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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service and the 
District of Columbia, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

For Release on Delivery: 
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Tuesday, March 16, 2010: 

Homeland Security: 

Ongoing Challenges Impact the Federal Protective Service's Ability to 
Protect Federal Facilities: 

Statement of Mark L. Goldstein, Director: 
Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

GAO-10-506T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-10-506T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Federal Workforce, Postal Service and the District of Columbia, 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Recent events including last monthís attack on Internal Revenue 
Service offices in Texas, and the January 2010 shooting in the lobby 
of the Nevada, federal courthouse demonstrate the continued 
vulnerability of federal facilities and the safety of the federal 
employees who occupy them. These events also highlight the continued 
challenges involved in protecting federal real property and reiterate 
the importance of protecting the over 1 million government employees, 
as well as members of the public, who work in and visit the nearly 
9,000 federal facilities. 

This testimony is based on past GAO reports and testimonies and 
discusses challenges Federal Protective Service (FPS) faces in 
protecting federal facilities and tenant agenciesí perspective of FPSí
s services. To perform this work, GAO visited a number of federal 
facilities, surveyed tenant agencies, analyzed documents, and 
interviewed officials from several federal agencies. 

What GAO Found: 

Over the past 5 years GAO has reported that FPS faces a number of 
operational challenges protecting federal facilities, including: 

* FPSís ability to manage risk across federal facilities and implement 
security countermeasures is limited. FPS assesses risk and recommends 
countermeasures to the General Services Administration (GSA) and its 
tenant agencies, however decisions to implement these countermeasures 
are the responsibility of GSA and tenant agencies who have at times 
been unwilling to fund the countermeasures. Additionally, FPS takes a 
building-by-building approach to risk management, rather than taking a 
more comprehensive, strategic approach and assessing risks among all 
buildings in GSAís inventory and recommending countermeasure 
priorities to GSA and tenant agencies. 

* FPS has experienced difficulty ensuring that it has sufficient staff 
and its inspector-based workforce approach raises questions about 
protection of federal facilities. While FPS is currently operating at 
its congressionally mandated staffing level of no fewer than 1,200 
full-time employees, FPS has experienced difficulty determining its 
optimal staffing level to protect federal facilities. Additionally, 
until recently FPSís staff was steadily declining and as a result 
critical law enforcement services have been reduced or eliminated. 

* FPS does not fully ensure that its contract security guards have the 
training and certifications required to be deployed to a federal 
facility. GAO found that FPS guards had not received adequate training 
to conduct their responsibilities. Specifically, some guards were not 
provided building-specific training, such as what actions to take 
during a building evacuation or a building emergency. This lack of 
training may have contributed to several incidents where guards 
neglected their assigned responsibilities. 

GSA has not been satisfied with FPSís performance, and some tenant 
agencies are unclear on FPSís role in protecting federal facilities. 
According to GSA, FPS has not been responsive and timely in providing 
security assessments for new leases. About one-third of FPSís 
customers could not comment on FPSís level of communication on various 
topics including security assessments, a response that suggests that 
the division of roles and responsibilities between FPS and its 
customers is unclear. 

FPS is taking some steps to better protect federal facilities. For 
example, FPS is developing a new risk assessment program and has 
recently focused on improving oversight of its contract guard program. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO makes no new recommendations in this testimony. DHS concurred with 
GAOís past recommendations for FPS, but FPS has not completed many 
related corrective actions. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-506T] or key 
components. For more information, contact Mark L. Goldstein at (202) 
512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We are pleased to be here to discuss the challenges the Federal 
Protective Service (FPS) faces and tenant agencies' perspective of the 
services FPS provides in protecting more than 1 million government 
employees, as well as members of the public, who work in and visit the 
nearly 9,000 federal facilities that are under the control and custody 
of the General Services Administration (GSA). While there has not been 
a large-scale terrorist attack on a domestic federal facility since 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the 1995 bombing of 
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, recent events 
including last month's attack on Internal Revenue Service offices in 
Austin, Texas, and the January 2010 shooting in the lobby of the Las 
Vegas, Nevada, federal courthouse demonstrate the continued 
vulnerability of federal facilities and the need to ensure the safety 
of the federal employees who occupy them. These recent events also 
continue to demonstrate the challenges involved in protecting federal 
real property and are part of the reason GAO has designated federal 
real property management as a high-risk area.[Footnote 1] 

FPS--located within the National Protection and Programs Directorate 
(NPPD) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--is responsible 
for protecting the buildings, grounds, and property that are under the 
control and custody of GSA, as well as the persons on that property; 
authorized to enforce federal laws and regulations aimed at protecting 
GSA buildings and persons on the property; and authorized to 
investigate offenses against these buildings and persons.[Footnote 2] 
FPS conducts its mission by providing security services through two 
types of activities: (1) physical security activities, including 
conducting risk assessments of facilities and recommending 
countermeasures, aimed at preventing incidents at facilities and (2) 
law enforcement activities, including proactively patrolling 
facilities, responding to incidents, conducting criminal 
investigations, and exercising arrest authority. To accomplish its 
mission, FPS currently has a budget of around $1 billion, about 1,225 
full-time employees, and about 15,000 contract guards deployed at 
federal facilities across the country. 

This testimony is based on our past reports and testimonies[Footnote 
3] and discusses challenges FPS faces in protecting federal 
facilities, as well as GSA and tenant agencies' views on the services 
FPS's provides.[Footnote 4] Work for these past reports and 
testimonies included assessing FPS's facility protection efforts using 
our key security practices as a framework. We also visited FPS regions 
and selected GSA buildings to assess FPS activities firsthand. We 
surveyed a generalizable sample of 1,398 federal officials who work in 
GSA buildings in FPS's 11 regions and are responsible for 
collaborating with FPS on security issues. Additionally, we reviewed 
training and certification data for 663 randomly selected guards in 6 
of FPS's 11 regions. Because of the sensitivity of some of the 
information in our prior work, we cannot specifically identify in this 
testimony the locations of the incidents discussed. For all of our 
work, we reviewed related laws and directives; interviewed officials 
and analyzed documents and data from DHS and GSA; and interviewed 
tenant agency representatives, contactors, and guards. These reviews 
took place between April 2007 and September 2009. The previous work on 
which this testimony is based was conducted in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings 
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

FPS Faces Challenges in Protecting Federal Facilities: 

FPS's Ability to Manage Risk Across Facilities and Implement Security 
Countermeasures Is Limited: 

FPS assesses risk and recommends countermeasures to GSA and tenant 
agencies; however, FPS's ability to use risk management to influence 
the allocation of resources is limited because resource allocation 
decisions are the responsibility of GSA and tenant agencies--in the 
form of Facility Security Committees (FSC)--who have at times been 
unwilling to fund the countermeasures FPS recommends. We have found 
that, under the current risk management approach, the security 
equipment that FPS recommends and is responsible for acquiring, 
installing, and maintaining may not be implemented for several reasons 
including the following: 

* tenant agencies may not have the security expertise needed to make 
risk-based decisions, 

* tenant agencies may find the associated costs prohibitive, 

* the timing of the assessment process may be inconsistent with tenant 
agencies' budget cycles, 

* consensus may be difficult to build amount multiple tenant agencies, 
or: 

* tenant agencies may lack a complete understanding of why recommended 
countermeasures are necessary because they do not receive security 
assessments in their entirety.[Footnote 5] 

For example, in August 2007, FPS recommended a security equipment 
countermeasure--the upgrade of a surveillance system shared by two 
high-security locations that, according to FPS officials, would cost 
around $650,000. While members of one FSC told us they approved 
spending between $350,000 and $375,000 to fund their agencies' share 
of the countermeasure, they said that the FSC of the other location 
would not approve funding; therefore, FPS could not upgrade the system 
as it had recommended. In November 2008, FPS officials told us that 
they were moving ahead with the project by drawing on unexpended 
revenues from the two locations' building-specific fees as well as the 
funding that was approved by one of the FSCs. Furthermore, FPS 
officials, in May 2009, told us that all cameras had been repaired, 
and all monitoring and recording devices had been replaced, and that 
the two FSCs had approved additional upgrades, which FPS was 
implementing. As we reported in June 2008, we have found other 
instances in which recommended security countermeasures were not 
implemented at some of the buildings we visited because FSC members 
could not agree on which countermeasures to implement or were unable 
to obtain funding from their agencies. Currently no guidelines exist 
outlining the requirements for FSCs including their composition, 
requirements, and relationship with FPS. The Interagency Security 
Committee (ISC), which is chaired within NPPD, recently began to 
develop guidance for FSC operations, which may address some of these 
issues. The ISC, however, has yet to announce an anticipated date for 
issuance of this guidance. 

Compounding this situation, FPS takes a building-by-building approach 
to risk management, using an outdated risk assessment tool to create 
facility security assessments (FSA), rather than taking a more 
comprehensive, strategic approach and assessing risks among all 
buildings in GSA's inventory and recommending countermeasure 
priorities to GSA and tenant agencies. As a result, the current 
approach provides less assurance that the most critical risks at 
federal buildings across the country are being prioritized and 
mitigated. Also, GSA and tenant agencies have concerns about the 
quality and timeliness of FPS's risk assessment services and are 
taking steps to obtain their own risk assessments. For example, GSA 
officials told us they have had difficulties receiving timely risk 
assessments from FPS for space GSA is considering leasing. These risk 
assessments must be completed before GSA can take possession of the 
property and lease it to tenant agencies. An inefficient risk 
assessment process for new lease projects can add to costs for GSA and 
create problems for both GSA and tenant agencies that have been 
planning for a move. Therefore, GSA is updating a risk assessment tool 
that it began developing in 1998, but has not recently used, to better 
ensure the timeliness and comprehensiveness of these risk assessments. 
GSA officials told us that, in the future, they may use this tool for 
other physical security activities, such as conducting other types of 
risk assessments and determining security countermeasures for new 
facilities. Additionally, although tenant agencies have typically 
taken responsibility for assessing risk and securing the interior of 
their buildings, assessing exterior risks requires additional 
expertise and resources. This is an inefficient approach considering 
that tenant agencies are paying FPS to assess building security. 

FPS Has Experienced Difficulty Ensuring That It Has Sufficient Staff, 
and Its Inspector-Based Workforce Approach Raises Questions About 
Protection of Federal Facilities: 

While FPS is currently operating at its congressionally mandated 
staffing level of no fewer than 1,200 full-time employees, FPS has 
experienced difficulty determining its optimal staffing level to 
protect federal facilities.[Footnote 6] Prior to this mandate, FPS's 
staff was steadily declining and, as a result, critical law 
enforcement services have been reduced or eliminated. For example, FPS 
has largely eliminated its use of proactive patrol to prevent or 
detect criminal violations at many GSA buildings. According to some 
FPS officials at regions we visited, not providing proactive patrol 
has limited its law enforcement personnel to a reactive force. 
Additionally, officials stated that, in the past, proactive patrol 
permitted its police officers and inspectors to identify and apprehend 
individuals that were surveilling GSA buildings. In contrast, when FPS 
is not able to patrol federal buildings, there is increased potential 
for illegal entry and other criminal activity. In one city we visited, 
a deceased individual had been found in a vacant GSA facility that was 
not regularly patrolled by FPS. FPS officials stated that the deceased 
individual had been inside the building for approximately 3 months. 

In addition to the elimination of proactive patrol, many FPS regions 
have reduced their hours of operation for providing law enforcement 
services in multiple locations, which has resulted in a lack of 
coverage when most federal employees are either entering or leaving 
federal buildings or on weekends when some facilities remain open to 
the public. Moreover, some FPS police officers and inspectors also 
said that reducing hours has increased their response times in some 
locations by as much as a few hours to a couple of days, depending on 
the location of the incident. The decrease in FPS's duty hours has 
also jeopardized police officer and inspector safety, as well as 
building security. Some inspectors said that they are frequently in 
dangerous situations without any FPS backup because many regions have 
reduced their hours of operations and overtime. 

In 2008, FPS transitioned to an inspector-based workforce--eliminating 
the police officer position--and is relying primarily on FPS 
inspectors for both law enforcement and physical security activities, 
which has hampered its ability to protect federal facilities.[Footnote 
7] FPS believes that an inspector-based workforce approach ensures 
that its staff has the right mix of technical skills and training 
needed to accomplish its mission. However, FPS's ability to provide 
law enforcement services under its inspector-based workforce approach 
may be diminished because FPS relies on its inspectors to provide both 
law enforcement and physical security services simultaneously. This 
approach has contributed to a number of issues. For example, FPS faces 
difficulty ensuring the quality and timeliness of FSAs and adequate 
oversight of its 15,000 contract security guards. In addition, in our 
2008 report, we found that representatives of several local law 
enforcement agencies we visited were unaware of FPS's transition to an 
inspector-based workforce and stated that their agencies did not have 
the capacity to take on the additional job of responding to incidents 
at federal facilities. In April 2007, a DHS official and several FPS 
inspectors testified before Congress that FPS's inspector-based 
workforce approach requires increased reliance on state and local law 
enforcement agencies for assistance with crime and other incidents at 
GSA facilities and that FPS would seek to enter into memorandums of 
agreement (MOA) with local law enforcement agencies. However, 
according to FPS's Director, the agency decided not to pursue MOA with 
local law enforcement officials, in part because of reluctance on the 
part of local law enforcement officials to sign such MOAs. In 
addition, FPS believes that the MOAs are not necessary because 96 
percent of the properties in its inventory are listed as concurrent 
jurisdiction facilities where both federal and state governments have 
jurisdiction over the property.[Footnote 8] Nevertheless, these MOAs 
would clarify roles and responsibilities of local law enforcement 
agencies when responding to crime or other incidents. 

Insufficient Oversight and Inadequate Training of Contract Guards Has 
Hampered FPS's Protection of Federal Facilities: 

FPS does not fully ensure that its contract security guards have the 
training and certifications required to be deployed to a GSA building. 
FPS maintains a contract security guard force of about 15,000 guards 
that are primarily responsible for controlling access to federal 
facilities by (1) checking the identification of government employees, 
as well as members of the public who work in and visit federal 
facilities and (2) operating security equipment, including X-ray 
machines and magnetometers, to screen for prohibited materials such as 
firearms, knives, explosives, or items intended to be used to 
fabricate an explosive or incendiary device. We reported in July 2009, 
that 411 of the 663 guards (62 percent) employed by seven FPS 
contractors and deployed to federal facilities had at least one 
expired certification, including a declaration that the guards have 
not been convicted of domestic violence, which makes them ineligible 
to carry firearms. 

We also reported in July 2009, that FPS guards had not received 
adequate training to conduct their responsibilities. FPS requires that 
all prospective guards complete about 128 hours of training including 
16 hours of X-ray and magnetometer training. However, in one region, 
FPS has not provided the X-ray or magnetometer training to its 1,500 
guards since 2004. Nonetheless, these guards are assigned to posts at 
GSA buildings. X-ray training is critical because guards control 
access points at buildings. In addition, we also found that some 
guards were not provided building-specific training, such as what 
actions to take during a building evacuation or a building emergency. 
This lack of training may have contributed to several incidents where 
guards neglected their assigned responsibilities. Following are some 
examples: 

* at a level IV facility,[Footnote 9] the guards did not follow 
evacuation procedures and left two access points unattended, thereby 
leaving the facility vulnerable; 

* at a level IV facility, the guard allowed employees to enter the 
building while an incident involving suspicious packages was being 
investigated; and: 

* at a level III facility, the guard allowed employees to access the 
area affected by a suspicious package; this area was required to be 
evacuated. 

We also found that FPS has limited assurance that its guards are 
complying with post orders.[Footnote 10] In July 2009, we reported 
that FPS does not have specific national guidance on when and how 
guard inspections should be performed. Consequently, inspections of 
guard posts in 6 of the 11 regions we visited were inconsistent and 
varied in quality. We also found that guard inspections in the 6 
regions we visited are typically completed by FPS during regular 
business hours and in locations where FPS has a field office and 
seldom at nights or on weekends or in nonmetropolitan areas. For 
example, in 2008, tenants in a level IV federal facility in a 
nonmetropolitan area complained to a GSA property manager that they 
had not seen FPS in over 2 years, there was no management of their 
guards, and the number of incidents at their facility was increasing. 
GSA officials contacted FPS officials and requested FPS to send 
inspectors to the facility to address the problems. Most guards are 
also stationed at fixed posts that they are not permitted to leave, 
which can impact their response to incidents. For example, we 
interviewed over 50 guards and asked them whether they would assist an 
FPS inspector chasing an individual in handcuffs escaping a federal 
facility. The guards' responses varied, and some guards stated they 
would likely do nothing and stay at their posts because they feared 
being fired for leaving. Other guards also told us that they would not 
intervene because of the threat of a liability suit for use of force 
and did not want to risk losing their jobs. Additionally, guards do 
not have arrest authority, although contract guards do have authority 
to detain individuals. However, according to some regional officials, 
contract guards do not exercise their detention authority also because 
of liability concerns. 

GSA Has Not Been Satisfied With FPS's Performance and Some Tenant 
Agencies Are Unclear On FPS's Role In Protecting Federal Facilities: 

We found that GSA--the owner and lessee of many FPS protected 
facilities--has not been satisfied with the level of service FPS has 
provided since FPS transferred to DHS. For example, according to GSA 
officials, FPS has not been responsive and timely in providing 
assessments for new leases. GSA officials in one region told us that 
the quality of the assessments differs depending on the individual 
conducting the assessment. This official added that different 
inspectors will conduct assessments for the same building so there is 
rarely consistency from year to year, and often inspectors do not seem 
to be able to fully explain the countermeasures that they are 
recommending. We believe that FPS and GSA's information sharing and 
coordination challenges are primarily a result of not finalizing a new 
MOA that formalizes their roles and responsibilities. According to GSA 
officials, in November 2009, the two agencies have met to start 
working through the MOA section by section, and as of early March 2010 
they have had four working group sessions and are anticipating an 
initial agreed upon draft in late spring 2010. In the absence of a 
clearly defined and enforced MOA, FPS officials told us they feel they 
are limited in their ability to protect GSA properties. 

Additionally, in 2009, we reported that tenant agencies have mixed 
views about some of the services they pay FPS to provide.[Footnote 11] 
For example, according to our generalizable survey of tenant agencies, 

* About 82 percent of FPS's customers indicated they do not use FPS as 
their primary law enforcement agency in emergency situations, and said 
they primarily rely on other agencies such as local law enforcement, 
the U.S. Marshals Service, or the Federal Bureau of Investigation; 18 
percent rely on FPS. 

* About one-third of FPS's customers indicated that they were 
satisfied with FPS's level of communication, one-third were neutral or 
dissatisfied, while the remaining one-third could not comment on how 
satisfied or dissatisfied they were with FPS's level of communication 
on various topics including building security assessments, threats to 
their facility, and security guidance This response that suggests that 
the division of roles and responsibilities between FPS and its 
customers is unclear. 

Our survey also suggests that this lack of clarity is partly due to 
the little or no interaction customers have with FPS officers. 
Examples are as follows: 

* A respondent in a leased facility commented that FPS has very 
limited resources, and the resources that are available are assigned 
to the primary federally owned building in the region. 

* A respondent remembered only one visit from an FPS officer in the 
last 12 years. 

FPS Is Taking Steps to Better Protect Federal Facilities: 

Over the past 5 years, we have conducted a body of work reviewing the 
operations of FPS and its ability to adequately protect federal 
facilities and we have made numerous recommendations to address these 
challenges. For example, we recommended FPS improve its effective long-
term human capital planning, clarify roles and responsibilities of 
local law enforcement agencies in regard to responding to incidents at 
GSA facilities, develop and implement performance measures in various 
aspects of its operations, and improve its data collection and quality 
across its operations. While FPS has generally agreed with all of our 
recommendations, it has not completed many related corrective actions. 

At the request of Congress we are in the process of evaluating some of 
FPS's most recent actions. For example, FPS is developing the Risk 
Assessment and Management Program (RAMP), which could enhance its 
approach to assessing risk, managing human capital, and measuring 
performance. With regard to improving the effectiveness of FPS's risk 
management approach and the quality of FSAs, FPS believes RAMP will 
provide inspectors with the information needed to make more informed 
and defensible recommendations for security countermeasures. FPS also 
anticipates that RAMP will allow inspectors to obtain information from 
one electronic source, generate reports automatically, track selected 
countermeasures throughout their life cycle, and address some concerns 
about the subjectivity inherent in FSAs. 

In response to our July 2009 testimony, FPS took a number of immediate 
actions with respect to contract guard management. For example, the 
Director of FPS instructed Regional Directors to accelerate the 
implementation of FPS's requirement that two guard posts at Level IV 
facilities be inspected weekly. FPS also required more X-ray and 
magnetometer training for inspectors and guards. 

To improve its coordination with GSA, the FPS Director and the 
Director of GSA's Public Buildings Service Building Security and 
Policy Division participate in an ISC executive steering committee, 
which sets the committee's priorities and agendas for ISC's quarterly 
meetings. Additionally, FPS and GSA have established an Executive 
Advisory Council to enhance the coordination and communication of 
security strategies, policies, guidance, and activities with tenant 
agencies in GSA buildings. This council could enhance communication 
and coordination between FPS and GSA, and provide a vehicle for FPS, 
GSA, and tenant agencies to work together to identify common problems 
and devise solutions. 

We plan to provide Congress with our final reports on FPS's oversight 
of its contract guard program and our other ongoing FPS work later 
this year. 

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy 
to respond to any questions you or other members of the committee may 
have at this time. 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

For further information on this testimony, please contact me at (202) 
512-2834 or by e-mail at goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions 
to this testimony include Tammy Conquest, Assistant Director; Tida 
Barakat; Jonathan Carver; Delwen Jones; and Susan Michal-Smith. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 22, 
2009). 

[2] 40 U.S.C ß 1315. 

[3] This testimony draws upon six primary sources. We reported on 
FPS's allocation of resources using risk management, leveraging of 
technology, and information sharing and coordination in GAO, Homeland 
Security: Greater Attention to Key Practices Would Improve the Federal 
Protective Service's Approach to Facility Protection, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-142] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 23, 
2009), and GAO, Homeland Security: Greater Attention to Key Practices 
Would Help Address Security Vulnerabilities at Federal Buildings, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-236T] (Washington, 
D.C.: Nov. 18, 2009). We reported on FPS's strategic management of 
human capital in GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service 
Has Taken Some Initial Steps to Address its Challenges, but 
Vulnerabilities Still Exist, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-1047T] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 
2009); GAO, Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal 
Protective Service's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered 
By Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-859T] (Washington, D.C.: July 8, 
2009); and GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Should 
Improve Human Capital Planning and Better Communicate with Tenants, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-749] (Washington, D.C.: 
July 30, 2009). We reported on FPS's performance measurement and 
testing in GAO, Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service 
Faces Several Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal 
Facilities, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-683] 
(Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008). 

[4] Tenant agencies are also referred to as FPS's customers. 

[5] Historically, FPS has not shared its security assessments with GSA 
or tenant agencies, but it instead provided an executive summary. 
However, in his November 2009 testimony, FPS's Director stated this 
will change with the implementation of FPS's new security assessment 
tool, Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP), and that the 
security assessment would be fully disclosed and shared with GSA. 

[6] This mandate has been included in FPS's annual appropriations acts 
for fiscal years 2008, 2009, and 2010. Appropriations are presumed to 
be annual appropriations and applicable to the fiscal year unless 
specified to the contrary. See Pub. L. No. 110-161, Division E, 121 
Stat. 1844, 2051-2052 (2007); Pub. L. No. 110-329, Division D, 122 
Stat. 3574, 3659-3660 (2008); and Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2142, 
2156-2157 (2009). 

[7] This model was intended to make more efficient use of FPS's 
declining staffing levels by increasing focus on FPS's physical 
security duties and consolidating law enforcement activities. FPS's 
goal was to shift its law enforcement workforce composition from a mix 
of about 40 percent police officers, about 50 percent inspectors, and 
about 10 percent special agents, to a workforce primarily composed of 
inspectors and some special agents. 

[8] Under the Assimilative Crimes Act, state law may be assimilated to 
fill gaps in federal criminal law where the federal government has 
concurrent jurisdiction with the state. 18 U.S.C. ß13. 

[9] The level of security FPS provides at each of the 9,000 federal 
facilities varies depending on the building's security level. Based on 
the Department of Justice's (DOJ) 1985 "Vulnerability Assessment 
Guidelines," there are five types of security levels. A level I 
facility is typically a small storefront-type operation such as 
military recruiting office that has 10 or fewer employees and a low 
volume of public contact. A level II facility has from 11 to 150 
employees, a level III facility has from 151 to 450 employees and 
moderate to high volume of public contact, a level IV facility has 
over 450 employees, a high volume of public contact, and includes high-
risk law enforcement and intelligence agencies. FPS does not have 
responsibility for level V facilities which include the White House 
and the Central Intelligence Agency. The ISC has recently promulgated 
new security level standards that will supersede the 1995 DOJ 
standards. 

[10] At each guard post, FPS maintains a book, referred to as post 
orders, that describes the duties that guards are to perform while on 
duty. 

[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-749]. 

[End of section] 

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