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entitled 'Homeland Security: Prospects For Biometric US-VISIT Exit 
Capability Remain Unclear' which was released on June 28, 2007. 

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United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

Testimony before the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global 
Counterterrorism, Committee on Homeland Security, House of 
Representatives: 

For Release on Delivery: 

Expected at 1 p.m. EDT Thursday, June 28, 2007: 

Homeland Security: 

Prospects For Biometric US-VISIT Exit Capability Remain Unclear: 

Statement of Randolph C. Hite, Director: 
Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues: 

Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director: 
Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

GAO-07-1044T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-1044T, a report to Subcommittee on Border, 
Maritime and Global Counterterrorism, Committee on Homeland Security, 
House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has spent and continues to 
invest hundreds of millions of dollars each year in its U.S. Visitor 
and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US VISIT) program to 
collect, maintain, and share information on selected foreign nationals 
who enter and exit the United States at over 300 air, sea, and land 
ports of entry (POEs). The program uses biometric identifiers (digital 
finger scans and photographs) to screen people against watch lists and 
to verify that a visitor is the person who was issued a visa or other 
travel document. 

GAOís testimony addresses the status of US-VISIT entry and exit 
capabilities and DHSís management of past and future exit efforts. In 
developing its testimony, GAO drew from eight prior reports on US-VISIT 
as well as ongoing work for the committee. 

What GAO Found: 

After investing about $1.3 billion over 4 years, DHS has delivered 
essentially one half of US VISIT, meaning that biometrically enabled 
entry capabilities are operating at almost 300 air, sea, and land POEs 
but comparable exit capabilities are not. To the departmentís credit, 
operational entry capabilities have reportedly produced results, 
including more than 1,500 people having adverse actions, such as denial 
of entry, taken against them. However, DHS still does not have the 
other half of US-VISIT (an operational exit capability) despite the 
fact that its funding plans have allocated about one-quarter of a 
billion dollars since 2003 to exit-related efforts. During this time, 
GAO has continued to cite weaknesses in how DHS is managing US VISIT in 
general, and the exit side of US-VISIT in particular, and has made 
numerous recommendations aimed at better ensuring that the program 
delivers clearly defined and adequately justified capabilities and 
benefits on time and within budget. 

The prospects for successfully delivering an operational exit solution 
are as uncertain today as they were 4 years ago. The departmentís 
latest available documentation indicates that little has changed in how 
DHS is approaching its definition and justification of future US-VISIT 
exit efforts. Specifically, DHS has indicated that it intends to spend 
$27.3 million ($7.3 million in fiscal year 2007 funding and $20 million 
in fiscal year 2006 carryover funding) on air and sea exit 
capabilities. However, it has not produced either plans or analyses 
that adequately define and justify how it intends to invest these 
funds. Rather, it has only described in general terms near term 
deployment plans for biometric exit capabilities at air and sea POEs, 
and acknowledged that a near-term biometric solution for land POEs is 
not possible. Beyond this high-level schedule, no other exit program 
plans are available that define what will be done by what entities and 
at what cost. 

In the absence of more detailed plans and justification governing its 
exit intentions, it is unlikely that the departmentís latest efforts to 
deliver near term air and sea exit capabilities will produce results 
different from the past. Therefore, the prospects for having 
operational exit capabilities continue to be unclear. Moreover, the 
longer the department goes without exit capabilities, the more its 
ability to effectively and efficiently perform its border security and 
immigration enforcement missions will suffer. Among other things, this 
means that DHS cannot ensure the integrity of the immigration system by 
identifying and removing those people who have overstayed their 
original period of admission, which is a stated goal of US-VISIT. 
Further, DHS immigration and customs enforcement entities will continue 
to spend limited resources on investigating potential visa violators 
who have already left the country. 

What GAO Recommends: 

In light of the departmentís longstanding challenges in delivering an 
operational exit capability and the uncertainty surrounding its future 
exit efforts, GAO urges the department to approach its latest attempt 
at deploying mission critical exit capabilities with the kind of rigor 
and discipline that GAO has previously recommended. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1044T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Randy Hite at (202) 512-
3439 or hiter@gao.gov, or Rich Stana at (202) 512-8777 or 
stanar@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee, 

We appreciate the opportunity to participate in the subcommittee's 
hearing focusing on the exit side of the United States Visitor and 
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT). As you know, US-VISIT 
is a multibillion dollar program of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) that is to, among other things, enhance the security of our 
citizens and visitors and ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration 
system. To achieve these goals, US-VISIT is to record certain 
travelers'[Footnote 1] entry and exit to and from the United States at 
over 300 ports of entry (POEs), verify their identity, and determine 
their compliance with the terms of their admission and stay. 

Since fiscal year 2002, we have produced eight reports that have 
identified fundamental challenges that DHS continues to face in 
defining and justifying the program's future direction and delivering 
program capabilities and benefits on time and within cost.[Footnote 2] 
Our testimony today draws on the above cited reports as well as our 
ongoing work for the House Committee on Homeland Security on the 
definition and completion of US-VISIT's strategic solution. All the 
work on which this testimony is based was performed in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. 

In summary, DHS has invested about $1.3 billion over 4 years and 
delivered basically one-half of US-VISIT, meaning that biometrically 
enabled entry capabilities are operating at almost 300 air, sea, and 
land POEs, but comparable exit capabilities are not. Moreover, the 
prospects for this changing are essentially as uncertain today as they 
were 4 years ago, despite the fact that the department's funding plans 
have provided about one-quarter of a billion dollars to exit-related 
efforts. During this time, we have continued to cite weaknesses in how 
DHS was managing US-VISIT in general, and the program's exit capability 
in particular, and have made numerous recommendations aimed at better 
ensuring that the program delivered clearly defined and adequately 
justified capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. Today, 
as DHS embarks on yet another attempt to deliver long-overdue exit 
capabilities, these recommendations still apply. Unless the department 
implements them, it runs the serious risk of repeating the mistakes it 
made on prior exit efforts and producing similar results. Accordingly, 
we urge the department to approach its latest attempt at deploying 
mission critical exit capabilities in the kind of rigorous and 
disciplined fashion that we have recommended. If it does not, the 
prospects for having an operational exit capability will be diminished, 
which in turn will limit the department's ability to effectively and 
efficiently perform its border security and immigration enforcement 
missions. 

Background: 

US-VISIT is a governmentwide program intended to enhance the security 
of U.S. citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate travel and trade, 
ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and protect the 
privacy of our visitors. To achieve its goals, US-VISIT is to collect, 
maintain, and share information on certain foreign nationals who enter 
and exit the United States; detect fraudulent travel documents, verify 
traveler identity, and determine traveler admissibility through the use 
of biometrics; facilitate information sharing and coordination within 
the immigration and border management community; and identify foreign 
nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the terms of their 
admission; (2) may be eligible to receive, extend, or adjust their 
immigration status; or (3) should be apprehended or detained by law 
enforcement officials. The scope of the program includes the pre-entry, 
entry, status, and exit of hundreds of millions of foreign national 
travelers who enter and leave the United States at over 300 air, sea, 
and land POEs. 

The US-VISIT program office is responsible for managing the 
acquisition, deployment, operation, and sustainment of US-VISIT systems 
in support of such DHS agencies as Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). As of March 31, 2007, 
the program director reports to the Under Secretary for the National 
Protection and Programs Directorate. 

In 2003, DHS planned to deliver US-VISIT capability in 4 increments: 
Increment 1 (air and sea entry and exit), Increment 2 (land entry and 
exit), Increment 3 (land entry and exit), and Increment 4, which was to 
define, design, build, and implement a more strategic program 
capability. Since then the scope of the first three increments has 
changed. The current scope is Increment 1 (air and sea entry), 
Increment 2 (air, sea, and land entry), and Increment 3 (land entry). 
Increment 4 is still intended to define, design, build, and implement a 
more strategic program capability, which program officials stated will 
consist of a series of incremental releases or mission capability 
enhancements that will support business outcomes. In Increments 1 
through 3, the program has built interfaces among existing ("legacy") 
systems, enhanced the capabilities of these systems, and deployed these 
capabilities to air, sea, and land POEs. These first three increments 
have been largely pursued through existing system contracts and task 
orders. Increment 4 strategic system enhancements are being pursued 
through a systems integration contract awarded to Accenture and its 
partners in May 2004. 

Through fiscal year 2007, about $1.7 billion has been appropriated for 
US-VISIT. According to the Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act, 2007,[Footnote 3] DHS may not obligate $200 million 
of the $362.494 million appropriated for US-VISIT in fiscal year 2007 
until DHS provides the Senate and House Committees with a plan for 
expenditure that meets several criteria. The department has requested 
$462 million in fiscal year 2008 for the program. As of January 31, 
2007, program officials stated that about $1.3 billion has been 
obligated for US-VISIT activities. 

US-VISIT Entry Is Operating at Most POEs: 

A biometrically enabled US-VISIT entry capability is operating at most 
POEs. On January 5, 2004, the program office deployed and began 
operating most aspects of its planned biometric entry capability at 115 
airports and 14 seaports for certain foreign nationals, including those 
from visa waiver countries.[Footnote 4] As of December 2006, the 
program office also deployed and began operating this entry capability 
in the secondary inspection areas of 154 of 170 land POEs. According to 
program officials, 14 of the remaining 16 POEs have no operational need 
to deploy US-VISIT because visitors subject to US-VISIT are, by 
regulation, not authorized to enter into the United States at these 
locations. The other two POEs do not have the necessary transmission 
lines to operate US-VISIT, and thus they process visitors manually. 

According to DHS, these entry capabilities have produced results. For 
example, as of June 15, 2007, it had more than 7,600 biometric hits in 
primary entry resulting in more than 1,500 people having adverse 
actions, such as denial of entry, taken against them. Further, about 
14,000 leads were referred to ICE's immigration enforcement unit, 
resulting in 315 arrests.[Footnote 5] Another potential consequence is 
the deterrent effect of having an operational entry capability. 
Although deterrence is difficult to demonstrate, officials have cited 
it as a byproduct of having a publicized capability at the border to 
screen entry on the basis of identity verification and matching against 
watch lists of known and suspected terrorists. 

Despite Expending Considerable Time and Resources, US-VISIT Exit Is Not 
Operational: 

Over the last few years, DHS has devoted considerable time and 
resources towards establishing an operational exit capability at air, 
sea, and land POEs. For example, between 2003 and 2006, DHS reports 
allocating about $250 million[Footnote 6] for exit-related efforts. 
Notwithstanding this considerable investment of time and resources, DHS 
still does not have an operational exit capability. Our prior reports 
have raised a number of concerns about DHS's management of US-VISIT's 
exit efforts. 

As we and others have reported,[Footnote 7] the absence of a biometric 
exit capability raises questions about what meaningful US-VISIT data 
are available to DHS components, such as ICE. Without this exit 
capability, DHS cannot ensure the integrity of the immigration system 
by identifying and removing those people who have overstayed their 
original period of admission--a stated goal of US-VISIT. Further, ICE's 
efforts to ensure the integrity of the immigration system could be 
degraded if it continues to spend its limited resources on 
investigating potential visa violators who have already left the 
country. 

Air and Sea Exit Efforts Have Not Been Managed Well: 

Between January 2004 and May 2007, the program office conducted various 
exit pilots at one air and one sea POE without fully deploying a 
biometric exit capability. Throughout this period, we have reported on 
the limitations in how these pilot activities were planned, defined, 
and justified. For example, we reported in September 2003,[Footnote 8] 
prior to the pilots being deployed, that DHS had not economically 
justified the initial US-VISIT increment (which was to include an exit 
capability at air and sea POEs) on the basis of benefits, costs, and 
risks. As a result, we recommended that DHS determine whether proposed 
incremental capabilities would produce value commensurate with program 
costs and risks. We later reported in May 2004[Footnote 9] that DHS had 
not deployed a biometric exit capability to the 80 air and 14 sea POEs 
as part of Increment 1 deployment in December 2003, as it had 
originally intended. Instead, as we mention above, the pilot exit 
capability was deployed to only one air and one sea POE on January 5, 
2004. 

In February 2005, we reported[Footnote 10] that the program office had 
not adequately planned for evaluating its exit pilot at air and sea 
POEs because the pilot's evaluation scope and time line were 
compressed, and thus would not provide the program office with 
sufficient information to adequately assess the pilots and permit the 
selection of the best exit solution for deployment. Accordingly, we 
recommended that the program office reassess its plans for deploying an 
exit capability to ensure that the scope of the pilot provided an 
adequate evaluation of alternatives. 

A year later in February 2006, we reported[Footnote 11] that the 
program office had extended the pilot from 5 to 11 POEs (nine airports 
and two seaports) and the time frame by an additional 7 months. 
Notwithstanding the expanded scope and time frame, the exit pilots were 
not sufficiently evaluated. In particular, on average only about 24 
percent of those travelers subject to US-VISIT actually complied with 
the exit processing steps. The evaluation report attributed this, in 
part, to the fact that compliance during the pilot was voluntary, and 
that to achieve the desired compliance rate, the exit solution would 
need an enforcement mechanism, such as not allowing persons to reenter 
the United States if they do not comply with the exit process. Despite 
this limitation, as of February 2006, program officials had not 
conducted any formal evaluation of enforcement mechanisms or their 
possible effect on compliance or cost, and according to the then Acting 
Program Director, no such evaluation would be done. Nonetheless, DHS 
continued to operate the exit pilots. 

In February 2006, we also reported that while DHS had analyzed the 
cost, benefits, and risks for its air and sea exit capability, the 
analyses did not demonstrate that the program was producing or would 
produce mission value commensurate with expected costs and benefits, 
and the costs upon which the analyses were based were not reliable. A 
year later, we reported[Footnote 12] that DHS had not adequately 
defined and justified its past investment in its air and sea exit 
pilots and its land exit demonstration projects, and still did not have 
either an operational exit capability or a viable exit solution to 
deploy. We further noted that exit-related program documentation did 
not adequately define what work was to be done or what these efforts 
would accomplish, did not describe measurable outcomes from the pilot 
or demonstration efforts, and did not indicate the related cost, 
schedule, and capability commitments that would be met. We recommended 
that planned expenditures be limited for exit pilots and demonstration 
projects until such investments were economically justified and until 
each investment had a well-defined evaluation plan. In its comments on 
our report, DHS agreed with our recommendation. 

Land Exit Efforts Have Not Produced a Viable Solution: 

In January 2004, DHS committed to delivering a biometric exit 
capability by December 2005; however, we reported[Footnote 13] that 
program officials concluded in January 2005 that a biometric land exit 
capability could not be implemented without having a major impact on 
land POE facilities. According to these officials, the only proven 
technology available to biometrically verify individuals upon exit at 
land POEs would necessitate mirroring the entry processes,which the 
program reported was "an infeasible alternative for numerous reasons, 
including but not limited to, the additional staffing demands, new 
infrastructure requirements, and potential trade and commerce 
impacts."[Footnote 14] 

In light of these constraints, the program office tested radio 
frequency identification (RFID) technology[Footnote 15] as a means of 
recording visitors as they exit at land POEs. However, this technology 
was not biometrics-based. Moreover, testing and analysis at five land 
POEs at the northern and southern borders identified numerous 
performance and reliability problems, such as the failure of RFID 
readers to detect a majority of travelers' tags during testing. 

According to program officials, no technology or device currently 
exists to biometrically verify persons exiting the country that would 
not have a major impact on land POE facilities. They added that 
technological advances over the next 5 to 10 years will make it 
possible to biometrically verify persons exiting the country without 
major changes to facility infrastructure and without requiring those 
exiting to stop and/or exit their vehicles. 

In November 2006, during the course of our work on, among other things, 
the justification for ongoing land exit demonstration projects, DHS 
terminated these projects. In our view, the decision was warranted 
because DHS had not adequately defined and justified its investment in 
its pilots and demonstration projects. As noted earlier, we recommended 
in February 2007, that planned expenditures be limited for exit pilots 
and demonstration projects until such investments are economically 
justified and until each investment has a well-defined evaluation plan. 
DHS agreed with our recommendation. 

Lack of Definition and Justification of Future US-VISIT Exit 
Capabilities Risks Repeating Past Mistakes: 

According to relevant federal guidance,[Footnote 16] the decision to 
invest in a system or system component should be based on a clear 
definition of what capabilities, involving what stakeholders, will be 
delivered according to what schedule and at what cost. Moreover, such 
investment decisions should be based on reasonable assurance that a 
proposed program will produce mission value commensurate with expected 
costs and risks. As noted earlier, DHS funding plans have collectively 
allocated about $250 million to a number of exit efforts through 2006, 
but without having adequately defined or economically justified them. 
Now, in 2007, it risks repeating these same mistakes as it embarks on 
yet another attempt to implement a means by which to biometrically 
track certain foreign nationals exiting the United States, first at 
airports, and then at seaports, with land exit capabilities being 
deferred to an unspecified future time. 

Based on the department's latest available documentation, it intends to 
spend $27.3 million ($7.3 million in fiscal year 2007 funding and $20 
million in fiscal year 2006 carryover funding) on air and sea exit 
capabilities. However, it has not produced either the plans or the 
analyses that adequately define and justify how it intends to invest 
these funds. Rather, it has only generally described near-term 
deployment plans for biometric exit capabilities at air and sea POEs, 
and acknowledged that a near-term biometric solution for land POEs is 
not possible. 

More specifically, the US-VISIT fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan 
states that DHS will begin the process of planning and designing an air 
and sea exit solution during fiscal year 2007, focusing initially on 
air exit and then emulating these technology and operational 
experiences in completing the sea exit solution. According to this 
plan, air exit efforts will begin during the third quarter of fiscal 
year 2007, which ends in 2 days. However, US-VISIT program officials 
told us as recently as three weeks ago that this deadline will not be 
met. 

Moreover, no exit program plans are available that define what will be 
done, by what entities, and at what cost to define, acquire, deliver, 
deploy, and operate this capability, including plans describing 
expected system capabilities, defining measurable outcomes (benefits 
and results), identifying key stakeholder (e.g., airlines) roles/ 
responsibilities and buy-in, and coordinating and aligning with related 
programs. Further, there is no analysis available comparing the life 
cycle costs of the air exit solution to its expected benefits and 
risks. The only additional information available to date is what the 
department characterized as a high-level schedule for air exit that we 
obtained on June 11, 2007. This schedule shows that business 
requirements and a concept of operations are to be completed by 
September 3, 2007; a cost-benefit analysis is to be completed by 
October 1, 2007; testing is to be completed by October 1, 2008; and the 
exit solution is to be fully deployed in 2 years (June 2009). However, 
the schedule does not include the underlying details supporting the 
timelines for such areas of activity as system design, system 
development, and system testing. According to program officials, more 
detailed schedules exist but were not provided to us because the 
schedules had not yet been approved by DHS. 

Further, while the expenditure plan states that DHS plans to integrate 
the air exit solution with the commercial airlines' existing check-in 
processes and to integrate US-VISIT's efforts with CBP's pre-departure 
Advance Passenger Information System and the Transportation Security 
Administration's (TSA's) Secure Flight,[Footnote 17] the program office 
did not provide any documentation that describes what has been done 
with regard to these plans or what is planned relative to engaging with 
and obtaining buy-in from the airlines. Nevertheless, DHS plans to 
issue a proposed regulation requiring airlines to participate in this 
effort by December 17, 2007. 

With regard to land exit, the future is even more unclear. According to 
the fiscal year 2007 expenditure plan, the department has concluded 
that a biometric land exit capability is not practical in the short 
term because of the costly expansion of existing exit capacity, 
including physical infrastructure, land acquisition, and staffing. As a 
result, DHS states an intention to begin matching entry and exit 
records using biographic information in instances where no current 
collection exists today, such as in the case of individuals who do not 
submit their Form I-94 upon departure. According to DHS, it has also 
initiated discussions with its Canadian counterparts about the 
potential for them to collect biographical exit data at entry into 
Canada. Such a solution could include data sharing between the two 
countries and would require significant discussions on specific data 
elements and the means of collection and sharing, including technical, 
policy, and legal issues associated with this approach. However, DHS 
has yet to provide us with any documentation that specifies what data 
elements would be collected or what technical, policy, and legal issues 
would need to be addressed. Further, according to DHS, it has not yet 
determined a time frame or any cost estimates for the initiation of 
such a non-biometric land exit solution. 

In closing, we would like to emphasize the mission importance of a cost 
effective, biometrically enabled exit capability, and that delivering 
such a capability requires effective planning and justification, and 
rigorous and disciplined system acquisition management. To date, these 
activities have not occurred for DHS's exit efforts. If this does not 
change, there is no reason to expect that DHS's newly launched efforts 
to deliver an air and sea exit solution will produce results different 
from its past efforts--namely, no operational exit solution despite 
many years and hundreds of millions of dollars of investment. More 
importantly, the continued absence of an exit capability will hinder 
DHS's ability to effectively and efficiently perform its border 
security and immigration enforcement mission. Hence, it is important 
that DHS approach its latest attempt to deploy its exit capabilities in 
the kind of rigorous and disciplined fashion that we have previously 
recommended. 

Madam Chairwoman, this concludes our statement. We would be happy to 
answer any questions that you or members of the subcommittee may have 
at this time. 

Contact and Acknowledgements: 

If you should have any questions about this testimony, please contact 
Randolph C. Hite at (202) 512-3439 or hiter@gao.gov, or Richard M. 
Stana at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. Other major contributors 
include Deborah Davis, Kory Godfrey, Daniel Gordon, David Hinchman, 
Kaelin Kuhn, John Mortin, and Amos Tevelow. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] US-VISIT applies to foreign travelers that enter the United States 
under a nonimmigrant visa or are traveling from a country that has a 
visa waiver agreement with the United States under the Visa Waiver 
Program. The Visa Waiver Program enables foreign nationals of certain 
countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business for 
stays of 90 days or less without obtaining a visa. 

[2] See, for example, GAO, Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border 
and Transportation Security Program Need to Be Addressed, GAO-03-1083 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2003); GAO, Border Security: US-VISIT 
Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and Technological Challenges at 
Land Ports of Entry, GAO-07-248 (Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006); 
and GAO, Homeland Security: Planned Expenditures for U.S. Visitor and 
Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Adequately Defined and Justified, 
GAO-07-278 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2007). 

[3] Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355, 1357-58 (Oct. 4, 2006). 

[4] On September 30, 2004, US-VISIT expanded biometric entry procedures 
to include individuals from visa waiver countries applying for 
admission. 

[5] We did not verify this information. 

[6] As reported in the fiscal year 2005, revised 2006, and 2007 
expenditure plans. The fiscal year 2007 plan reported that of this 
amount, $53.1 million is still available as prior year carryover. 

[7] GAO-07-248 and Department of Homeland Security, Inspector General, 
Review of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Compliance 
Enforcement Unit, OIG-05-50 (September 2005). 

[8] GAO-03-1083. 

[9] GAO, Homeland Security: First Phase of Visitor and Immigration 
Status Program Operating, but Improvements Needed, GAO-04-586 
(Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2004). 

[10] GAO, Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges 
Remain on U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 
Program, GAO-05-202 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2005). 

[11] GAO, Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Management of 
Key Border Security Program Need to Be Implemented, GAO-06-296 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2006). 

[12] GAO-07-278. 

[13] GAO-07-248. 

[14] US-VISIT, Increment 2C Operational Alternatives Assessment--FINAL 
(Rosslyn, Va.: Jan. 31, 2005). 

[15] RFID technology can be used to electronically identify and gather 
information contained on a tag--in this case, a unique identifying 
number embedded in a tag on a visitor's arrival/departure form--which 
an electronic reader at the POE is to detect. 

[16] See, for example, OMB Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, 
and Execution of the Budget (June 2006). 

[17] The Advanced Passenger Information System captures arrival and 
departure manifest information provided by air and sea carriers. Secure 
Flight is a program being developed by TSA for domestic flights to 
prescreen passengers or match passenger information against terrorist 
watch lists to identify individuals who should undergo additional 
security scrutiny. 

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