General Accounting Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

May 17, 2004:

Congressional Committees:

While the Department of Defense (DOD) continues its work in preparing 
for the upcoming base realignment and closure (BRAC) round in 2005, 
legislation[Footnote 1] required DOD to report to Congress on several 
BRAC-related issues in 2004 in order for the 2005 round to proceed. The 
legislation directed, among other things, that the Secretary of Defense 
provide Congress with a 20-year force structure plan and a worldwide 
inventory of military installations in its submission of its fiscal 
year 2005 budget documentation and separately publish the final 
selection criteria for the 2005 BRAC round no later than February 16, 
2004. Of particular importance was the requirement that the Secretary 
of Defense certify the need for additional base realignments and 
closures and, if such a need exists, certify that annual net savings 
would be realized by each military department not later than fiscal 
year 2011. DOD published its final selection criteria on February 12, 
2004, and reported on the other legislative requirements, including the 
necessary certifications, on March 23, 2004.[Footnote 2] The 
legislation also directed us, if DOD's certifications were provided, to 
submit a report to Congress, within 60 days of the issuance of DOD's 
report, evaluating specific aspects of DOD's legislatively required 
submissions.

In this report, we evaluate (1) DOD's responsiveness to the legislative 
reporting requirements; (2) the force structure plan, infrastructure 
inventory, and final selection criteria for the 2005 BRAC round, 
including, as appropriate, observations on the relative analytical 
sufficiency and accuracy of each; (3) other key BRAC-related issues 
included in DOD's report, such as excess infrastructure capacity, 
estimated savings, and the economic impact of BRAC on nearby 
communities; and (4) the Secretary's certification regarding the need 
for an additional BRAC round. While the mandate did not direct us to 
address the third objective, we chose to include this information 
because of widespread interest in the 2005 BRAC process among Congress 
and the public and its relevance to the Secretary's certification of 
the need for the 2005 BRAC round.

In performing our review, we conducted work at the BRAC Office in the 
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and 
Environment and the Army, Navy, and Air Force BRAC offices. We also 
relied on our previous and ongoing work on BRAC-related issues. Because 
we were required to report within 2 months after DOD issued its report, 
we did not have time to fully assess the accuracy of all data used in 
the report; but we did perform limited reliability assessments of key 
data contained in DOD's report and determined that the data were 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report with relevant 
limitations noted in our report. We performed our work from March to 
May 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Further information on our scope and methodology appears in 
appendix I.

Results in Brief:

DOD's report to Congress generally addressed all of the requirements in 
section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, 
as amended, and separately complied with the requirements in section 
2913 for adopting selection criteria to guide BRAC decision making. 
According to DOD officials, the degree of coverage on some reporting 
requirements, such as the impact of joint basing and the extent of 
excess capacity, was limited in order to avoid preempting or prejudging 
the ongoing analytical process for the 2005 BRAC round.

While the worldwide military installation inventory, 20-year force 
structure plan, and selection criteria are important in setting a 
framework for the BRAC process, the latter two figure prominently in 
guiding DOD's analyses for the 2005 round. The worldwide inventory 
extends well beyond that required for the domestic BRAC 
process,[Footnote 3] which focuses on a smaller subset of the 
inventory. The unclassified portion of the 20-year force structure plan 
covers only the 2005 through 2009 time period and provides more of a 
macro-level focus (e.g., number of Army divisions). The plan depicts 
little change in the force structure through that period, even though 
the services have a number of initiatives underway that could affect 
force structure and infrastructure requirements. DOD's ongoing BRAC 
analysis, however, will need to consider the impact of this and other 
potential future force structure changes on infrastructure 
requirements. Further, as provided in the legislation, DOD has an 
opportunity to update the plan with its fiscal year 2006 budget 
submission in February 2005, which would be expected prior to the 
Secretary's announcement of his proposed closure and realignment 
recommendations in May 2005. DOD's selection criteria for the 2005 
round, while incorporating the requirements required by legislation 
authorizing the 2005 round, closely parallel the criteria that provided 
a solid foundation for BRAC analyses conducted in previous rounds. Even 
so, the analytical sufficiency of the criteria will best be assessed 
through their application, as DOD completes its data collection and 
analyses for the upcoming round.

Other BRAC-related issues--excess defense infrastructure, estimated 
savings, and community impact from BRAC actions--have historically been 
and continue to be areas of widespread interest to Congress and the 
public in considering the need for another BRAC round. DOD's analysis 
of excess infrastructure capacity, which was completed for the 2004 
report outside the BRAC process, has some limitations that could result 
in either overstating or understating the amount of excess capacity 
across various functional areas, and make it difficult to project a 
total amount of excess capacity across DOD. While the analysis gives 
some indication of excess capacity within the department, the issue 
warrants a more complete assessment in the official BRAC process. 
Moreover, in completing this analysis, the military services assessed 
their bases as though they were being used for a single function, and 
did not consider existing or the potential for increased multi-
functional/joint use that is expected to be considered in the 2005 BRAC 
round--and provides the potential for better identifying excess 
capacity. As to estimated savings, DOD's historical financial data 
suggest that, assuming conditions similar to those in the 1993 and 1995 
rounds, each of the military departments could achieve annual net 
savings in the 2005 round by fiscal year 2011, as stipulated by the 
mandate. While the potential exists for substantial savings and 
efficiencies to result from the BRAC 2005 round, it is difficult to 
conclusively project levels of expected savings from the 2005 round. 
There are too many unknowns at this time, such as the timing of 
individual closure or realignment actions, and the implementation costs 
that may be required. Further, important differences exist in the 
upcoming round, compared with prior rounds that could affect costs and 
savings. For example, this round has a greater focus on supporting 
force transformation and the potential need to support stateside 
redeployment of some forces currently based overseas as a result of 
separately ongoing overseas basing reviews. Additionally, we have 
previously noted the need for improvements in DOD's tracking and 
periodic updating of savings estimates from BRAC recommendations once 
they have been approved and are being implemented. DOD needs to firm up 
plans to implement previously proposed improvements as it moves forward 
with the 2005 BRAC round. As to economic impact, the department's 
report recognized that BRAC actions can affect the local economies of 
the surrounding communities but also notes that it has sought to 
minimize any adverse local impacts with a coordinated program of 
federal assistance from both DOD and domestic agencies. Our work has 
shown that many communities surrounding closed bases from the previous 
rounds have fared better than the national average, in terms of changes 
in unemployment rates and per capita income, with more mixed results 
recently, allowing for some negative impact from the economic downturn 
in recent years.

Although we identified some limitations with DOD's assessment of excess 
capacity and factors that could affect the timing and amount of savings 
from a future BRAC round, we found no basis to question DOD's 
certification of the need for an additional BRAC round. As directed by 
DOD, the upcoming round is expected to encompass more than a 
capacity-reduction and cost-savings effort; rather, it is also an 
effort to align the defense infrastructure with the transformation of 
its forces. Further, the need for an additional BRAC round has long 
been recognized by various defense officials and studies--and noted in 
several of our products since the time of the 1995 BRAC round.

This report contains a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to 
strengthen the BRAC analytical process, documenting allowance for 
future force structure and surge requirements, and a matter for 
congressional consideration to ensure steps are taken by DOD to improve 
the accounting for savings from BRAC decisions. In commenting on a 
draft of this report, DOD agreed with the report contents.

Background:

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002[Footnote 4] 
extended the authority of the 1990 BRAC legislation, with some 
modifications, to authorize an additional BRAC round in 2005. Under 
section 2912 of the 1990 Act and as part of its fiscal year 2005 budget 
submission, DOD was required to submit a 20-year force structure plan, 
an infrastructure inventory, and a certification that additional 
closures and realignments were needed and that annual net savings would 
be achieved for each military department by fiscal year 2011. The force 
structure plan was to be based on assessments by the Secretary of 
Defense of the probable threats to national security between fiscal 
years 2005 and 2025. Furthermore, the plan was to be based on the 
probable end strengths and major military force units (land divisions, 
carrier and other major combatant vessels, and air wings) needed to 
meet these threats. DOD was also required to prepare a comprehensive 
inventory of military installations worldwide that indicated the number 
and type of facilities in the active and reserve forces of each 
military department.

Using the force structure plan and the infrastructure inventory, the 
Secretary of Defense's submission to Congress was required to address 
(1) the inventory necessary to support the force structure, (2) the 
categories of excess infrastructure and infrastructure capacity, and 
(3) an economic analysis of the effect of the closure or realignment of 
military installations to reduce excess capacity. In analyzing the 
infrastructure requirements, DOD was to consider the continuing need 
for and availability of military installations outside the United 
States and any efficiency that may be gained from joint tenancy by more 
than one branch of the Armed Forces on military bases. On the basis of 
the force structure plan, the infrastructure inventory and the economic 
analysis, the Secretary was required to certify whether the need 
existed for further closures and realignments and, if so, that an 
additional round would result in annual net savings for each military 
department, beginning not later than 2011. Collectively, these 
requirements were to be addressed in a report to Congress at the time 
it submitted its fiscal year 2005 budget justification documentation. 
The legislation also stipulated that if the certifications were 
provided in DOD's report to Congress, we were to evaluate the force 
structure plan, infrastructure inventory, and the final selection 
criteria, and the need for an additional BRAC round. We were required 
to issue a report not later than 60 days after DOD submitted its report 
to Congress.

Section 2913 of the 1990 Act, as amended, also required the Secretary 
of Defense to publish in the Federal Register the selection criteria 
for use in the BRAC 2005 round and to provide an opportunity for public 
comment. The legislation required that military value be the primary 
criteria for making recommendations to close or realign military 
installations, and directed inclusion of a number of considerations in 
formulating the selection criteria. The proposed selection criteria 
were published on December 23, 2003, with a public comment period 
ending January 30, 2004. The final criteria were published on February 
12, 2004. We were also required by the legislation to evaluate the 
final selection criteria as part of our overall assessment of DOD's 
reporting on BRAC issues in 2004. This is in keeping with GAO's 
longstanding role as an independent, objective observer of the BRAC 
process.

Legislation authorizing the 2005 round continued the previous 
legislative requirement, applicable to earlier BRAC rounds that we 
review the Secretary's recommendations and selection process; it 
requires us to report to the congressional defense committees no later 
than July 1, 2005, 45 days after the last date by which the Secretary 
must transmit to the congressional defense committees and the BRAC 
Commission his recommendations for closures and realignments.[Footnote 
5] To make an informed and timely assessment, we have consistently 
operated in a real-time setting and have had access to significant 
portions of the process as it has evolved, thus affording the 
department an opportunity to address any concerns we raised on a timely 
basis. From our vantage point, we are looking to see to what extent DOD 
follows a clear, transparent, consistently applied process, where we 
can see a logical flow between DOD's analysis and its decision making.

DOD's Report Generally Addressed All of the Legislatively Required 
Information:

DOD's report to Congress generally addressed all of the requirements in 
section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, 
as amended, and separately complied with the requirements in section 
2913 for adopting selection criteria to guide BRAC decision making. In 
some instances, according to DOD officials there were limitations in 
the data provided in DOD's Section 2912 report in order to avoid 
preempting or prejudging the ongoing analytical process for the 2005 
BRAC round. Table 1 details the legislative requirements for DOD's 
Section 2912 report, indicates the pages in DOD's report where the 
issues are addressed, and provides our observations on the extent to 
which DOD provided the information required by each subsection in the 
legislation.

Table 1: GAO Assessment of DOD's Responsiveness to Legislative 
Requirements in its Section 2912 Report to Congress:

Section 2912 citation: Force structure plan and worldwide 
installation inventory: (a)(1)(A); 
Legislative requirement: A force structure plan for the Armed Force 
based on an assessment by the Secretary of the probable threats to 
national security during the 20-year period beginning with fiscal year 
2005, the probable end strengths and major military force units 
(including land force divisions, carrier and other major combatant 
vessels, air wings, and other comparable units) needed to meet these 
threats, and the anticipated levels of funding that will be available 
for national defense purposes during such period; 
DOD report citations: Section 2, pp. 17-23; 
GAO assessment of information provided: DOD provided an unclassified 
force structure plan through fiscal year 2009 and a separate classified 
force structure plan through fiscal year 2024.

Section 2912 citation: Force structure plan and worldwide 
installation inventory: (a)(1)(B); 
Legislative requirement: A comprehensive inventory of military 
installations worldwide for each military department, with 
specifications of the number and type of facilities in the active and 
reserve forces of each department; 
DOD report citations: Section 3, pp. 25-35. App. B, compact disk; 
GAO assessment of information provided: DOD provided a worldwide 
inventory of installations, but the inventory did not include all 
overseas installations where U.S. forces are deployed.

Section 2912 citation: Force structure plan and worldwide 
installation inventory: (a)(2)(A); 
Legislative requirement: A description of the infrastructure necessary 
to support the force structure described in the force structure plan; 
DOD report citations: Section 6, pp. 43-54; 
GAO assessment of information provided: DOD broadly compared the 
infrastructure required to support the force structure for certain 
functional areas through fiscal year 2009 (and not 2024) without 
specificity concerning infrastructure requirements.

Section 2912 citation: Force structure plan and worldwide 
installation inventory: (a)(2)(B); 
Legislative requirement: A discussion of categories of excess 
infrastructure and infrastructure capacity; 
DOD report citations: Section 6, pp. 43-54; 
GAO assessment of information provided: DOD provided the required 
information for selected functional areas, but the excess capacity 
methodology has some limitations.

Section 2912 citation: Force structure plan and worldwide 
installation inventory: (a)(2)(C); 
Legislative requirement: An economic analysis of the effect of the 
closure or realignment of military installations to reduce excess 
infrastructure; 
DOD report citations: Section 7, pp. 55-62; 
GAO assessment of information provided: DOD provided information on the 
savings realized from the previous BRAC rounds and the reuse of 
selected former bases.

Section 2912 citation: Force structure plan and worldwide 
installation inventory: (a)(3)(A); 
Legislative requirement: The anticipated continuing need for and 
availability of military installations outside the United States, 
taking into account current restrictions on the use of military 
installations outside the United States and the potential for future 
prohibitions or restrictions on the use of such military installations; 
DOD report citations: Section 4, pp. 37-40; 
GAO assessment of information provided: DOD provided a general 
discussion on the need for the availability of a worldwide network of 
bases, operating locations, and access arrangements, but no specific 
information on the continuing need for or restrictions on the use of 
specific bases.

Section 2912 citation: Force structure plan and worldwide 
installation inventory: (a)(3)(B); 
Legislative requirement: Any efficiencies that may be gained from joint 
tenancy by more than one branch of the Armed Forces at a military 
installation; 
DOD report citations: Section 5, p. 41; 
GAO assessment of information provided: DOD did not identity specific 
efficiencies but emphasized that joint basing is a priority for the 
2005 BRAC round.

Section 2912 citation: Certifications of need for further closures and 
realignments and requisite savings: (b)(1)(A); 
Legislative requirement: Certification regarding whether the need 
exists for the closure or realignment of additional military 
installations; 
DOD report citations: Cover letter; 
GAO assessment of information provided: DOD provided the required 
certification.

Section 2912 citation: Certifications of need for further closures and 
realignments and requisite savings: (b)(1)(B); 
Legislative requirement: Certification that the additional round of 
closures and realignments would result in annual net savings for each 
of the military departments beginning not later than fiscal year 2011; 
DOD report citations: Cover letter; 
GAO assessment of information provided: DOD provided the required 
certification. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD's Report Required by Section 2912 of the 
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended through 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, March 
2004.

[End of table]

Likewise, as discussed in a subsequent section, DOD also complied with 
the requirements of Section 2913 in adapting its selection criteria for 
the 2005 BRAC round.

Worldwide Installation Inventory, Force Structure Plan, and Selection 
Criteria:

While DOD's worldwide military installation inventory, 20-year force 
structure plan, and selection criteria are all important in setting a 
framework for the BRAC process, the latter two figure prominently in 
guiding BRAC analyses for the 2005 round. Although DOD provided a 
worldwide inventory of installations and facilities for each military 
department as required by the legislation, it exceeds the needs of the 
2005 BRAC process, which focuses on domestic bases.[Footnote 6] 
Further, to the extent one looks to the inventory as providing a total 
accounting of DOD facilities worldwide, it should be noted that the 
inventory lacks completeness in that not all overseas installations and 
associated facilities where U.S. forces are deployed are included--
primarily because some are considered temporary in nature. The 
unclassified portion of the force structure plan, extending through 
2009, has more of a macro-level focus reflecting limited change across 
the military services, even though the services have a number of 
initiatives under way that could affect force structure and 
infrastructure requirements. Nevertheless, DOD's ongoing BRAC 
analysis will need to consider the impact of such changes on 
infrastructure requirements. The department's final selection 
criteria, although incorporating legislatively directed language, 
essentially follows a framework similar to that employed in prior BRAC 
rounds. The full analytical sufficiency of the criteria will best be 
assessed through their application, as DOD completes its data 
collection and analysis for the 2005 round.

Worldwide Installation Inventory Provided but Extended Beyond 
Requirements for 2005 BRAC Round:

As required by the legislation, DOD provided a worldwide inventory of 
installations, which included the number and type of facilities in the 
active and reserve forces. While the inventory provides a detailed 
listing of facilities, it extends beyond the needs of the 2005 BRAC 
round with its focus on domestic installations. At the same time, it 
has some limitations in terms of a complete inventory for use beyond 
BRAC because it does not include all overseas installations. For 
example, the inventory omits various installations and associated 
facilities located in parts of the Middle East, such as Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Kuwait. DOD and military service officials told us 
that these installations are considered temporary or classified in 
support of contingency operations, and are not included in the database 
used to generate the inventory. This limitation should not impact the 
conduct of the 2005 BRAC round since the focus is on domestic bases, 
and DOD has identified the domestic bases in the database to assess in 
the BRAC 2005 round.

The inventory of installations and facilities was derived from DOD's 
Facilities Assessment Database, which is updated annually from the 
military services' real property databases.[Footnote 7] Because of time 
constraints, we performed only limited work on the accuracy of the 
inventory. Contractors who maintain the Facilities Assessment Database 
told us that since 1998 they have validated and verified facility data 
annually by performing data queries--such as verifying the size of 
buildings or the year a facility was acquired or built--to identify 
anomalies in the data. Contractor officials stated the queries have 
been successful in correcting erroneous data reported by the services 
and that the quality of the data has improved since 1998.

No Major Force Structure Changes Identified through Fiscal Year 2009 in 
DOD's 20-Year Force Structure Plan:

As with prior BRAC rounds, DOD has provided Congress with a force 
structure plan that will guide or inform BRAC decisions in 2005, except 
legislation authorizing the 2005 BRAC round required development of a 
20-year plan instead of a 6-year plan required in prior rounds. DOD's 
Section 2912 report contains the unclassified portion of DOD's 20-year 
plan extending through fiscal year 2009; the remaining years of the 
plan are addressed in a classified annex to the report. The 
unclassified report provides more of a macro-level focus (e.g., number 
of Army divisions) reflecting limited changes across the military 
services, even though the services have a number of initiatives under 
way that could affect force structure and infrastructure requirements, 
and which will need to be considered by DOD as it performs its 2005 
round analyses. DOD has the option of modifying its force structure 
plan, as needed, with its fiscal year 2006 budget submission which 
would be expected prior to its issuance of BRAC recommendations.

Table 2 summarizes DOD's force structure plans at the macro-level 
through 2009 by service force units and by end strength. It depicts 
limited changes in force units and end strength for active and reserve 
components of most services. Exceptions include the Navy, which expects 
to reduce personnel but increase the number of ships in its inventory, 
and the Air Force, which plans a slight increase in reserve personnel 
end strength.

Table 2: DOD's 20-year Force Structure Plan (unclassified portion 
through fiscal year 2009):

Service force units: Army divisions; Active; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 10; 
Fiscal year: 2009: 10; 
Change: None.

Service force units: Army divisions; Reserve; 
Fiscal year: 2005: Aircraft carriers: 8; 
Fiscal year: 2009: Aircraft carriers: 8; 
Change: Aircraft carriers: None.

Service force units: Aircraft carriers; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 12; 
Fiscal year: 2009: 12; 
Change: None.

Service force units: Carrier air wings; Active; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 10; 
Fiscal year: 2009: 10; 
Change: None.

Service force units: Carrier air wings; Reserve; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 1; 
Fiscal year: 2009: 1; 
Change: None.

Service force units: Battle force ships; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 332; 
Fiscal year: 2009: 347; 
Change: 15.

Service force units: Air and Space Expeditionary Forces; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 10; 
Fiscal year: 2009: 10; 
Change: None.

Service force units: Marine Corps divisions; Active; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 3; 
Fiscal year: 2009: 3; 
Change: None.

Service force units: Marine Corps divisions; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 1; 
Fiscal year: 2009: 1; 
Change: None.

End strength (in thousands): Army; Active[A]; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 482; 
Fiscal year: 2009: 482; 
Change: None.

End strength (in thousands): Army; Reserve; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 555; 
Fiscal year: 2009: 555; 
Change: None.

End strength (in thousands): Navy; Active; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 366; 
Fiscal year: 2009: 357; 
Change: (9).

End strength (in thousands): Navy; Reserve; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 83; 
Fiscal year: 2009: 76; 
Change: (7).

End strength (in thousands): Marine Corps; Active; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 175; 
Fiscal year: 2009: 175; 
Change: None.

End strength (in thousands): Marine Corps; Reserve; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 40; 
Fiscal year: 2009: 40; 
Change: None.

End strength (in thousands): Air Force; Active; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 360; 
Fiscal year: 2009: 360; 
Change: None.

End strength (in thousands): Air Force; Reserve; 
Fiscal year: 2005: 183; 
Fiscal year: 2009: 184; 
Change: 1. 

Source: DOD Report Required by Section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure 
and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended though the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, March 2004.

[A] The Army end strength figures do not reflect the temporary increase 
of 30,000 spaces for fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2007 to 
accelerate the Army transformation process while remaining fully 
engaged in worldwide operations.

[End of table]

While the Army showed no force structure changes through 2009, Army 
officials told us that they have a number of initiatives under way that 
may affect the force structure and related infrastructure requirements. 
Specifically, the Army is restructuring the way it organizes its forces 
to achieve greater flexibility by increasing the number of brigade 
combat teams from 33 to 43 or more. To achieve these goals while 
maintaining global commitments, the Army has been authorized by the 
Secretary of Defense to temporarily increase its end strength by 30,000 
personnel through fiscal year 2007. Congress is considering legislation 
to permanently authorize this increase. In addition, the Army is in the 
process of rebalancing capabilities between the active and reserve 
components by moving certain early-deploying and high-demand 
capabilities such as military police and civil affairs from the reserve 
components into the active force. Although the BRAC statute allows DOD 
to submit a revised force structure plan with the fiscal year 2006 
budget submission, Army officials told us that many of the details 
about this restructuring would not be completed by this timeframe.

Navy officials told us that their plans include the commissioning of 17 
new ships (13 Arleigh Burke destroyers, 2 submarines, 1 amphibious 
ship, and 1 littoral combat ship) while decommissioning 2 older ships. 
Navy officials indicated that the projected reductions in the number of 
active personnel result primarily from decommissioning ships and air 
squadrons and changes to crew requirements on some ships, and the 
projected reduction in reserve personnel is caused primarily by plans 
to deactivate 7 maritime patrol squadrons. Navy officials also noted 
plans to increase the number of ships in its inventory in future years 
but also have efforts under way to reduce average crew size per ship. 
Although the force structure plan shows a planned increase in the 
number of ships, available information indicates some uncertainty over 
the total number of ships the Navy may expect for its future force 
structure.

Air Force end strength levels shown in the force plan reflect 
authorized levels and not the current over-strength levels, reflecting 
Air Force expectations of reducing the current levels to those 
authorized. While the Air Force showed minimal force structure changes 
through 2009, an Air Force official stated that the service plans to 
increase the number of aircraft per squadron as well as increase crew 
ratios to make more effective use of fewer but more capable aircraft, 
which would most likely reduce future infrastructure requirements. We 
have previously reported[Footnote 8] that the Air Force could not only 
reduce infrastructure by increasing the number of aircraft per fighter 
squadron but could also save millions of dollars annually by doing so.

We recognize that developing a 20-year force structure plan is a 
challenging task for the department, given a host of uncertainties 
about the future security environment, potential technology advances 
and their application to the future force, and ongoing departmental 
transformation efforts. The uncertainties are evident in various 
ongoing defense programs. While increased use of unmanned aerial 
vehicles, for example, could have far-reaching effects for future 
defense force structure, we noted in a recent report that DOD's 
approach to planning for developing and fielding this capability does 
not provide reasonable assurance that its investment will facilitate 
the integration of these vehicles into the force structure 
efficiently.[Footnote 9] Further, DOD officials told us that another 
challenging aspect of its force structure planning resides in the 
longer term (those years beyond 2009) of the plan. In addition to the 
uncertainties cited above, these longer-term years are characterized by 
additional unknowns regarding future funding levels that could impact 
the future force structure and associated requirements, such as the 
total number of ships for the Navy. Despite these inherent 
uncertainties, however, the department must factor in relevant 
assumptions about potential future force structure changes and surge 
requirements as it performs its analyses for the upcoming BRAC round.

Final Selection Criteria Address Legislative Requirements and Provide 
Sound Framework for Follow-on BRAC Analyses:

The department's final selection criteria essentially follow a 
framework similar to that employed in prior BRAC rounds, with 
specificity added in selected areas in response to requirements 
contained in legislation authorizing the 2005 BRAC round. The Defense 
Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended in 2002, required 
DOD to give priority to selection criteria dealing with military value, 
including (1) the impact on joint war fighting, training, and 
readiness; (2) the availability and condition of training areas 
suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout 
diverse climates and terrains and staging areas for use by the Armed 
Forces in homeland defense missions; and (3) the ability to accommodate 
contingency, mobilization, and future force requirements. The 
legislation also required DOD to give special consideration to other 
criteria, many of which parallel those used in prior BRAC rounds. 
Furthermore, the legislation required DOD to consider cost impacts to 
other federal entities as well as to DOD in its BRAC decision making. 
Additionally, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2004[Footnote 10] requires DOD to consider surge requirements in the 
2005 BRAC process. Table 3 compares the 1995 BRAC criteria with that 
adopted for 2005, with changes highlighted in bold.

Table 3: Comparison of BRAC Criteria for the 1995 Round and Those 
Adopted for the 2005 Round:

Military Value; 
Criteria for 1995 Round: 1. The current and future mission requirements 
and the impact on operational readiness of DOD's total force; 
Criteria for 2005 Round: The current and future mission capabilities 
and the impact on operational readiness of the Defense Department's 
total force, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and 
readiness. 

Military Value; 
Criteria for 1995 Round: 2. The availability and condition of land, 
facilities, and associated airspace at both the existing and potential 
receiving locations; 
Criteria for 2005 Round: The availability and condition of land, 
facilities, and associated airspace--including training areas suitable 
for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout diversity of 
climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed 
Forces in homeland defense missions--at both existing and potential 
receiving locations. 

Military Value; 
Criteria for 1995 Round: 3. The ability to accommodate contingency, 
mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing 
and potential receiving locations; 
Criteria for 2005 Round: The ability to accommodate contingency, 
mobilization, and future total force requirements at both existing and 
potential receiving locations to support operations and training. 

Military Value; 
Criteria for 1995 Round: 4. Cost and manpower implications; 
Criteria for 2005 Round: The cost of operations and the manpower 
implications. 

Return on Investment; 
Criteria for 1995 Round: 5. The extent and timing of potential costs 
and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of 
completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the 
costs; 
Criteria for 2005 Round: The extent and timing of potential costs and 
savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of 
completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the 
costs. 

Community Impacts; 
Criteria for 1995 Round: 6. The economic impact on communities; 
Criteria for 2005 Round: The economic impact on existing communities in 
the vicinity of military installations. 

Community Impacts; 
Criteria for 1995 Round: 7. The ability of both the existing and 
potential receiving communities' infrastructures to support forces, 
missions, and personnel; 
Criteria for 2005 Round: The ability of both the existing and potential 
receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions, and 
personnel. 

Community Impacts; 
Criteria for 1995 Round: 8. The environmental impact; 
Criteria for 2005 Round: The environmental impact, including the impact 
of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste 
management, and environmental compliance activities. 

Source: DOD.

Note: Bolding added by GAO to denote changes from 1995.

[End of table]

Our analysis of lessons learned from prior BRAC rounds affirmed the 
soundness of these basic criteria and generally endorsed their 
retention for the future, while recognizing the potential for improving 
the process by which the criteria are used in decision making.[Footnote 
11] Notwithstanding our endorsement of the criteria framework, in a 
January 27, 2004, letter to DOD, we identified two areas in which we 
believed the draft selection criteria needed greater clarification to 
fully address special considerations called for in the legislation (see 
app. III). Specifically, we noted that the criterion related to cost 
and savings does not indicate the department's intention to consider 
potential costs to other DOD activities or federal agencies that may be 
affected by a proposed closure or realignment recommendation. Also, we 
pointed out the criterion on environmental impact does not clearly 
identify to what extent costs related to potential environmental 
restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities 
would be included in cost and savings analyses of individual BRAC 
recommendations. We suggested that DOD could address our concerns by 
incorporating these considerations either directly, in its final 
criteria, or through later explanatory guidance. DOD indicated it would 
address our concerns through clarifying guidance rather than a change 
to the criteria. We have not yet seen that guidance.

DOD also received a variety of other comments on the draft criteria 
from members of Congress, other elected representatives, and the 
general public but did not make any changes before issuing the final 
criteria. Most of these comments involved the military value criteria 
(see table 3: 1-4) and centered on the maintenance of adequate surge 
capacity; the roles military installations fulfill in homeland defense 
missions; the unique features of research, development, test, and 
evaluation facilities; and the preservation of vital human capital in 
various support functions. In responding to those comments, DOD 
expressed the view that the draft criteria adequately addressed these 
issues and did not see the need to make any changes to its draft 
criteria. For example, DOD said that surge requirements will be 
addressed under criterion one, which requires the department to 
consider "current and future mission capabilities," and criterion 
three, which requires DOD to consider an installation's ability to 
"accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force 
requirements" to support operations and training. Furthermore, DOD 
noted that the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 
requires the Secretary of Defense to "assess the probable threats to 
national security" and determine "potential, prudent, surge 
requirements" as part of BRAC 2005. DOD also noted that criterion two 
recognizes the role of military installations as staging areas for 
forces conducting homeland defense missions.

Collectively, in our view, many of the public comments on DOD's 
criteria expressed concern that the criteria for the 2005 BRAC round 
focused more on assessing military value based on military missions and 
operational capabilities without recognizing important support 
capabilities such as research, development, test, and evaluation. 
Although modifications to the criteria might have been made to address 
some of these concerns, the absence of such changes does not 
necessarily mean that these issues will not be considered in applying 
the criteria during the BRAC process. For example, the department has 
established a variety of joint cross-service groups[Footnote 12] to 
analyze various support functions during the upcoming round and each 
group will have to adapt the final criteria for its particular support 
area to assess military value related to each functional area. While 
our monitoring of the ongoing BRAC process indicates this is occurring, 
the effectiveness of these efforts will best be assessed as these 
groups complete their work.

Observations on Other Key BRAC-Related Issues Included in 
DOD's Report:

Other BRAC-related issues included in DOD's report--excess 
infrastructure capacity, estimated savings for the 2005 round, and the 
economic impact of prior BRAC actions on communities--are of widespread 
interest to Congress and the public and important to DOD's 
certification regarding the need for a BRAC round. Although the 
methodology DOD employed to identify excess capacity has some 
limitations, DOD's report does provides a rough indication that excess 
base capacity exists. Further, historical financial data would suggest 
that, assuming conditions similar to those in the 1993 and 1995 round, 
each of the military departments could achieve annual net savings by 
2011. As to economic impact, our work has shown that many communities 
surrounding closed bases from the previous rounds have fared better 
than the national average, in terms of changes in unemployment rates 
and per capita income, with more mixed results recently, allowing for 
some negative effect from the economic downturn in recent years.

DOD Analysis Indicates Excess Infrastructure Capacity Exists:

While DOD's analysis of its infrastructure capacity for the 2004 
report, which was completed outside the 2005 BRAC process, gives some 
indication of excess capacity across certain functional areas through 
fiscal year 2009, the methodology for that analysis has some 
limitations that could cause the results to be either overstated or 
understated, and raises questions about use of the methodology to 
project a total amount of excess capacity across DOD. At the same time, 
DOD's methodology did not consider any additional excess capacity that 
might occur by analyzing facilities or functions on a joint or cross-
service basis, a priority for the 2005 round. A more complete 
assessment of capacity and the potential to reduce it must await the 
results of the current BRAC analyses being conducted by DOD.

To estimate excess capacity, the military services and the Defense 
Logistics Agency (DLA) compared the capacity for a sample of bases in 
1989 with the projected capacity of a sample of bases in 2009. The 
services and DLA categorized the bases according to their primary 
function, and they identified a variety of indicators, or metrics, to 
measure capacity for each functional category. For example, they used 
total maneuver acres per brigade to establish capacity for Army 
training bases, total square feet of parking apron space to establish 
capacity for active and reserve Air Force bases, and total direct labor 
hours (versus budget or programmed direct labor hours) to establish 
capacity for Navy aviation depots. See app. IV for additional 
information on how DOD computed excess capacity.

This methodology has some limitations as we reported[Footnote 13] in 
1998 when DOD used it to project excess capacity in supporting the need 
for a future BRAC round. DOD's use of 1989 as a baseline did not take 
into account the excess base capacity that existed in that year prior 
to base closures in the 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995 BRAC rounds. As a 
result, the percentage of increased excess capacity reported 
understated actual excess capacity by an unknown amount for some 
functional categories, and may have overstated excess capacity for 
other categories. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) also 
reported[Footnote 14] that the department's use of 1989 as a baseline 
did not take into account the excess capacity that might have existed 
in 1989. Furthermore, CBO reported that the approach could understate 
the capacity required if some types of base support are truly a fixed 
cost, regardless of the size of the force. The methodology also did not 
consider any additional excess capacity that might occur by analyzing 
facilities or functions on a cross-service basis, a priority for the 
2005 round. In addition, capacity for some functions was measured 
differently for each service. For example, the Army and Air Force 
measured capacity for test and evaluation facilities in terms of 
physical total square feet of space, while the Navy measured its 
capacity for these facilities in terms of work years. Finally, as we 
recently noted, the variety of metrics and differences across the 
military services makes it difficult to be precise when trying to 
project a total amount of excess capacity across DOD.[Footnote 15]

Military service officials told us that they typically use most of the 
capacity metrics included in DOD's report, along with other measures, 
to assess excess capacity. For example, these officials stated that the 
metrics for depots, industrial, shipyards, logistics bases, and supply 
are used, along with other measures, as indicators of excess capacity. 
However, we found that some of the metrics used in DOD's report were 
less reliable than others as indicators of excess capacity. For 
example, the metric for Marine Corps bases compared the acres at 
five Marine Corps bases to the total authorized military personnel for 
the Marine Corps, and not just the authorized personnel at the five 
bases. Marine Corps officials acknowledged that this was not a 
requirements-based metric to measure excess capacity at Marine Corps 
bases. Likewise, the metric for administrative space in the Air Force 
was based on the administrative space at only one Air Force base. Air 
Force officials stated that this occurred because under the methodology 
each Air Force base could only be considered in one functional area.

While prior BRAC rounds have focused primarily on reducing excess 
capacity, DOD officials have stated this is not the sole focus of the 
2005 BRAC round. These officials noted that the 2005 round aims to 
further transform the military by rationalizing base infrastructure to 
the force structure, enhance joint capabilities by improving joint 
utilization, and convert waste to war-fighting capability by 
eliminating excess capacity. This approach has the potential to 
identify greater excess capacity than previously identified. However, a 
true assessment of excess capacity must, of necessity, await the 
completion of DOD's ongoing official analyses under BRAC 2005.

Extent of Savings from 2005 Round Are Unknown but Could Be Achieved 
by 2011:

DOD's financial data would suggest that, assuming conditions similar to 
those of the 1993 and 1995 rounds, the net annual savings for each of 
the military departments for the 2005 round could be achieved by 2011, 
as certified by the Secretary in DOD's report. DOD estimated that it 
would accrue net annual savings of $3 billion to $5 billion 
departmentwide by 2011. While we believe that the potential exists for 
significant savings to result from the 2005 BRAC round, it is difficult 
to conclusively project the expected magnitude of the savings because 
there simply are too many unknowns, such as the specific timing of 
individual closure or realignment actions and the extent to which DOD's 
efforts to maximize joint utilization and further its transformation 
efforts, would impact savings. Finally, to what extent forces that are 
currently based overseas may be redeployed to the United States and 
what effect that redeployment may have on BRAC and subsequent savings 
remains an unknown as well.[Footnote 16]

The Secretary's estimate of $3 billion to $5 billion in net annual 
savings by 2011 was based in part on savings achieved from the 1993 and 
1995 BRAC rounds. The lower estimate assumes that the actions in the 
2005 round would reduce infrastructure by about 12 percent, comparable 
to the reduction that occurred in the 1993 and 1995 rounds combined. 
The higher estimate assumes that infrastructure would be reduced by 
20 percent, which is about 67 percent higher than the previous two 
rounds combined. While we believe the potential for significant savings 
exists, a more reliable estimate of savings is not practical until the 
department has developed actual closure and realignment proposals.

While DOD's report estimated net annual savings of $3 billion to 
$5 billion could be achieved departmentwide, it did not explicitly 
indicate the amount of savings that each service would achieve by 2011. 
Our analysis of the savings from the 1993 and 1995 BRAC rounds, 
however, indicates that each department accrued net annual savings by 
the sixth year of implementation, as seen in table 4.

Table 4: Net Annual Savings In the Sixth Year of Implementation for 
BRAC 1993 and 1995 Rounds by Military Department:

Dollars in millions.

Army; 
Net Annual Savings: 1993 BRAC round: $62; 
Net Annual Savings: 1995 BRAC round: $22.

Navy; 
Net Annual Savings: 1993 BRAC round: 1,099; 
Net Annual Savings: 1995 BRAC round: 297.

Air Force; 
Net Annual Savings: 1993 BRAC round: 168; 
Net Annual Savings: 1995 BRAC round: 120.

Source: GAO Analysis of DOD's Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Estimates, 
February 2004.

[End of table]

Another way of looking at net savings is to consider the point at which 
cumulative savings exceed the cumulative costs of implementing BRAC 
decisions over a period of years. Experience has shown that the 
department incurs significant upfront investment costs in the early 
years of a BRAC round, and it takes several years to fully offset those 
cumulative costs and begin to realize cumulative net savings. The 
difference in the terminology is important to understand because it has 
a direct bearing on the magnitude and assessment of the savings at any 
given time. As previously discussed, each military department achieved 
net annual savings during the 1993 and 1995 rounds by the sixth year of 
implementation. However, with the exception of the Navy in 1995, the 
military departments did not achieve cumulative net savings for both 
the 1993 and 1995 rounds until after the sixth year of implementation.

Notwithstanding the issues we raise that could affect savings, we 
continue to believe that it is vitally important for DOD to improve its 
mechanisms for tracking and updating its savings estimates. We have 
previously noted that DOD's BRAC savings estimates have been imprecise 
for a variety of reasons such as weaknesses in DOD's financial 
management systems that limit the ability to fully account for the cost 
of its operations; the fact the DOD's accounting systems like other 
accounting systems are oriented to tracking expenses and disbursements, 
not savings; the exclusion of BRAC-related costs incurred by other 
government agencies; and inadequate updating of the savings estimates 
that are developed. Improvements can and should be made to address this 
issue. In its 1998 report to the Congress on BRAC issues, DOD proposed 
efforts that, if adopted, could provide for greater accuracy in the 
estimates. Specifically, DOD proposed developing a questionnaire that 
would be completed annually by each base affected by BRAC rounds during 
the 6-year implementation period. The questionnaire would request 
information on costs, personnel reductions, and changes in operating 
and military construction costs in order to provide greater insight 
into the savings created by each BRAC action. DOD suggested that 
developing such a questionnaire would be a cooperative effort involving 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, the 
defense agencies, the Office of the DOD Inspector General, and the 
service audit agencies. This proposal recognizes that better 
documentation and updating of savings will require special efforts 
parallel to the normal budget process. DOD has not yet initiated 
actions to implement this proposal. We strongly endorse such action. If 
DOD does not take steps to improve its estimation of savings in the 
future, then previous questions about the reliability, accuracy, and 
completeness of DOD's savings estimates will likely continue. We intend 
to examine DOD's progress in instituting its proposed improvements 
during our review of the 2005 BRAC process.

Many Affected Communities Are Recovering from BRAC Actions in Prior 
Rounds:

The department's report recognized that BRAC actions can affect the 
local economies of the surrounding communities. It noted that from 1988 
through 1995, realignment or closure actions were approved at 387 
locations; and that, in implementing the actions, the department had 
sought to minimize any adverse local impacts with a coordinated program 
of federal assistance from both DOD and domestic agencies.

Our own work has shown that while the short-term impact can be very 
traumatic, several factors, such as the strength of the national and 
regional economies, play a role in determining the long-term economic 
impact of the base realignment or closure process on communities. Our 
work has also shown that many communities surrounding closed bases from 
the previous rounds have fared better than the national average, in 
terms of changes in unemployment rates and per capita income, with more 
mixed results recently, allowing for some negative effect from the 
economic downturn in recent years.

Our analysis of selected economic indicators has shown that over time 
the economies of BRAC-affected communities compare favorably with the 
overall U.S. economy. We used unemployment rates and real per capita 
income rates as broad indicators of the economic health of those 
communities where base closures occurred during the prior BRAC rounds. 
Our analysis included 62 communities surrounding base realignment and 
closure sites from all four BRAC rounds for which government and 
contractor civilian job losses were estimated to be 300 or more.

We previously reported that as of September 2001, of the 62 communities 
surrounding these major base closures, 44 (71 percent) had average 
unemployment rates lower than the (then) average 9-month national rate 
of 4.58 percent.[Footnote 17] We are currently updating this analysis 
and attempting to assess the impact of the recent economic downturn on 
these communities. Our preliminary results indicate that, in keeping 
with economic downturn in recent years, the average unemployment rate 
in 2003 had increased for 60 of the 62 communities since 2001. However, 
the 2003 unemployment figures indicated that the rates for these 62 
communities continue to compare favorably with the overall U.S. rate of 
6.1 percent; that is, 43 (or 69 percent) of the communities had 
unemployment rates at or below the U.S. rate.

In our previous work, we had also reported that annual per capita 
income growth rate of affected communities for these 62 BRAC-affected 
communities compared favorably with national averages. We found that 
from 1996 through 1999, 33 (or 53 percent) of the 62 communities had an 
estimated annual real per capital income growth rate that was at or 
above the average of 3.03 percent for the nation at that time. Our 
recent analysis has also noted that changes in the average per capita 
income growth rate of these communities over time compared favorably 
with corresponding changes at the national level. This analysis 
indicates that 30 (48 percent) of the 62 areas examined had average 
income growth rates higher than the average U.S. rate of 2.2 percent, a 
drop from the rate during the previous time period.

In our previous report,[Footnote 18] we identified a number of factors 
that affected economic recovery, based on our discussions with various 
community leaders. These factors included:

* robustness of the national economy,

* diversity of the local economy,

* regional economic trends,

* natural and labor resources,

* leadership and teamwork,

* public confidence,

* government assistance, and:

* reuse of base property.

If history is any indication, these factors are likely to be equally 
applicable in dealing with the effects of closures and realignments 
under BRAC 2005.

Certification of the Need for an Additional BRAC Round:

In transmitting the 2004 report to Congress, the Secretary of Defense 
certified the need for an additional BRAC round. The certification was 
predicated on the force-structure plan and infrastructure inventory 
included with the report and was reinforced by the department's 
assessment of excess capacity, economic impact, and a certification 
that net annual savings from a 2005 round could be achieved by 2011. 
The Secretary's certification of need for the 2005 BRAC round was 
echoed by a separate March 22, 2004, memorandum to the Secretary from 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It stated that the Joint 
Chiefs unanimously agree that additional base realignments and closures 
are necessary if DOD is to transform the armed forces to meet the 
threats to national security and execute national strategy. The 
Chairman also noted that "(d)uring this period of transition, we are 
fundamentally reconfiguring our forces to meet new security challenges. 
The military value requirements that flow from future force structure 
and future strategy needs will differ in character and shape from those 
of today. BRAC offers a critical tool to turn transformational goals 
into reality." We found no basis to question DOD's certification of the 
need for an additional BRAC round. The need for an additional BRAC 
round has long been recognized by various defense officials and 
studies--and noted in various GAO products since the time of the 1995 
BRAC round. (See app. V for a summary of key points from selected GAO 
products.):

The Secretary's certification of the need for a 2005 BRAC round is 
underscored by the department's desire to realize broader objectives in 
the 2005 round, including fostering jointness, transformation, 
assessing common business oriented functions on a cross-service basis, 
and accommodating the potential redeployment of some forces from 
overseas bases back to the United States. Analyses conducted in these 
areas could identify opportunities to achieve consolidations and reduce 
capacity not previously identified. Having said that, we believe the 
efficacy and sufficiency of DOD's BRAC analyses now under way--
considering the force structure plan, inventory, and selection 
criteria--can best be assessed as the BRAC process unfolds.

Conclusion:

While we found no basis to question the Secretary's certification of 
the need for an additional BRAC round, we identified some limitations 
with the department's assessment of excess capacity, completed outside 
the BRAC process, to meet the 2004 reporting requirement. While clear 
limitations exist in DOD's assessment of excess capacity, it does 
nonetheless point to some areas that warrant additional analysis--and 
the current BRAC process is an appropriate forum for doing so.

Today's security environment is evolving, as are force structure 
requirements along with technology advancements, and defense 
transformation efforts. The department must consider ongoing force 
transformation initiatives in its BRAC analyses as well as factor in 
relevant assumptions about the potential for future force structure 
changes--changes that likely will occur long after the timeframes for 
the 2005 BRAC round. This includes consideration of future surge 
requirements. Assuring Congress and the public that this analysis has 
been done and that appropriate allowances for future force structure 
changes have been incorporated into the process will be key to building 
public confidence in the soundness of 2005 closure and realignment 
recommendations. Full discussion of these issues by the department in 
its report accompanying its BRAC recommendations in 2005 is warranted. 
At the same time, consideration of these longer term issues should not 
detract from opportunities available to DOD in the upcoming BRAC round 
to achieve greater economies and efficiencies in support capabilities 
and use of infrastructure through cross-servicing and joint utilization 
of bases.

Finally, many questions have previously existed about the accuracy and 
precision of DOD's estimates of savings from prior BRAC rounds. 
Weaknesses in DOD's financial management systems have contributed to 
this problem and are not likely to be resolved in the near term. At the 
same time, we have previously recommended, and DOD has agreed that 
improvements can and should be made to the accounting for and periodic 
updating of BRAC savings. That notwithstanding, DOD has not made 
sufficient efforts to address this issue. DOD needs to provide 
assurance that it has plans in place for improvements in this area 
before it begins implementing any closure and realignment decisions 
from the upcoming BRAC round.

Recommendation for Executive Action:

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense include in his May 2005 
report on recommendations for base closures and realignments a full 
discussion of relevant assumptions, and allowances made for potential 
future force structure requirements and changes, including the 
potential for future surge requirements.

Matter for Congressional Consideration:

To ensure that the Department of Defense and the military services 
improve their tracking and updating of BRAC savings estimates 
associated with implementing closure and realignment decisions for the 
upcoming BRAC round, Congress may want to consider requiring DOD and 
the military services to provide certification that actions have been 
taken to implement previously planned improvements for tracking and 
updating its BRAC savings estimates. This certification should be 
submitted with its fiscal year 2006 budget request documentation.

Agency Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense (Installations and Environment) agreed with our report. DOD's 
comments are included in appendix VI of this report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the 
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Director, Office of 
Management and Budget. The report will also be available to others upon 
request and can be accessed at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://
www.gao.gov. In addition, a list of our key prior reports on base 
realignments and closures is included in appendix VII and these reports 
can be accessed on our Web site as well.

Please contact me on (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any 
questions regarding this report. Additional contacts and staff 
acknowledgments are provided in appendix VIII.

Barry W. Holman, Director, 
Defense Capabilities and Management:

List of Congressional Committees:

The Honorable John W. Warner: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate:  

The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate:  

The Honorable John Ensign: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate:  

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Military Construction: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate:  

The Honorable Duncan Hunter: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives:  

The Honorable Jerry Lewis: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives:  

The Honorable Joel Hefley: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Readiness: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives:  

The Honorable Joe Knollenberg: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Chet Edwards: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Military Construction: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section]

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

The scope of this report was determined by the legislative requirements 
imposed on us and included in sections 2912 and 2913 of the Defense 
Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended. Our focus was to 
assess the Department of Defense's (DOD) March 24, 2004, report to 
Congress regarding issues associated with the need for an additional 
BRAC round as well as the final selection criteria for the upcoming 
2005 BRAC round as published in the Federal Register on February 12, 
2004. Because of time constraints, we could not fully assess the 
accuracy of all data used in the report but performed limited 
reliability assessments of key data contained in DOD's report and 
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 
this report, with relevant limitations noted.

DOD Responsiveness to Legislative Requirements:

We evaluated DOD's responsiveness to the legislative reporting 
requirements by comparing individual requirements as presented in the 
legislation with DOD's presentation of information in its report and 
final selection criteria. Where appropriate, we made judgments as to 
the extent to which DOD addressed the requirements, and discussed with 
DOD officials those areas where we believed the requirements were not 
fully addressed. In some cases, DOD officials from the BRAC Office 
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) told us that the 
information provided was somewhat limited in order to avoid preempting 
or prejudging the ongoing analytical process for the 2005 BRAC round.

Worldwide Installation Inventory, Force Structure Plan, and Selection 
Criteria:

To address the importance of the worldwide installation inventory, 
force structure plan, and selection criteria and evaluated, where 
appropriate, the analytical sufficiency and accuracy of each, we 
interviewed DOD officials to obtain their views on the relative 
importance and applicability of each to the BRAC 2005 process and 
analyzed the corresponding documentation for analytical sufficiency and 
accuracy where it was reasonable to do so.

More specifically, to evaluate the worldwide installation inventory, we 
interviewed officials from the contracting firm responsible to DOD for 
managing its Facilities Assessment Database, the DOD-wide database that 
was used to compile the worldwide inventory. Our interest was in 
documenting the contractor's process for validating the real property 
data in the database. Because the DOD-wide database draws from the 
services' real property databases, we reviewed the contractor's 
analysis of anomalies identified in the services' real property 
databases (i.e., the Army's Integrated Facilities System, the Navy's 
and Marine Corps' Navy Facility Assets database, and the Air Force's 
Automated Civil Engineer System) to gain a sense of the relative 
accuracy of the data. We also compared the list of Army, Navy, Marine 
Corps, and Air Force installations receiving the recent data capacity 
call for the 2005 BRAC round to the installation inventory to assure 
ourselves that these installations were a subset of the worldwide 
inventory. Furthermore, to determine if the inventory included all 
overseas installations, we compared the listed installations by country 
to a list of countries where U.S. forces are currently deployed. We 
then interviewed a DOD official to verify and obtain rationale for the 
absence of some overseas installations in the inventory.

To evaluate the unclassified portion (fiscal years 2005 through 2009) 
of DOD's 20-year force structure plan as presented in DOD's 2004 
report, we identified major force unit and personnel end strength 
changes by service over the specified time frame and sought out 
rationale for the increases or decreases. We discussed with service 
officials the nature of these changes and how these revisions would be 
considered in the BRAC process. We also interviewed service officials 
regarding a number of initiatives under way, such as the Army's efforts 
to increase the number of brigades in its force, that have implications 
for the future sizing and composition of the force structure and 
associated infrastructure for those respective services. We inquired as 
to when planned force structure changes stemming from these initiatives 
would be incorporated into DOD's force structure plan.

To evaluate the final selection criteria for the upcoming 2005 round, 
we compared the criteria as published in the Federal Register on 
February 12, 2004, with those used in the 1995 BRAC round. In so doing, 
we noted the differences and evaluated whether the legislatively 
directed language[Footnote 19] regarding selection criteria was 
incorporated into the revised criteria for the upcoming round. In 
addition to discussing with DOD officials the use of these criteria as 
part of a framework for conducting its base analyses for the 2005 
round, we relied on our prior work that reported on lessons learned 
from previous base closure rounds, which covered, among other topics, 
the analytical sufficiency of the selection criteria. We also referred 
to a January 27, 2004, letter we sent to the Acting Under Secretary of 
Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) commenting on our 
analysis of the draft criteria that were out for public comment at that 
time. Finally, we reviewed the public comments received on the draft 
selection criteria and discussed with DOD officials their rationale for 
not incorporating any of the suggested changes into the final selection 
criteria.

Excess Defense Infrastructure Capacity, Estimated BRAC Savings, and 
Economic Impact:

While the mandate did not specifically require us to address excess 
defense infrastructure capacity, estimated BRAC savings from the 2005 
round, and economic impact of communities surrounding base closures in 
prior rounds, as discussed in DOD's 2004 report, we chose to do so 
because of widespread interest in Congress and the public and its 
importance to DOD's certification of the need for a BRAC round. In 
addition to an analysis of these topics as presented in DOD's 2004 
report, we relied on prior and ongoing work related to these areas of 
interest.

More specifically, to evaluate the analytical sufficiency of DOD's 
excess capacity analysis, we interviewed DOD and service officials and 
reviewed documentation describing DOD's methodology. We inquired about 
the reasonableness of the various metrics used to develop the capacity 
measures for the various functional support areas, such as depots, 
identified in the analysis in DOD's report. We verified the 
calculations of increases in each of the functional areas and on an 
aggregate basis, and partially verified the data reported by the 
services in making the comparisons of capacity between the 1989 
baseline year and 2009. DOD's BRAC Office provided the services with 
the 1989 baseline numbers for the various metrics used to measure 
capacity. We were unable to verify the 1989 baseline data in DOD's 
report for the Army and Department of the Navy, which had accepted the 
numbers, because supporting documentation from DOD's development of 
that data had not been retained from the time that data were first 
developed in 1998 for an earlier DOD report. However, we did verify the 
Air Force's 1989 baseline numbers because it revised the DOD-provided 
1989 baseline numbers using available data. We also selectively 
verified the projected 2009 data in the analysis.

To evaluate whether DOD's estimates for expected savings from the 
upcoming 2005 round were reasonable, we interviewed a DOD official in 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) BRAC Office and examined 
the methodology, to include assumptions and the underlying basis 
employed by DOD in deriving the estimates. Because a key assumption for 
building the estimates focused on the probable range of reductions for 
aggregate plant replacement value reductions (i.e., the scope of the 
infrastructure reduction) that had occurred across a combination of the 
1993 and 1995 rounds, we were not in a position to question whether 
this assumption would be valid for the 2005 round, given that the 
analysis for the 2005 round has not yet been completed. As to whether 
DOD can achieve the net annual savings for each military department by 
2011, we reviewed DOD's historical financial data for the 1993 and 1995 
round to ascertain if the military departments achieved net annual 
savings by the final or sixth year of implementation for these rounds. 
This would correspond to the year 2011 for the 2005 round and again 
would assume that the 2005 round would be similar to that of the 1993 
and 1995 rounds.

To evaluate the economic recovery of communities affected by the BRAC 
process in the prior rounds, we first performed a broad-based economic 
assessment of 62 communities where more than 300 civilian jobs were 
eliminated during the prior closure rounds.[Footnote 20] This work was 
essentially an update of similar work we had performed and reported on 
in April 2002.[Footnote 21] We used two key economic indicators--
unemployment and real per capital growth rates--as measures to analyze 
changes in the economic condition of communities over time in relation 
to the national averages. We chose unemployment and real per capital 
income as key performance indicators because (1) DOD used these 
measures in its community economic impact analysis during the BRAC 
location selection process and (2) economists commonly use these 
measures in assessing the economic health of an area over time. While 
our assessment does provide an overall picture of how these communities 
compare with the national averages, it does not necessarily isolate the 
condition, or the changes to the condition, that may be attributed to 
the BRAC action.

We conducted our work from March to May 2004 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: BRAC 2005 Timeline:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

[End of section]

Appendix III: GAO's Letter on Draft Selection Criteria for the 2005 
Base Closure Round:

January 27, 2004:

The Honorable Michael W. Wynne:

Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
Department of Defense:

Subject: Draft Selection Criteria for the 2005 Base Closure Round:

Dear Mr. Wynne:

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 [NOTE 1] 
extended the authority of the 1990 Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Act, authorizing another round of base realignment and closures in 
2005. The 2002 legislation continued the requirement enacted in 1990 
requiring the Secretary of Defense to publish in the Federal Register 
the selection criteria proposed by the Department of Defense (DOD) for 
use in base realignment and closure (BRAC) recommendations and to 
provide the opportunity for public comment, while stipulating specific 
areas of emphasis for 2005. The proposed selection criteria were 
published on December 23, 2003, with a public comment period ending 
January 28, 2004. The Act requires the Secretary of Defense to publish 
the final selection criteria no later than February 16, 2004, and 
allows for congressional disapproval of those criteria by an Act of 
Congress until March 15, 2004. Given GAO's longstanding role in 
monitoring the BRAC process, I am providing GAO's observations on the 
draft criteria with our suggestions for clarification in two areas for 
the department's consideration either in finalizing the criteria or in 
subsequent implementing guidance to ensure consistent understanding and 
application of the criteria.

Draft Criteria Continue Framework Used in Prior BRAC Rounds:

The department's draft criteria essentially follow a framework similar 
to that employed in prior BRAC rounds, with added specificity in 
selected areas in response to requirements contained in the 2002 
legislation. The 2002 legislation required that DOD give priority to 
military value and consider (1) the impact on joint warfighting, 
training, and readiness; (2) the availability and condition of training 
areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout 
diverse climates, terrains, and staging areas for use by the Armed 
Forces in homeland defense missions; and (3) the ability to accommodate 
contingency, mobilization, and future force requirements. The 
legislation also required DOD to give special consideration to other 
factors, many of which replicate criteria used in prior BRAC rounds. 
Finally, the legislation required DOD to consider cost impacts to other 
Federal entities as well as to DOD in its BRAC decision-making. (See 
appendix I for a summary of the legislative provisions.) Figure 1 
compares the 1995 BRAC criteria with that proposed for 2005, with 
changes highlighted in bold.

Figure 1: BRAC Criteria from 1995 and Those Proposed for 2005:

[See PDF for image]

Source: DOD (emphasis bolding added by GAO).

[End of figure]

Our analysis of lessons learned from prior BRAC rounds affirmed the 
soundness of these basic criteria and generally endorsed their 
retention for the future, while recognizing the potential for improving 
the process by which the criteria are used in decision-making. [NOTE 2] 

Areas where Clarification Is Needed:

There are two areas where we believe the draft selection criteria may 
need greater clarification to fully address the special considerations 
called for in the 2002 legislation. DOD could accomplish this by either 
incorporating these considerations directly in its final criteria or 
through later explanatory guidance. Specifically, the criterion related 
to cost and savings does not indicate the department's intention to 
consider potential costs to other DOD activities or federal agencies 
that may be affected by a proposed closure or realignment 
recommendation. Also, it is not clear to what extent the impact of 
costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, 
and environmental compliance activities would be included in cost and 
savings analyses of individual BRAC recommendations.

Potential Costs to Other Federal Agencies:

The proposed selection criterion does not indicate the department's 
intention to consider potential costs to other DOD activities or 
federal agencies that may be affected by a BRAC recommendation. The 
2002 legislation authorizing the upcoming BRAC round stipulated that 
"any selection criteria proposed by the Secretary relating to the cost 
savings or return on investment from the proposed closure or 
realignment of military installations shall take into account the 
effect of the proposed closure or realignment on the costs of any other 
activity of the Department of Defense or any other federal agency that 
may be required to assume responsibility for activities at the military 
installations." The emphasis on assessing cost impacts on other federal 
agencies repeats the concern we expressed in prior BRAC rounds that 
some DOD BRAC recommendations excluded costs that might be incurred by 
other federal agencies as a result of BRAC actions. We then recommended 
that DOD at least disclose such costs. [NOTE 3] We believe that DOD 
needs to clarify, either in its final criteria or in explanatory 
guidance, its plans for complying with this new legislative 
requirement.

Clarifv Consideration of Environmental Costs:

The proposed selection criteria makes it unclear to what extent the 
impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste 
management, and environmental compliance activities would be included 
in cost and savings analyses of individual BRAC recommendations. The 
2002 legislation requires DOD to give special consideration to the 
impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste 
management, and environmental compliance activities. DOD incorporated 
this language into the 2005 BRAC round's draft criterion #8. This is an 
expansion of criterion #8 from the 1995 round which, as implemented 
during that round, called for Defense components to consider the impact 
of BRAC actions on such environmental issues as threatened or 
endangered species, wetlands, floodplains, water supplies, and air 
quality, but it did not address the issue of environmental costs. Left 
unstated and, likely, unclear to the public and to the Congress, is the 
extent to which the Department intends for environmental costs, 
particularly those for restoration, to be considered under criterion #5 
in evaluating potential costs and savings associated with individual 
realignment and closure options. [NOTE 4]

We recognize that determining the extent to which environmental 
restoration costs should be considered in BRAC decisionmaking (and 
associated costing analyses) is an issue that has elicited differing 
opinions among the interested parties in prior BRAC rounds. However, 
DOD policy guidance has historically stipulated that environmental 
restoration costs were not to be factored into analyses of costs and 
savings when examining potential bases for realignment and closure, 
since DOD was obligated to restore contaminated sites on military bases 
regardless of whether or not they were closed.[NOTE 5] We recognize 
that determining such costs could be problematic in advance of a 
closure decision, since reuse plans for BRAC properties would not yet 
be determined and studies to identify restoration requirements would 
not yet be completed. On the other hand, budgeted costs for 
environmental compliance activities would be more readily available at 
the time when realignment and closing options were being considered. To 
the extent compliance costs can be identified for facilities being 
reviewed under the BRAC process, a more compelling case can be made for 
including them in the cost and savings analyses completed under 
criterion #5. Regardless, we believe that DOD needs to clarify, either 
in the final criteria or in supplemental guidance, its plans for 
considering environmental costs in its cost and savings analyses under 
criterion #5.

With the clarifications specified above, the proposed selection 
criteria would more clearly address the legislative requirements. 
Further, the draft criteria, if adopted, would add an element of 
consistency and continuity in approach with those of the past three 
BRAC rounds. The full analytic sufficiency of the final criteria will 
best be assessed through their application, as DOD completes its BRAC 
data collection and analyses. The transparency, consistency, and logic 
of individual closure and realignment recommendations in relation to 
those criteria will be important considerations as we and others assess 
DOD recommendations. Please contact me at (202) 512-8412 if you would 
like to further discuss these issues.

Sincerely yours,

Signed by: 

Barry W. Holman, Director:

Defense Capabilities and Management:

cc: Raymond F. DuBois:

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment):

Philip Grone:

Principal Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations 
and Environment):

Appendix I: Legislation Provisions Regarding Section Criteria for 2005 
Round [NOTE 6]:

The selection criteria prepared by the Secretary shall ensure that 
military value is the primary consideration in making of 
recommendations for the closure or realignment of military 
installations. Military value shall include at a minimum the following: 

* Preservation of training area suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, 
or air forces to guarantee future availability of such areas to ensure 
the readiness of the Armed Forces.

* Preservation of military installations in the United States as staging 
areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions.

* Preservation of military installations throughout a diversity of 
climate and terrain areas in the United States for training purposes.

* The impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.

* Contingency, mobilization, and future force requirements at both 
existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and 
training.

The selection criteria for military installations shall also address at 
a minimum the following:

* The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the 
number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure 
or realignment, for the savings to exceed costs.

* The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of 
military installations.

* The ability of both existing communities and potential receiving 
communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions, and personnel.

* The impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, 
waste management, and environmental compliance activities.

Any section criteria proposed by the Secretary relating to the cost 
savings or return on investment from the proposed closure or 
realignment of military installations shall take into account the 
effect of the proposed closure or realignment on the costs of any other 
activity of the Department of Defense or any other federal agency that 
may be required to assume responsibility for activities at the military 
installations.

(305486):

NOTES: 

[1] P.L. 107-107, Title XXX (Dec. 28, 2001).

[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Bases Lessons Learned from 
Prior Base Closure Rounds, GAO/NSIAD-97-151 (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 
1997).

[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 
1995 Process and Recommendations for Closure and Realignment, 
GAO/NSIAD-95-133 (Washington, D. C.: April 14, 1995).

[4] In completing cost and savings analyses of proposed base 
realignment and closure actions, DOD uses the Cost of Base Realignment 
Actions (COBRA) model that relies on base-specific data, scenario-
specific data, and standardized data to calculate cost and savings 
estimates that can be compared with other potential realignment and 
closure actions.

[5] Such costs were considered once BRAC decisions were final and 
budgets were developed to implement the decisions.

[6] P.L. 107-107, Section 3002 (Dec. 28, 2001).

[End of section]

Appendix IV: DOD's Methodology for Estimating Excess Capacity:

To perform the capacity analysis, the services and the Defense 
Logistics Agency (DLA) compared capacity in a sample of bases in 1989 
to the capacity for a sample of bases in 2009. The services then 
categorized the bases according to their primary missions and defined 
indicators of capacity, or metrics, for each category. DOD divided the 
metric by measures of force structure to determine a ratio and 
calculated the extent to which the ratio of capacity in 2009 exceeded 
the ratio in 1989. As an example, table 5 shows the results for the 
Army as shown in DOD's report. Similar tables appear for the Navy, Air 
Force, and DLA in DOD's report.

Table 5: Army Analysis of Proportional Capacity:

Base category/metric: Administration: Administrative space square feet 
(000); 
Input: Fiscal Year 1989: 6,627; 
Input: Fiscal Year 2009: 6,121; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 1989: [Empty]; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 2009: [Empty]; 
Proportional capacity[B]: [Empty]; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989:
Delta from 2009 capacity[C]: [Empty]; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Excess 2009 capacity[D]: [Empty].

Base category/metric: Administration: Military/civilian authorized; 
Input: Fiscal Year 1989: 81,518; 
Input: Fiscal Year 2009: 64,598; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 1989: 0.0813; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 2009: 0.0948; 
Proportional capacity[B]: 5,251; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Delta from 2009 capacity[C]: 870; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Excess 2009 capacity[D]: 14%. 

Base category/metric: Depots: Capacity direct labor hours (000); 
Input: Fiscal Year 1989: 29,000; 
Input: Fiscal Year 2009: 16,957; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 1989: [Empty]; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 2009: [Empty]; 
Proportional capacity[B]: [Empty]; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Delta from 2009 capacity[C]: [Empty]; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Excess 2009 capacity[D]: [Empty].

Base category/metric: Depots: Budgeted/programmed direct labor hours; 
Input: Fiscal Year 1989: 21,000; 
Input: Fiscal Year 2009: 12,828; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 1989: 1.3810; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 2009: 1.3219; 
Proportional capacity[B]: 17,715; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Delta from 2009 capacity[C]: No increase; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Excess 2009 capacity[D]: No increase.

Base category/metric: Industrial: Total facilities square feet (000); 
Input: Fiscal Year 1989: 34,707; 
Input: Fiscal Year 2009: 24,324; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 1989: [Empty]; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 2009: [Empty]; 
Proportional capacity[B]: [Empty]; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Delta from 2009 capacity[C]: [Empty]; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Excess 2009 capacity[D]: [Empty].

Base category/metric: Industrial: Military/civilian authorized; 
Input: Fiscal Year 1989: 23,897; 
Input: Fiscal Year 2009: 9,498; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 1989: 1.4524; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 2009: 2.5610; 
Proportional capacity[B]: 13,795; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Delta from 2009 capacity[C]: 10,529; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Excess 2009 capacity[D]: 43%. 

Base category/metric: Major training active: Base acres; 
Input: Fiscal Year 1989: 1,509,334; 
Input: Fiscal Year 2009: 1,242,842; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 1989: [Empty]; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 2009: [Empty]; 
Proportional capacity[B]: [Empty]; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Delta from 2009 capacity[C]: [Empty]; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Excess 2009 capacity[D]: [Empty].

Base category/metric: Major training active: Maneuver brigades; 
Input: Fiscal Year 1989: 48; 
Input: Fiscal Year 2009: 43; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 1989: 31,444; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 2009: 28,903; 
Proportional capacity[B]: 1,352,112; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Delta from 2009 capacity[C]: No increase; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Excess 2009 capacity[D]: No increase.

Base category/metric: Major training reserve: Base acres; 
Input: Fiscal Year 1989: 258,413; 
Input: Fiscal Year 2009: 330,393; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 1989: [Empty]; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 2009: [Empty]; 
Proportional capacity[B]: [Empty]; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Delta from 2009 capacity[C]: [Empty]; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Excess 2009 capacity[D]: [Empty].

Base category/metric: Major training reserve: End strength; 
Input: Fiscal Year 1989: 319000; 
Input: Fiscal Year 2009: 205,000; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 1989: 0.8101; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 2009: 1.6117; 
Proportional capacity[B]: 166,065; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Delta from 2009 capacity[C]: 164,328; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Excess 2009 capacity[D]: 50%. 

Base category/metric: Maneuver: Base acres; 
Input: Fiscal Year 1989: 3,053,623; 
Input: Fiscal Year 2009: 3,361,679; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 1989: [Empty]; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 2009: [Empty]; 
Proportional capacity[B]: [Empty]; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Delta from 2009 capacity[C]: [Empty]; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Excess 2009 capacity[D]: [Empty].

Base category/metric: Maneuver: Maneuver brigades; 
Input: Fiscal Year 1989: 48; 
Input: Fiscal Year 2009: 43; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 1989: 63,617; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 2009: 78,179; 
Proportional capacity[B]: 2,735,537; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Delta from 2009 capacity[C]: 626,142; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Excess 2009 capacity[D]: 19%. 

Base category/metric: Schools: Instructional space square feet (000); 
Input: Fiscal Year 1989: 14,964; 
Input: Fiscal Year 2009: 14,854; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 1989: [Empty]; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 2009: [Empty]; 
Proportional capacity[B]: [Empty]; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Delta from 2009 capacity[C]: [Empty]; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Excess 2009 capacity[D]: [Empty].

Base category/metric: Schools: Military/Civilian authorized; 
Input: Fiscal Year 1989: 350,108; 
Input: Fiscal Year 2009: 222,723; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 1989: 0.0427; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 2009: 0.0667; 
Proportional capacity[B]: 9,519; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Delta from 2009 capacity[C]: 5,335; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Excess 2009 capacity[D]: 36%. 

Base category/metric: Test and evaluation: Total facilities square feet 
(000); 
Input: Fiscal Year 1989: 48,924; 
Input: Fiscal Year 2009: 51,321; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 1989: [Empty]; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 2009: [Empty]; 
Proportional capacity[B]: [Empty]; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Delta from 2009 capacity[C]: [Empty]; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Excess 2009 capacity[D]: [Empty].

Base category/metric: Test and evaluation: Acquisition workforce; 
Input: Fiscal Year 1989: 157,964; 
Input: Fiscal Year 2009: 62,193; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 1989: 0.3097; 
Index[A]: Fiscal Year 2009: 0.8252; 
Proportional capacity[B]: 19,262; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Delta from 2009 capacity[C]: 32,059; 
Change in capacity relative to force structure since 1989: 
Excess 2009 capacity[D]: 62%. 

Source: DOD.

[A] The index for each functional area is computed by dividing the 
denominator into the numerator. For example, the 1989 administration 
index .0813 is derived by dividing 81,518 into 6,627.

[B] The proportional capacity is computed by multiplying the 
denominator of the fiscal year 2009 input times the fiscal year 1989 
index. For example, the administration proportional capacity 5,251 is 
computed by multiplying 64,598 times .0813.

[C] The delta from 2009 capacity is computed by subtracting the 
proportional capacity from the fiscal year 2009 index numerator. For 
example, the administration delta from 2009 capacity 870 is computed by 
subtracting 5,251 from 6,121.

[D] The percent of 2009 capacity is computed by dividing the delta from 
2009 capacity by the fiscal year 1989 input numerator. For example, the 
administration percent of 2009 capacity (14 percent) is computed by 
dividing 6,627 into 870.

[End of table]

DOD then took a weighted average of all functional areas to determine 
the overall excess capacity for each department. The weights were 
computed by the number of bases in a functional area divided by the 
total number of bases in all functional areas. Table 6 shows the 
overall estimated percentage of excess capacity for each military 
department and the DLA.

Table 6: Estimated Percentage of Excess Capacity:

Department: Army; 
Estimated percentage of excess capacity: 29.

Department: Navy; 
Estimated percentage of excess capacity: 21.

Department: Air Force; 
Estimated percentage of excess capacity: 24.

Department: Defense Logistics Agency; 
Estimated percentage of excess capacity: 17.

Total; 
Estimated percentage of excess capacity: 24.

Source: DOD.

[End of table]

Likewise, DOD computed a weighted average to estimate an overall 
percentage of excess capacity for DOD. The weights were computed from 
the number of bases per department divided by the total of all bases 
included in the analysis.

[End of section]

Appendix V: Key Points from Prior GAO Products Regarding the Need for 
an Additional BRAC Round:

At the time the 1995 BRAC round was being completed and subsequently, 
DOD officials, including the Secretary and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, recognized that additional excess capacity would remain 
following that round and that future base realignments and closures 
would be needed. Various GAO products have noted that issue in 
subsequent years. The following are selected excerpts from key GAO 
products.

* "Despite these recent BRAC rounds, DOD continues to maintain large 
amounts of excess infrastructure, especially in its support functions, 
such as maintenance depots, research and development laboratories, and 
test and evaluation centers. Each service maintains its own facilities 
and capabilities for performing many common support functions and, as a 
result DOD has overlapping, redundant, and underutilized 
infrastructure. DOD has taken some steps to demolish unneeded buildings 
on various operational and support bases; consolidate certain 
functions; privatize, outsource, and reengineer certain workloads; and 
encourage interservicing agreements--however, these are not expected to 
offset the need for additional actions. At the same time, DOD officials 
recognize that significant additional reductions in excess 
infrastructure requirements in common support areas could come from 
consolidating workloads and restructuring functions on a cross-service 
basis, something that has not been accomplished to any great extent in 
prior BRAC rounds." U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Bases: 
Lessons Learned From Prior Base Closure Rounds, GAO/NSIAD-97-151 
(Washington, D.C.: July 25, 1997, p. 3).

* "Notwithstanding the results of the four recent BRAC rounds, DOD 
officials recognized, even while they were finishing the 1995 round, 
that they had missed OSD's goal in terms of reductions needed through 
base closures. DOD calculated that the first three BRAC rounds reduced 
the plant replacement value (PRV)[Footnote 22] of DOD's domestic 
facilities by 15 percent. It established a goal for the fourth round of 
reducing PRV by an additional 15 percent, for a total of 30 percent. 
When the Secretary announced his recommendations for base closures and 
realignments in 1995, OSD projected that if all of the Secretary's 
recommendations were adopted, the total PRV would be reduced by 
21 percent, nearly a third less than OSD's goal."[Footnote 23] GAO/
NSIAD-97-151, p. 17.

* "The Secretary of Defense's 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, which 
assessed defense strategy, programs, and policies, included the issue 
of future base closures in the infrastructure portion of the review. In 
his May 19, 1997, report to Congress on the results of this review, the 
Secretary asked Congress to authorize domestic base closure rounds in 
1999 and 2001. That recommendation was endorsed by the National Defense 
Panel, the independent, congressionally mandated board that is 
reviewing the work of the Quadrennial Defense Review and completing 
its own review of defense issues." GAO/NSIAD-97-151, p. 3.

* DOD's Support Infrastructure Management has been designated as High-
Risk by GAO since 1997. GAO's January 2003 update noted that "DOD plans 
an additional base closure round in 2005; this could enable it to 
devote its facility resources on fewer, more enduring facilities. With 
or without base closures, DOD faces the challenge of adequately 
maintaining and revitalizing the facilities it expects to retain for 
future use. Available information indicates that DOD's facilities 
continue to deteriorate because of insufficient funding for their 
sustainment, restoration, and modernization." U.S. General Accounting 
Office, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.: 
Jan. 2003).

* In commenting on DOD's investment plans for reversing the aging of 
its facilities, we noted that "Öbecause of competing priorities, DOD is 
not likely to realize its investment objectives for facilities in the 
near term. More specifically, the services do not propose to fully fund 
all of OSD's objectives for improving facilities or, in some instances, 
the services have developed funding plans that have unrealistically 
high rates of increase in the out-years compared with previous funding 
trends and other defense priorities. The base realignment and closure 
round authorized for fiscal year 2005, while it carries with it a 
significant up-front investment cost to implement realignment and 
closure decisions, offers an important opportunity to reduce excess 
facilities and achieve greater efficiencies in sustaining and 
recapitalizing the remaining facilities if sufficient funding levels 
are maintained into the future. Additionally, DOD is reexamining its 
worldwide basing requirements, which could potentially lead to 
significant changes in facility requirements over the next several 
years. As these decisions are implemented over the next several years, 
this should permit DOD and the services to increasingly concentrate 
future resources on enduring facilities." U.S. General Accounting 
Office, Defense Infrastructure: Long-term Challenges in Managing the 
Military Construction Program, GAO-04-288 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24, 
2004).

[End of section]

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense:

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:

ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:

MAY 14 2004:

Mr. Barry Holman, Director:

Defense Capabilities and Management 
United States General Accounting Office 
Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Mr. Holman:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) draft report 04-760, "MILITARY BASE CLOSURES: 
Assessment of DoD's 2004 Report on the Need for a Base Realignment and 
Closure Round," dated May 2004, (GAO Code 350485).

The Department agrees with the draft report's findings. In particular, 
the Department agrees with the report's finding that there was no basis 
to question the Secretary's certification of the need for an additional 
base realignment and closure (BRAC) round.

The Department also agrees with the report's assessment that while the 
analysis of excess infrastructure capacity contained in the report has 
limitations, the current BRAC 2005 process is an appropriate forum for 
conducting a thorough analysis to address the 
full extent of excess capacity. Regarding the comments on the necessity 
to periodically update savings estimates, the Department acknowledges 
that efforts to improve this capability must be undertaken. The 
Department intends to have in place for BRAC 2005 a defense-wide 
systematic approach.

BRAC 2005 is absolutely essential to rationalizing our infrastructure 
with our force structure and to convert waste to warfighting 
capabilities within a framework where military value is the primary 
factor. The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the 
draft report.

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Raymond F. DuBois, 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment):

[End of section]

Appendix VII: Key Prior GAO Reports on DOD's Base Realignments 
and Closures:

Military Base Closures: Observations on Preparations for the Upcoming 
Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-558T. Washington, D.C.: 
March 25, 2004.

Military Base Closures: Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve 
Enclaves. GAO-03-723. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2003.

Military Base Closures: Progress in Completing Actions from Prior Base 
Realignments and Closures. GAO-02-433. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2002.

Military Base Closures: DOD's Updated Net Savings Estimate Remains 
Substantial. GAO-01-971. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2001.

Military Bases: Status of Prior Base Realignment and Closure Rounds. 
GAO/NSIAD-99-36. Washington, D.C.: December 11, 1998.

Military Bases: Review of DOD's 1998 Report on Base Realignment and 
Closure. GAO/NSIAD-99-17. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 1998.

Military Bases: Lessons Learned from Prior Base Closure Rounds. GAO/
NSIAD-97-151. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 1997.

Military Bases: Closure and Realignments Savings Are Significant, but 
Not Easily Quantified. GAO/NSIAD-96-67. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 
1996.

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's 1995 Process and Recommendations for 
Closure and Realignment. GAO/NSIAD-95-133. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 
1995.

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD's Recommendations and Selection Process 
for Closures and Realignments. GAO/NSIAD-93-173. Washington, D.C.: 
April 15, 1993.

Military Bases: Observations on the Analyses Supporting Proposed 
Closures and Realignments. GAO/NSIAD-91-224. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 
1991.

Military Bases: An Analysis of the Commission's Realignment and Closure 
Recommendations. GAO/NSIAD-90-42. Washington, D.C.: November 29, 1989.

[End of section]

Appendix VIII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contacts:

Michael Kennedy (202) 512-8333 James Reifsnyder (202) 512-4166:

Acknowledgments:

In addition to the individuals named above, Nelsie Alcoser, Nancy 
Benco, Ray Bickert, Joel Christenson, Warren Lowman, Tom Mahalek, David 
Mayfield, Charles Perdue, James Reynolds, and Laura Talbott made key 
contributions to this report.

FOOTNOTES

[1] The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2002 (P.L. 
107-107, Title XXX, Dec. 28, 2001) authorized a defense base 
realignment and closure round for 2005 by amending the Defense Base 
Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-510, Title XXIX, Nov. 5, 
1990). Provisions in Section 2912 and 2913 of the 1990 Act, as amended, 
require DOD to address various BRAC-related issues in order for the 
2005 round to continue.

[2] Department of Defense, Report Required by Section 2912 of the 
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended through 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, 
(Washington, D.C., March 2004).

[3] The BRAC legislation for the 2005 round applies to military 
installations in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, American 
Samoa, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the 
United States. 

[4] P.L. 107-107, Title XXX, (Dec. 28, 2001).

[5] See app. II for other key BRAC dates.

[6] At the same time, DOD has indicated that the domestic BRAC process 
may be used to accommodate any decisions to relocate forces from 
overseas bases that may result from an ongoing but separate study of 
overseas basing.

[7] These databases include the Army's Integrated Facilities System; 
the Navy's and Marine Corp's Navy Facility Assets Database; and the Air 
Force's Automated Civil Engineer System.

[8] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Air Force Aircraft: 
Consolidating Fighter Squadrons Could Reduce Costs, GAO/NSIAD-96-82 
(Washington, D.C.: May 6, 1996).

[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Improved Strategic 
Planning Can Enhance DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO-04-342 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2004).

[10] P.L. 108-136, section 2822, (Nov. 24, 2003).

[11] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Bases: Lessons 
Learned From Prior Base Closure Rounds, GAO/NSIAD-97-151 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 25, 1997).

[12] DOD has established seven joint cross-service groups to examine 
the following defense functional support areas--industrial, technical, 
medical, headquarters and support activities, supply and storage, 
education and training, and intelligence--during the 2005 BRAC process.

[13] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Bases: Review of 
DOD's 1988 Report on Base Realignment and Closure, GAO/NSIAD-99-17 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 1998).

[14] See Congressional Budget Office: Review of the Report of the 
Department of Defense on Base Realignment and Closure (Washington, 
D.C.: July 1, 1998).

[15] U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Base Closures: 
Observations on Preparations for the Upcoming Base Realignment and 
Closure Round, GAO-04-558T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25, 2004).

[16] As previously noted, the Secretary of Defense has already 
undertaken a comprehensive study of global basing and presence--the 
Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS). DOD has 
indicated that it expects that BRAC will accommodate any decisions from 
that study that relocate forces to the U.S. and that DOD will 
incorporate its global basing strategy into a comprehensive BRAC 
analysis, thereby ensuring that any overseas redeployment decisions 
inform its recommendations to the BRAC Commission. See Analysis of 
Public Comments in 69 F.R. 6948, Feb. 12, 2004: DOD Final Selection 
Criteria for Closing and Realigning Military Installations Inside the 
United States. 

[17] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Base Closures: 
Progress in Completing Actions from Prior Realignments and Closures, 
GAO-02-433 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 5, 2002).

[18] GAO-02-433.

[19] The language appeared in Section 3002 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2002, P.L. 107-107 (Dec. 28, 2001).

[20] The impact areas for communities were defined by using standard 
definitions for metropolitan and nonmetropolitan statistical areas and 
reflected the impact areas used in the 1995 round.

[21] See GAO-02-433.

[22] PRV is defined as the cost to replace current facilities using 
today's construction costs and standards. PRV is recognized as an 
imprecise measure, one that is calculated differently by each service. 
However, it was a key measure used by OSD to establish its goals for 
base closures.

[23] The 1995 BRAC Commission did not approve all of the Secretary's 
recommendations and it added other bases to the closure list. Since 
that time, OSD has not recalculated the net reduction in PRV.

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